OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

Manners, Government, and Policy

OF THE

G R E E K S.

TRANSLATED FROM

The French of the Learned Abbé *Mably*.

WITH

NOTES and ILLUSTRATIONS.

By Mr. CHAMBERLAND.

Quid deceat, quid non, quo Virtus, quo ferat Error.

HOR.

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OBSERVATIONS

OBSERVATIONS ON THE Manners, the Government, and Policy OF THE GREEKS.

BOOK I.

HISTORY repreſents the firſt inhabitants of Greece as wandering tribes, moving from one part of the country to another, unconnected by ſocial intercourſe; and who, diſtracting each other, through mutual diſtruſt appeared conſtantly armed. Such are at this day the Savages of America, who have not been humanized by their commerce with the Europeans. Force was the ſole arbitrator of right and wrong; and the ſtrong tyrannized over the weak. As they

ſubſiſted wholly on plunder, the earth remained uncultivated; for no one felt a deſire to amaſs wealth which muſt have been defended from robbers, whom the ſight of it would have rendered more enterprizing. Whatever ills, however, the Grecians brought on themſelves, they were not their greateſt enemies. If we may believe their hiſtorians, the inhabitants of the adjoining Iſles, ſtill more barbarous than their neighbours, made frequent deſcents on the coaſts of Greece, where they ravaged every thing, and were not ſeldom drawn by the luſt of plunder, or rather devaſtation, into the interior parts of the country.

Some writers have extended their inquiries beyond theſe barbarous ages; and *Dicearchus*, who, in the judgement of *Porphiry*, excelled even the Philoſophers in the fidelity with which he painted the manners of the firſt Grecians, has repreſented them as a nation of ſages who led a tranquil and blameleſs life; while the earth, attentive to their wants, poured forth her ſtores without meaſure and without toil. This age of

gold,

gold, which never ought to have exiſted but in the reveries of poets, was a tenet of the ancient Philoſophy. Plato, in his Commonwealth, deſcribes the empire of juſtice amongſt the firſt men: but we know what degree of credibility is to be given to thoſe beds of verdure, thoſe crowns of flowers, thoſe celeſtial concerts, and thoſe vacant and agreeable moments, which conſtituted the happineſs of a ſociety, where the paſſions were unknown.

While the Second Minos reigned in Crete, Greece was freed from a part of the calamities that afflicted her. From the time that the Grandfather of this Prince had taught his ſubjects to find their happineſs in their obedience to the Laws, to whoſe wiſdom all antiquity looked up with reſpectful admiration, the Cretans, proud of their polity, could not forbear to deſpiſe their neighbours, while the conſciouſneſs of their ſuperiour ſtrength, inſpired them with ambition. Minos the Second, ſtill more ambitious than his people, was not ſlow to avail himſelf of this favourable diſ-

poſition; he conſtructed ſhips, exerciſed his people in the art of navigation, conquered the neighbouring Iſles, and eſtabliſhed in them colonies of Cretans.

As it was his intereſt to maintain a free communication between the different parts of his empire, he cleared the ſea of the pirates that infeſted it; and the happineſs which he thus procured to his ſubjects, inſenſibly involved in it that of all Greece. It is not unlikely that this firſt taſte of tranquillity gave the Grecians an idea of improving it. But whether fear alone was the motive that firſt aſſociated ſeveral families, and inſtructed them to guard againſt inſults, by defending the avenues of their habitations; or whether they owed this wiſe inſtitution to any of the Demi-gods, ſo common in thoſe barbarous ages; certain it is, that, from this time, pillaging became a more difficult, as well as more dangerous occupation. The Ravagers, deceived in their hopes, learned to have leſs confidence in their power, and finding themſelves often without reſources, were finally compelled

pelled to ſeek for ſuſtenance from the labour of their own hands: they attached themſelves to a certain ſpot; all the Grecians by degrees, acquired ſettled habitations, and their new courſe of life gave them new views and new diſpoſitions.

The Athenians, ſays Thucidides, were the firſt who renounced their wandering life.* As Attica was by no means a fertile country, the Grecians who took refuge in it, were leſs expoſed to the incurſions of Strangers; thus they were indebted to their poverty for an uninterrupted peace, which continually allured to them new inhabitants. Their paſſions, which now began to develop themſelves, ſoon gave birth to induſtry and legiſlation, while their knowledge, which

* Cecrops, a native of Egypt, led a Colony of his Countrymen into Greece, ſettled in Attica, and founded the kingdom of Athens. He divided the country into twelve diſtricts, and aſſumed the name of King. He pitched on a hill, in the midſt of a large plain, for the foundation of his City, and built the Citadel on the Rock in which the hill terminated. He eſtabliſhed a Religion amongſt his ſubjects, and inſtituted a particular form of worſhip to Jupiter and Minerva. The Areopagus, a kind of Senate, which aſſembled and held its deliberations upon a hill near the Citadel, conſecrated to Mars, was alſo inſtituted by Cecrops. This Tribunal was afterwards rendered by Solon the moſt famous in the world.

increaſed with their neceſſities, diffuſed itſelf from community to community, until it totally pervaded Greece.

Hiſtory is profoundly ſilent on what may be called the ſecond ſituation of the Grecians, when every hamlet conſtituted an independent community; or if it is any where mentioned, it is ſo debaſed with the marvellous as to forfeit all claim to belief. It is certain, however, that they joined at length in one common enterprize, the Siege of Troy. The little that we can collect from Homer is, that theſe different ſocieties believed they had the ſame origin, that they were but rude in the art of war, yet had made a conſiderable progreſs in the ſciences that regard the law of nations and of government, though their manners were yet exceedingly barbarous.

Immediately after the Trojan expedition, Greece became again the theatre of various revolutions: the war had ſwept off thouſands of its inhabitants, and other thouſands were expelled from the ſoil which they had juſt begun to ſtyle their country. It was thus that

that the Beotians, driven from Arna by the Theſſalians, eſtabliſhed themſelves in Cadmis, to which they gave their name. The whole appearance of Peloponeſus was changed by the reſtoration of the deſcendants of Hercules: the inhabitants of this Province, either terrified or vanquiſhed, abandoned their country; and the very men who were incapable of defending their old poſſeſſions, ſhewed ſufficient reſolution and bravery in the conqueſt of a new territory. Greece was over-run with troops of adventurers, who aſpired to procure an aſylum for themſelves by violence, and who could only be ſupported by plunder. War, indeed, in thinning their numbers, eſtabliſhed ſome appearance of order and tranquillity: but it had unhappily multiplied the ſources of enmity, and accuſtomed them to liſten to nothing but the firſt tranſports of paſſion, and to ſeize the ſlighteſt pretence to ravage the territories of their neighbours.

In proportion as the conſequences of theſe diſſenſions were pernicious, Greece perceived the depth of barbarity in which ſhe was

a ſecond

a ſecond time ingulphed: her inhabitants being as yet uninfluenced by motives of ambition, it was impoſſible they ſhould not have been wearied with the miſeries of a continual warfare. Different communities accuſtomed themſelves to treat together, and intereſt taught them to be juſt: they now began to cultivate the lands which they regarded as their inheritance, with leſs reluctancy, and having learnt from a tranſitory truce, the value of a laſting peace, they were conſequently ſtudious of the means, not only to procure, but to confirm it.

As the ſoldiers were loſt in the citizens, they felt new wants, and were ſwayed by new intereſts: they perceived the inſufficiency of their ancient inſtitutions; they ſaw the propriety of making new Laws, and this change in the internal principles of their conſtitution ought naturally to occaſion domeſtic revolutions. It was now that their Kings, whoſe power had been almoſt unlimited, at the head of their armies, and who found themſelves reduced by peace to the functions of a ſimple Magiſtracy, proſtituted

tituted their influence to the aggrandizement of their own power, and endeavoured to deſpoil the people of their moſt valuable prerogatives, for the iniquitous purpoſe of exchanging their office of enforcers of the laws for that of Legiſlators. Ambition, united to ruſticity of manners, had not yet diſcovered the ſecret of diſguiſing herſelf with addreſs, of borrowing the maſk of moderation, and of preſſing to the goal through indirect and ſecret ways. Never, however, had ſhe greater need of thoſe arts. She raiſed againſt herſelf a race of poor but hardy warriors, whoſe courage was unbroken, and whoſe haughty ſpirits were as yet unblunted by that pernicious troop of wants and of paſſions which triumphed over and enſlaved their deſcendants.

Scarce had ſome of the cities ſhaken off their yoke, ere all Greece aſpired to be free. No ſociety thought it ſufficient for herſelf alone to be governed by her laws; ſhe was deſirous of communicating that happineſs; and whether ſhe thought her own liberty intereſted in the extirpation of tyranny from her

her neighbours, or only followed that enthuſiaſm to which we abandon ourſelves in the firſt tranſports of a revolution, ſhe offered her aſſiſtance to every community who wiſhed to rid herſelf of Monarchial government. The love of independence became the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of the Grecians. The very name of Royalty was odious to them; and one of their cities, oppreſſed by a tyrant, would have been eſteemed in ſome ſort an affront to the reſt of Greece.

The mutual ſervices which the Grecians rendered each other in the courſe of theſe revolutions, allayed the hatred that had divided them, and the intereſt of their common liberty ſcattered amongſt them the ſeeds of an union, for which they had been prepared by a variety of their ancient eſtabliſhments. They aſſembled together to offer the ſame ſacrifices to the ſame Gods; the Games which were celebrated at Olympia, at Corinth, and at Nemæa, were ſo many ſolemnities common to a great part of Greece, and a kind of congreſs in which they treated of their mutual intereſts, after having

having fulfilled the duties of religion. Several ſocieties, alarmed at their want of ſtrength, had already contracted defenſive alliances: they were witneſſes of the happy ſituation of the cities which compoſed the Amphictyonic league, and deſired to be admitted into it: thus, while they believed they were only putting their laws and their liberty under the protection of a powerful and reſpectable body, they began in effect to confound their intereſts, and to form one great Republick.

This league, one of the moſt ancient eſtabliſhments of Greece, was the work of Amphictyon, the third King of Athens. He united by the cloſeſt ties ſeveral of the neighbouring ſtates,* who ſent deputies every year to Delphos and Thermopilæ, to deliberate on their private and publick concerns: they bound themſelves by a ſolemn oath, never to injure, but on the contrary, always to

* We have no preciſe account who were the firſt ſtates that compoſed the Council of Amphictyons. In the moſt ancient liſt which is to come to us, we find the Tonians, Dorians, Magneſians, Phthyotæ, Phocians, Melians, Theſſalians, Beotians, Perrhœbeans, Locrians, Oetheans, and Dolopians.

contribute

contribute to the defence of each other, and to revenge in concert whatever inſult might be offered to the Temple of Delphos.

The Council of the Amphictyons, ſo laudable for its piety to the Gods, its prudence in preventing or terminating every diſpute among the ſeveral members of the league, its diſintereſtedneſs and impartial adminiſtration of juſtice to ſtrangers, undoubtedly communicated a portion of its ſpirit to all Greece, while it became, as it were, the general aſſembly of her ſtates. Let no one imagine, however, that it acted from this time with as much wiſdom as when it was compoſed of the delegates of a few cities; there are a thouſand Political inſtitutions, whoſe advantages are entirely loſt, the moment they are ſtretched beyond certain bounds. If the Grecians acquired ſomething of the mild and equitable manners of the Amphictyons, the Amphictyons acquired ſtill more of the inflexible and ferocious diſpoſitions of the Grecians. The avenues of their aſſembly, which had hitherto been ſhut againſt intrigue and cabal,

were

were neceſſarily thrown open,* the moment they admitted a number of Commonwealths unequal in ſtrength and credit: they owed their ſtrength to the unanimity of the Amphictyons; but this unanimity became almoſt impracticable, ſince their numbers had been ſo prodigiouſly augmented. As ſimple mediators, they might perhaps have impoſed their influence on allies who were fond of peace, and who had the ſame intereſt as themſelves to preſerve the aſcendency of the Council: but after the admiſſion of ſo many members, nothing could have ſupported its authority, but forming the whole aſſembly into a tribunal,† from whoſe ſentence there

* At the concluſion of the war with Xerxes, the Lacedæmonians demanded that the Amphictyons would baniſh from their Council, the deputies of thoſe cities which had deſerted the intereſt of their country, to embrace that of Perſia. Themiſtocles oppoſed this demand, apprehending, ſay the hiſtorians, that if the Argives, Theſſalians, and Thebans, nations ſtedfaſtly devoted to the intereſts of Athens, were excluded from the Council, the Lacedæmonians would have the advantage in plurality of votes, and become maſters in every queſtion.

† The *Oath* adminiſtered to the repreſentatives who compoſed the Council of the Amphictyons, clearly proves that each city in the league preſerved an entire independence: and that this Council, very nearly reſembling the general Diet of the Swiſs Cantons, had no right to make laws for each of the aſſociated cities, or to paſs a definitive judgement on their particular differences. Had

ſhould

ſhould lie no appeal, and which arming all Greece by a ſimple decree, might reduce to obedience every ſtate that diſputed its ſupremacy.

Happily for Greece, many cauſes concurred to preſerve that ſpirit of union which the Amphictyonick Council had inſpired, but which, from the nature of her conſtitution, it was incapable of maintaining. One of theſe cauſes was the cuſtom which they had long ſince imbibed, and which the cities of Greece ſtill preſerved, of diſburthening themſelves, by ſending colonies * of the citizens which they were

it enjoyed ſuch privelege, the Deputies would doubtleſs have bound themſelves to render juſtice without any regard to particular intereſts, and promiſed, in the name of their reſpective cities, to ſubmit to the determination of the Council.

* Politicians have, with juſt reaſon, condemned this cuſtom, ſince colonies were of no utility to the countries from whence they derived their origin. Beſides, the remoteneſs of ſituation, which neceſſitated them to regulate their conduct in conformity to their new intereſts, theſe emigrants frequently forgot their mother country; or maintained no other intercourſe with it than by Ambaſſadors, authoriſed to participate in the ſacrifices offered at certain ſolemnities. It is a known fact, that the Greeks eſtabliſhed in Italy and Sicily were abſolutely unintereſted in the affairs of Greece, who, in their turn, neglected and ſuffered them to fall a prey to the Carthagenians and Romans. It was impoſſible that the cities of Greece, in delivering themſelves from the burthen of their citizens, ſhould have been able to retain them in

unable

unable to ſupport, inſtead of availing themſelves of their ſtrength, to conquer other territories, which would have enriched their ſtate. This manner of proceeding kept every community in a condition rather unfavourable to the attempting of foreign conqueſts, and they became more and more ſenſible of their weakneſs, in proportion as their numbers were diminiſhed by war. Incapable from theſe cauſes of aggrandizing themſelves at the expence of each other, the Grecians never brought to their enterprizes the perſeverance neceſſary to complete the projects of an ambitious people; and although their diſſenſions were attended with ſome tranſient diſorder, they could not, nevertheleſs, make any alteration in the fundamental principles of their union.

While the weakneſs of Greece contributed to maintain the credit of the Amphictyonick Council, its authority acquired an additional ſtrength from the inteſtine di-

obedience. Theſe colonies muſt either form a government totally independent, or be degraded from the rank of citizens into that of ſubjects of Greece, ſince their diſtance would not admit of their having any ſhare in the publick adminiſtration.

viſions

viſions to which every State became a prey. The reader will do well to recollect, that, at the annihilation of Monarchy in Greece, chance alone had determined the ſpecies of government which ſucceeded it. Laws were haſtily and inconſiderately made; every one endeavoured to profit by the revolution, ſtudious to inveſt himſelf with authority, and all were diſſatisfied, when they came to examine their ſituation. Here, an overbearing and imperious Nobility wiſhed, under the ſanction of liberty, to become the tyrants of their country; there, an unquiet and inſolent Populace ſpurned at the laws, and diſdained to obey Magiſtrates; every where the avidity and injuſtice of rich and poor, afforded matter for reciprocal complaint. It was neceſſary then to frame new laws, to eſtabliſh liberty on a new foundation, to diſtribute the power among the different orders of the citizens, and to fix their rights and privileges. The Republicks wholly occupied on theſe objects by far more intereſting than any external concern, confined their cares to their domeſtick affairs

affairs only: it was now that they learnt to fear, to eſteem, to cultivate the friendſhip of each other, and theſe ſentiments united foſtered their growing union.

It is not improbable but that war was leſs pernicious in its conſequences to the Grecians now than formerly; but their Confederacy was ſtill very far from being as wiſely formed as might have been expected from an enlightened Polity. Inſtead of a due ſubordination which might have maintained order, aſſigned to the different States their proper ſtation in the Confederacy, and given them a chief without impoſing on them a maſter; the extreme equality which prevailed among them, neceſſarily gave riſe to continual diſputes, and involved them in all the miſeries of anarchy. Greece ſtood in want of a center of re-union more ſure than that of the Amphictyonic Council, whoſe authority might be ſuſpended by the ſimple diſſent of its members. It wanted, in one word, a maſter-ſpring which might regulate the movements of the whole ma-

chine, and as circumſtances required, retard or accelerate its operations.

This grand *deſideratum* was procured for the Grecians by Lycurgus, and the form of Government which he eſtabliſhed at Sparta, rendered him, in ſome ſort, the legiſlator of all Greece. When this great man ſaw himſelf at the head of his country, with the title of Regent, during the minority of his Royal Nephew, Lacedæmon was not in a more reſpectable condition than the other Grecian Republicks. Her Laws were treated with contempt; her two Kings were deſirous of reigning deſpotically, and her people, not content with being free, were equally deſirous of abuſing their freedom: thus the Government one while inclined towards tyranny, and one while ſunk into anarchy; according to the ability or the ſtrength of the community which had poſſeſſed itſelf of the Sovereign power.

Lycurgus did not imitate the other legiſlators of Greece, who, by endeavouring to find a medium capable of ſatisfying at once all

all the Citizens, produced a reformation which pleaſed no one, and left in all their ſtrength the ſeeds of future diſſenſions. It is the duty of the Politician who is charged to frame Laws for a great ſtate, to conſult particularly the manners and the prevailing diſpoſitions of the people; for the national genius will always be ſtronger than the Legiſlator; but when he has only to provide for a handful of people, who may be ſaid to compoſe one family within the walls of the ſame city, he needs not to proceed with the ſame circumſpection. Lycurgus oppoſed his own genius to that of the Spartans united: he did not believe it impracticable to intereſt them, either by hope or fear, to an immediate concurrence in the revolution he meditated; and he ventured to form the daring project of moulding them into a new people.

He permitted the double Royalty, which cuſtom had endeared to the Lacedæmonians, and which was then poſſeſſed by the two branches of the family of Hercules, ſtill to

ſubſiſt; but at the ſame time that he gave to thoſe Princes an abſolute power at the head of their armies, he reduced them, within the walls of Sparta, to the rank of private citizens, obedient to the Laws. It was in the hands of the people that Lycurgus placed the ſupreme authority; that is to ſay, the power of making laws, of decreeing war or peace, and of creating Magiſtrates: but that they might remain contented with theſe privileges, and not, under colour of preſerving their rights, become the ſlaves of a reſtleſs diſtruſt, which would have erected them into tyrants; he gave them Magiſtrates * who freed them from the continual ſolicitudes of watching over their own intereſts. He alſo created a Senate

* Plutarch is of opinion that King Theopompus 130 years after the death of Lycurgus, created the Ephori, in order to reduce the too exorbitant power of the Senate; but this opinion is not the moſt probable. What ever it may be, let us agree with Herodotus and Xenophon that their authority was very great and laſted one year only. During that time, they could oblige the inferior Magiſtrates, and even the Kings themſelves, to render an account of their Adminiſtration: they could arreſt and impriſon the perſons both of the Senators and of the Kings: a remarkable inſtance of this power happened afterwards in the caſe of Pauſaunias.

compoſed of the moſt venerable and the moſt experienced men * in the Republick. This reſpectable body exerciſed the offices of civil Magiſtrates, attended the council of the Kings, who were permitted to undertake nothing without their concurrence; and had alone the privilege of propoſing to the people the ſubjects on which it was thought neceſſary to deliberate.

The Republick of Lycurgus was then poſſeſſed of all the advantages in the different modes of Political Government. It was a Democracy exempt from thoſe defects which are ſo natural to it, becauſe in entruſting to particular Magiſtrates that part of the Government (the power of propoſing laws) which a free people knows not how to employ, and which it conſtantly abuſes, ſhe left to the Spartans the enjoyment of every bleſſing which the love of liberty and of one's country can confer on a popular

* Sixty was the neceſſary age for a ſeat in Senate, the number of Senators was twenty eight, and their ſeats for life. Their nomination was in the people, and every citizen had an equal claim to that honour.

Government. Irreſolution, caprice, paſſion, violence, in a word, none of the vices which diſtracted the reſt of Greece, where the people were the maſters, found admiſſion into the Spartan councils. Add to this that the power of the Kings and the authority of the Senate mutually balanced by each other, and both ſubmiſſive to the power of the people, ſo far from threatening any abuſe on their part, enriched, on the contrary, the Republick with advantages which have been thought the peculiar characteriſticks of Monarchy and Ariſtocracy. * The Senate rendered the people capable of knowing and diſcuſſing their true intereſts, of abiding by certain fixed and invariable principles, and of eternally preſerving their original ſpirit: the Kings, actually ſupreme at the head of their armies, procured for the Spartans that prompt and deciſive activity

* To aſk which is the beſt Government, either Monarchy, Ariſtocracy or Democracy, is to aſk what greater or leſs evils the paſſions of a King, of a Senate, or of a multitude can produce: to aſk whether a mixt Government is better than another, is to aſk whether paſſions are as juſt and as moderate as the laws.

which

which is the ſoul of action and of military ſucceſs, and is almoſt always unknown amongſt free ſtates.

But however wiſe this ſyſtem of policy might be, Lycurgus muſt have looked on it as an edifice of no long duration, while the ancient manners were ſuffered to ſubſiſt. Laws ſhould form the manners; but in return, manners ſhould protect the Laws; * and it was on their reciprocal action on each other, that this profound Legiſlator founded the perfection of his work.

What would in effect have been the conſequence of the order he had eſtabliſhed, if a taſte for riches and a love for luxury, always united, and always followed by an inequality among the citizens, becauſe they incline one part of them to tyranny and the other

* In vain does man conſpire againſt himſelf, his nature is inalterable; he is born free, and never can be governed but by his own will. When the heart does not relent, Law is but an unnatural violence againſt the body; and, without morals, Legiſlature is but an ineffectual work of art. Laws alone may make ſlaves; but leſs ſtrong than paſſions, they contain men without making them better; whilſt, on the contrary, Laws, with the aſſiſtance of Morals will preſerve them both virtuous and free.

to ſlavery, had imperceptibly deranged the harmony of his Government? the people, humbled by their neceſſities, far from daring to attempt to be maſters, would have flattered the pride of the great; and the Kings, in augmenting the corruption, would have aſpired after abſolute power. In order to render the Citizens worthy of liberty, and capable of preſerving it, Lycurgus took care to eſtabliſh a perfect equality of fortunes, but he did not content himſelf with ſimply making a new diſtribution of lands: This advantage would have been of too ſhort duration to anſwer the greatneſs of the revolution he was meditating: Nature, without doubt, had not given all the Lacedæmonians the ſame paſſions nor the ſame induſtry to improve their poſſeſſions; conſequently avarice would ſpeedily have accumulated wealth to itſelf, by taking advantage of the indolence of ſome and the prodigality of others; the Republick would have been once more obliged to look around her for a remedy, but not finding perhaps

a Lycurgus

a Lycurgus to preſide over her movements and to regulate them in ſo critical a conjuncture, ſhe would doubtleſs have ſunk under the diſtraction of this revolution, or, at leaſt, have abandoned her ancient laws to frame new ones.

Lycurgus proſcribed the uſe of gold and ſilver, but gave a currency to a kind of iron money. He eſtabliſhed publick tables,* where every citizen was obliged to ſet a continual example of temperance and auſterity. He decreed that the furniture of the houſes of his countrymen ſhould be fabricated with no nicer tools than the hatchet and the ſaw; in a word, he confined

* Rich and poor were obliged to eat of the ſame diet. Every table contained fifteen perſons, each of whom furniſhed a certain quantity of requiſite proviſions. A buſhel of flour, eight gallons of wine, five pounds of cheeſe, two pounds and a half of figs, together with a ſmall ſum of money to purchaſe a little fleſh and fiſh, and cook the victuals, was the monthly contribution of every member. No new member could be admitted to any of thoſe tables without the conſent of the whole company. From their entertainments all delicate and luxurious diſhes were baniſhed. The converſation allowed turned wholly upon ſuch ſubjects as tended moſt to improve the minds of the younger ſort in the principles of wiſdom and virtue. Hence, as Xenophon obſerves, the publick tables became ſo many ſchools not only for temperance and ſobriety, but alſo for inſtruction.

their

their wants to the indiſpenſable requiſitions of nature, and above all, prohibited all intercourſe with ſtrangers.* From this moment the arts, which miniſter to luxury, abandoned Lacedæmon: riches, now rendered uſeleſs, appeared contemptible, and Sparta became a fortreſs inacceſſible to corruption. The children, formed by a publick education, acquired with years a habit of virtue from the example of their fathers. Women, by whoſe inticing charms a laxity of manners has been introduced into almoſt every ſtate, were fitted a Sparta to animate and ſuſtain the courage of men: their exerciſes, which were of the moſt violent kind, while they rendered them ſtrong and robuſt, elvated them above their ſex, and inured their minds to patience, to reſolution, to conſtancy, and to every heroick virtue.

* This law was called Xenelaſiæ. The Lacedæmonians were not to go out of their own territories, unleſs to execute ſome commiſſion of the Republick; when they were under the neceſſity of admitting a ſtranger, they appointed a Proxenos, a kind of inſpector, to attend him, and who watched his conduct. It was not till after the Peloponneſian war, that they relaxed in this article.

The

The love of poverty, neceſſarily rendered the Spartans indifferent to the ſpoils and the tributes obtained from a vanquiſhed enemy. As they lived entirely on the produce of their lands, and had no publick fund, it was impoſſible for them to ſupport a war at any diſtance from their ſtate. They had likewiſe a law which reſtrained them from giving the freedom of their city to ſtrangers;* they conſequently could not repair the loſſes incident even to victory; and thus, from their incapability of profiting by their ſucceſs, they became intereſted in the ſearch and maintenance of peace. Lycurgus, however, did not rely on theſe two motives, though ſo well adapted to maintain the Citizens in their priſtine moderation. He was apprehenſive that the ambition of making conqueſts, a paſſion which inevitably degenerates into avarice, and which, while it enriches the State, neceſſarily changes the

* Herodotus remarks, that the Spartans never enrolled but two ſtrangers in the liſt of their citizens, Tiſamenes and his brother Egias, during the Perſian war. The commentators of this hiſtorian, call this a miſtake, becauſe they granted this honour to four or five other perſons.

con-

condition of the Citizens, would one day ſubvert the principles of his Government. He, therefore, enacted a law, by which the Lacedæmonians were expreſsly forbidden to take up arms, unleſs in their own defence; and they were, moreover, ſtrictly enjoined never to avail themſelves of a victory, by purſuing the enemy they had put to flight.

This prohibition, which at firſt ſight appears extravagant, was, however, extremely neceſſary; for Lycurgus, to ſupply the deficiency of number in the Lacedæmonian army, had given Sparta more the reſemblance of a camp than of a city. There they formed themſelves continually to martial exerciſes; for all but theſe were held in contempt. Every citizen was a ſoldier, and to have refuſed to die for the country, would have been the height of infamy. Poſſibly, without the wiſe reſtrictions already mentioned, the Spartans, hurried away by their courage, might have made an improper uſe, for their aggrandizement, of that excellence in the military art, which had been

been recommended only for ſelf-defence. The love of glory was very capable of miſleading them; and other paſſions, ingenious to diſguiſe themſelves, and attentive to turn every thing to their advantage, would ſoon have abſorbed in ſiniſter and lucrative views, nay even expelled that moderation, which prevailed in Sparta, during the ſpace of near ſix hundred years.

The reader may judge, from the portrait of Lacedæmon which I have juſt laid before him, with what reſpect, or rather, with what admiration, ſhe was looked up to by the reſt of Greece. Hercules, ſays Plutarch, roamed through the world, and with his club alone exterminated tyrants and robbers. Sparta had no weapon but poverty, yet ſhe gained an equal aſcendency over Greece; her juſtice, her moderation, and her courage, were ſo well known, that, without arming her citizens, without taking the field, ſhe appeaſed, by the Miniſtration of a ſingle Envoy, the domeſtick ſeditions of Greece, conſtrained tyrants to abandon their uſurped

authority,

authority, and terminated the diſputes which ſo frequently aroſe between rival cities.

This kind of mediation, always favourable to publick order and tranquillity, procured ſo much the more eaſily for the Spartans a decided ſuperiority, that the other Grecian Republicks were continually obliged to have recourſe to their protection; for as they all in turn had experienced the advantages of their friendly interpoſition, no one of them refuſed to be directed by their advice. What a glorious conſideration for human nature, that a nation ſhould owe its greatneſs ſolely to its love of juſtice! Greece accuſtomed herſelf to obey the Spartans, becauſe it would have been the height of folly not to have reſpected their wiſdom: Thus their city became inſenſibly the capital of the country, and aſſumed without a rival the command of its united armies.

The happineſs of the Grecians appeared to be firmly eſtabliſhed under the Adminiſtration of Lacedæmon: and, indeed, too much praiſe could not be given to the Political arrange-

arrangement which I have juſt diſplayed, if Greece had formed a power capable of reſiſting the attacks of a foreign enemy, whoſe forces might be conſiderable: or if her neighbours had never changed their ſituation, that is, if Aſia Minor had always continued in the hands of weak Princes, more attentive to their pleaſure than their glory, while thoſe petty Principalities, which formed the boundary of Greece, on the European ſide, had remained a prey to domeſtic diviſions, which thinned their numbers, and rendered them contemptible. But unhappily for Greece, that ſtate of weakneſs in her neighbours was but of ſhort duration, while ſhe nouriſhed within her a principle that neceſſarily retained her in her priſtine mediocrity. Her general genius, compoſed of the particular turn of every city, unaccuſtomed to look with ambition on the poſſeſſions of her neighbours, rendered her incapable of thinking to puſh her conqueſts abroad. On the other hand, the paſſions which nature has implanted in the human heart, and which

prompt

prompt every ſtate to aggrandize itſelf, had not been repreſſed amongſt the Barbarians by any Political inſtitution, and had conſequently prepared them for new revolutions. It became, therefore, a neceſſary conſequence that ſome among them ſhould riſe upon the ruin of others: thus the ſituation of Greece became every day more grievous; for without ſuffering the leaſt diminution in her natural force, ſhe became every day comparatively weaker, from the augmentation of ſtrength in the nations around her.

Suppoſing the Grecians could have had from this period a Temiſtocles at the head of their affairs, that is, one of thoſe men who could pry into the womb of time, and, as an antient writer expreſſes it, take the lead of events, what could his Political penetration have diſcovered to remedy the evil I am pointing out? Would he have taught the Greeks to bluſh at their inaction? would he have flattered their courage, and ſtimulated them to undertake foreign enterpriſes, magnifying their proſpect of advantage? by

no

no means; prudence forbade it. There was ſufficient reaſon to fear that, in inſpiring them with ambition, one would have only deſtroyed the principles of their Government, ſown diſſenſions between their different Republicks, inflamed them with the deſire of ſubjugating each other, and given birth to a diverſity of intereſts and of hatred, which would probably in the end have thrown them in the hands of ſome Foreign Power. But taking it for granted, that ſuch conduct might not have been productive of the conſequences I have deduced, can it be ſuppoſed that a man, ſufficiently enlightened to diſcern that the incapability of Greece to extend her Empire, from the nature of her Political conſtitution, muſt one day be the cauſe of her deſtruction, ſhould at the ſame time be ſo blind as to make a fruitleſs effort to engage her in the purſuit of conqueſts, which, without enriching any State in particular, would have rendered their Community more powerful. A diſtant advantage never ſtrikes the Multitude, and one that

regards the general utility, does it but feebly. And although it had been poſſible to make the general aſſembly of Greece ſenſible of the neceſſity of increaſing their power, yet the obſtacles inſeparable from the attempt, would very ſoon have diſguſted them with it; and they would have ſoon returned to their original principles. A confederate Republick may maintain an offenſive war with ſucceſs; becauſe the great object of ſelf-preſervation, when its liberty is attacked, inſpires the whole with one common intereſt. Such a war may be conducted with the ſlow, but deliberate wiſdom peculiar to a Political body of this kind; beſides that, the approach of danger may ſometimes haſten their meaſures, and compel them to diſpenſe with thoſe formalities which, on other occaſions, are regarded as indiſpenſably neceſſary. But an offenſive war, on the contrary, is ſo far from conciliating the inclinations of Confederate Commonwealths, that it almoſt always divides them: it requires no common degree of promptitude and activity, and the complicated ſprings which give motion to a Confederacy,

federacy, never act but with difficulty and ſlowneſs.

Let the reader examine Greece under this point of view, and he will regard as an advantage that remnant of jealouſy and diſcord which, in ſpite of the authority of Sparta, and of the Amphictyonick Council, ſometimes endangered its repoſe. Without this fermentation, the Citizens, enervated by employment merely Civil, and a long ceſſation of military toils, would never have been able to have defended their country againſt a Foreign Enemy. It was to her diſtruſts, her jealouſies, and her diſputes, that Greece became indebted for ſoldiers and for Generals, whoſe courage, diſcipline, and profeſſional ſkill, repaired, in ſome meaſure, the feebleneſs of her Political conſtitution.

As yet her power was confined within the narrow compaſs of her own coaſts, while vaſt Empires were already founded in Aſia: ſhe was, perhaps, abſolutely ignorant of the power acquired by the Aſſyrians and the Medes, when the rapid conqueſts of Cyrus preſented at her gates an enemy,

who was deſtined to be here after her Conqueror.

The hiſtory of this Prince, as tranſmitted to poſterity, is either disfigured by the puerile tales, with which Herodotus fancied he was adorning it; or embelliſhed by the pen of a Philoſopher, leſs anxious to convey the truth, than to give leſſons to Monarchs; which, if attended to, are capable of rendering them worthy of their fortune. Herodotus tells us, that Cambyſes was a perſon of low birth, whom Aſtiages choſe for his ſon-in-law, becauſe he dreaded the accompliſhment of a dream, which predicted, that the ſon of his daughter Mandane, ſhould dethrone him. The obſcurity of Cyrus's birth, and the immenſe diſtance to which it threw him from the Throne, could not remove the apprehenſions of that timorous Grand-father: the Infant was expoſed as ſoon as born, but preſerved by a kind of prodigy, and the conqueror of Aſia had no better education than that of a ſhepherd. The greatneſs of his ſoul, however, unfolded itſelf: born to command by the elevation of his genius, he reduced

duced his equals to the rank of ſubjects. By degrees he became the Chief of a nation which the Medes had ſubdued; he made the Perſians bluſh at their ſlavery, and ſtill more at the patience with which they ſuſtained it. He armed and diſciplined them, reared aloft the Standard of Rebellion, declared war againſt the Medes, and after having ruined Aſtiages, deprived him of his Crown.

Every thing changes its appearance in the hands of Xenophon. The Perſians are ſtill, it is true, far from being a numerous People, but then they are laborious, active, vigilant, and admirably diſciplined: and, though ſurrounded by Nations effeminiſed by luxury, their country is every where ſhut againſt corruption: Cambyſes, ſubmiſſive himſelf to the Laws which his People had made, is the King of this reſpectable Nation. Cyrus receives an education ſuitable to the rank to which he is deſtined, and from his infancy one ſees the ſeeds of thoſe qualities unfold themſelves, which conſtitute a Hero. Aſtiages dies in peace in the poſſeſſion of his Kingdom; his ſon Cyaxares ſucceeds him, and

ſo far is Cyrus from being only the Captain of a gang of banditti, or an Uſurper, that he makes war for no other purpoſe than to eſtabliſh the Crown on the head of his uncle, and to leſſen the power of the Medes, whoſe legitimate Maſter he afterwards becomes by ſucceſſion.

But whoever Cyrus was, we ſee that, having attracted the juſt admiration of all Aſia, he had the uſual fortune of extroardinary men, whoſe hiſtory is debaſed with a train of marvellous fictions, in proportion as the real grandeur of their action ſtands leſs in need of embelliſhments to render it intereſting. This Prince, raiſed to the higheſt pitch of reputation and glory, a Nation which before him had been almoſt wholly unknown. The conqueſt of Lydia rendered him maſter of the treaſures of Crœſus, and threw Aſia Minor into his hands. He carried war into Syria, reduced it to a Province, as well as Arabia; overturned the Empire of the Aſſyrians, beſieged and took Babylon, and at length extended his Empire over all thoſe immenſe

immenſe tracts of country, which are comprehended between India, the Caſpian Lake, the Euxine and Ægean Seas, Æthiopia, and the Arabian Ocean.

The Greeks who were ſettled along the coaſts of Aſia Minor, ſaw with joy the defeat of Crœſus, to whom they had been tributaries; and ſuffering themſelves to be blinded by reſentment, they did not perceive that a ſtill more formidable Power was erecting itſelf on his ruins. Their preſumption even induced them to believe, that, in preſſing to the friendſhip of Cyrus, they ſhould be re-eſtabliſhed in their antient independence. But this Hero, little flattered by the homage of a few cities, already on the verge of ſlavery, condeſcended to treat with them only as Subjects.

From this time the affairs of Greece would have been connected with thoſe of Perſia, if Cyrus, who was not even acquainted with the name of the Lacedæmonians, had reſented * the haughtineſs with which they

* The Grecian colonies having implored the aſſiſtance of Lacedæmon, that Republick treated Cyrus as ſhe would have done one addreſſed

addreſſed him in behalf of their Colonies. He treated their temerity with ſilent contempt, and not deigning even to do the Aſiatick Grecians the honour of conquering them himſelf, he left that care to his Lieutenants, in order to execute, in another quarter, enterpriſes of more glory and more importance.

The hour was now come in which it was neceſſary that Greece ſhould perceive her want of ſtrength; and how, without any diminution of her power, her liberty was in danger: from this ſingle circumſtance, that Lydia was ſubjected to the maſter of Aſia, and that Perſia was become too formidable to her neighbours, to keep long within the bounds of moderation. From the birth of time, the predominant Power has ſought to ſwallow up every other; becauſe Ambition, a Paſſion in its nature incapable of enjoyment, is never ſatisfied; ſince proſperity it-

of the States of Greece. She ſent Ambaſſadors to inform him, that the deſcendants of the Greeks, whatever part of the world they inhabited, had a natural right to freedom; and menaced him with a declaration of war, if he committed any hoſtilities againſt them.

ſelf

ſelf inflaming it, becomes the motive and the inſtrument of new ſucceſs. Although Cambyſes was totally deficient in the talents neceſſary to ſuſtain the dignity of his Crown, he knew not how to reſign himſelf to his natural indolence. Carried in ſpite of himſelf to the Sublime, by the Genius of his nation, he was compelled to be in motion; and any enterpriſe leſs than the ruin of a powerful Kingdom, would have been unworthy of the Succeſſor of Cyrus. If Cambyſes ſpared Greece, it was becauſe he thought it too inconſiderable to tempt his vanity; and becauſe Egypt opened to him a more brilliant career: but this being once conquered, his Succeſſors had no way to extend their Empire, but by carrying their arms into Africa or Europe. This laſt quarter of the world ſtood the moſt convenient for them; and as the Grecians were in poſſeſſion of the keys of it, every thing announced them, to a certainty, an approaching invaſion from the Perſians.

At this critical conjuncture, the Colonies, which were ſituated along the coaſts of Aſia Minor,

Minor, were too ſenſibly affected at their ſlavery, not to cheriſh the flattering hope of recovering their liberty; and an unbounded confidence unhappily rendered them fit to dare every thing for its attainment. Ariſtagoras, a man as vain and precipitate as he was ambitious, ſaw with delight this ſpirit of independency, kindling and diffuſing itſelf from man to man through the Colonies; but before he raiſed the Standard of Rebellion, he was deſirous to intereſt the Grecians in the ſucceſs of his enterpriſe. If he could not ſhake the reſolutions of the Spartans, who were at laſt ſenſible how much it was their intereſt to treat with decency and circumſpection ſo powerful a neighbour as the King of Perſia, he found no difficulty in prevailing on the Athenians to enter into his views.

Next to the Spartans, this people held the firſt rank in Greece, where they were diſtinguiſhed by their courage, their riches, their induſtry, and above all by an elegance of manners, and a particular agreeableneſs, which the Greeks could not but be pleaſed with,

with, though their good ſenſe induced them to prefer more eſſential qualifications. Naturally vain, impetuous, lively, volatile and inconſtant, they believed themſelves deſtined (on what account, it is impoſſible to gueſs) to the empire of the univerſe. Every Citizen bound himſelf by an oath, to regard whatever country produced wine, oil, or corn, as the Territory of the Republick. Athens had never enjoyed a moment of tranquillity within her walls, but ſhe, at the ſame time, was eager to interrupt it by engaging in diſſenſions abroad. Ardent for action, repoſe fatigued her; and her reſtleſs ambition would ſpeedily have overturned the Political ſyſtem of Greece, if her Government had permitted her to follow an enterpriſe with any degree of conſtancy. Polybius compares this Republick to a veſſel without pilot, where every man has an equal pretenſion to ſteer the helm as he pleaſes: "Some, (ſays he) are deſirous of continuing "their voyage, others of anchoring on the "neighbouring ſhore; theſe furl the ſails, "thoſe unlooſe them; and, in this con-

"fuſion,

" fuſion, the veſſel, which drives, without " any determined courſe, at the mercy of " the winds, is always on the point of " being loſt."

The Athenians had juſt freed themſelves from the yoke of Piſiſtrates, and Hippias, the laſt of their tyrants, had found an aſylum, and indeed a diſtinguiſhed protection from Artapharnes, Governor of Lydia, when Ariſtagoras applied to them for ſuccour in behalf of the Aſiatic Greeks, the greateſt part of whom derived their origin from Attica. The intoxication of an infant Liberty, and above all their reſentment againſt the Perſians, hurried the Athenians into a ſtep which was to be the cauſe of their ruin.

Athens promiſed every thing to the Colonies, and revolt was begun with the Surprize of Sardis, which was reduced to aſhes. Darius, who had aſcended the Throne ſince the Magus Smerdis had been puniſhed for his impoſture, would not ſuffer this raſhneſs to paſs with impunity; and, after poſſeſſing himſelf of all the Iſles which ſkirt the coaſts of Aſia, he reſolved to extend his puniſhment

to

to Greece itſelf, where he diſpatched Heralds to demand in his name *Earth* and *Water*; in other words, an unconditional ſubmiſſion to his power. The Athenians, far from repenting of what they had done, or agreeing to the demand of the Heralds, were ſo provoked at the arrogance of their commiſſion, that through that violent diſpoſition, natural to thoſe who live under a Republican Government, they tranſgreſſed the laws of nations in the perſons of the Heralds: One they threw into a well, the other into a deep ditch, telling them, with a ſpirit of raillery peculiar to the Greeks, that they might take from thence as much earth and water as they pleaſed. They, however, in the mean while, made every preparation for war, and without being intimidated by either the threats or the number of their enemies, marched with confidence to meet the Perſians, and, under the conduct of Miltiades, gave them a ſignal overthrow at Marathon.

Such was, I will not ſay, the origin of the war which Xerxes made ſome years afterwards to Greece, but the firſt incident of a

rupture,

rupture, which the ambition of the Perſians, their ſituation, and the arrogance of the Greeks, rendered unavoidable; and which would have burſt out in another manner, if the Athenians had been as cautious as the Spartans. Xerxes employed four years in preparing for this expedition, for which he collected all the forces of Aſia. His land army, if we may believe Herodotus, was compoſed of ſeventeen hundred thouſand fighting men; and his naval army, which amounted to three hundred thouſand more, was embarked on board twelve hundred veſſels of war, followed by three thouſand tranſports. It is not unlikely that this enumeration is exaggerated; but, according to the computation of other, and perhaps more accurate hiſtorians, this Prince had ſtill an army ſufficiently numerous to warrant his aſpiring to the conqueſt of all Europe.

It is leſs ſurprizing, in my humble opinion, that the Greeks ſhould have vanquiſhed the King of Perſia, after they had put themſelves under a neceſſity of vanquiſhing or periſhing, than that, during the dreadful interval in

in which they ſaw the ſtorm gathering at a diſtance, and in which they were at liberty to endeavour to avert it by reſpectful ſubmiſſion, they ſhould have conceived the deſign of reſiſting it. Their pride, their immoderate love of liberty, their invenomed hatred of Monarchy, all contributed to incline them to prefer death to the yoke of the Perſians. We can have no adequate idea at preſent of the difficulty of ſubjugating a free people. Since Monarchy has become the prevailing mode of Government in Europe, the Citizen is loſt in the Subject, and is more intereſted in the advancement of his private fortune, than that of the State: war now is only carried on againſt Provinces accuſtomed to obedience, and it would be a folly to expect to find there Patriots, who ſhould refuſe to ſurvive the ruins of their country.

I am not ignorant of the manner in which many of the Hiſtorians have endeavoured to account for the extraordinary iſſue of this war. Sparta, ſay they, was yet at this time religiouſly attached to the moſt rigid inſti-

tutions

tutions of Lycurgus, and all her Citizens reſembled thoſe three hundred Heroes, who ſacrificed their lives to the defence of the paſs of Thermopylæ. Athens, they continue, and I agree with them, had never been in ſo flouriſhing a ſtate, although ſhe carried within herſelf the ſeeds of thoſe diviſions which were formerly the bane of her tranquillity; although ſhe had yet no other laws than thoſe of Solon, a Legiſlator * ſo unequal to the office, that he had the mortification of being himſelf a witneſs of the tyranny which deſtroyed his Government; in a word, although the Commonalty had

* Plutarch ſays, that Solon only palliated the diſorders in his Republick. Some of his Laws are wiſe, but there is no correſpondent relation between the principles on which they are founded, and the end they are to attain; frequently there is a manifeſt contradiction. For inſtance; Solon diſpleaſes the Rich by his Law for the Abolition of Debts, and he at the ſame time diſobliges the Poor, by rejecting their Petition for a new Diviſion of the Lands. In order to gratify the Nobles, he confined the Officers of the Magiſtracy to ſuch, whoſe eſtates produced two hundred meaſures of corn, oil, or wine: this enraged the Populace, to whom the Great could not pardon the privilege of appealing from the ſentence of the Magiſtrates. The taſk would be endleſs to enter into a particular examination of every Law of Solon. His Democracy was monſtrous in one inſtance; that the People, as Supreme Legiſlators, directed the execution of the Law both at home and abroad. After the fall of Piſiſtratus, Ariſtides promulged a Law, by which every Citizen might arrive at the Magiſtracy.

ſtretched

ſtretched their power far beyond the bounds preſcribed by good order, it cannot be denied, but that the Athenians governed themſelves at this time with prudence, becauſe their Morals ſtood them in the ſtead of Laws, and that theſe ſame Morals had been wholly changed under the uſurpation of the Piſiſtrates. The Citizens, occupied with the care of recovering their liberty, had kept their eyes firmly fixed on every object that concerned it, and inflamed with redoubled love for their country, which they ſaw once more reſtored to liberty after having being enſlaved, they conducted themſelves with a zeal which excited a general emulation, and, while it baniſhed intrigue and cabal, held out rewards only to courage and abilities.

Hiſtorians are doubtleſs warranted in ſaying that nothing was impoſſible for Athens to accompliſh, in order to ſupport the glory which ſhe had accquired at Marathon; but are they equally to be credited, when, repreſenting the reſt of the Grecians as ſo many

Patriots, outrageouſly jealous of their liberty, and as warriors trained to the moſt ſkilful and rigid diſcipline, they deſcribe the ſoldiers of Xerxes leſs like men than women, ſunk in luxury and effeminacy? So far was this from being the truth, that many Republicks, not daring even to entertain the hope of vanquiſhing this Prince, cowardly embraced his cauſe. With regard to the troops of Perſia, it cannot be denied but that Cambyſes, in his expedition againſt the Æthiopians * and Ammonians; and Darius in the war with Scythia, had loſt the flower of them. It muſt be granted, however, that a nation which had been perpetually engaged in war, could not poſſibly be without ſoldiers. The inſtitutions of Cyrus were not yet forgotten, and Darius, who

* In order to paſs from Egypt to Æthiopia, it was neceſſary to go through vaſt deſarts; and Cambyſes had taken no meaſures for the ſubſiſtance of his army, during its march; the ſoldiers, ſays Herodotus, after having fed upon their beaſts of burthen, and horſes, were driven to the extremity of devouring each other. A ſecond army, ſent to ſubdue the Ammonians, was overtaken in the plains of Africa by a whirlwind, that buried it under mountains of ſands. Darius, ſays the ſame writer, loſt likewiſe a great many men in his Scythian expedition.

ſucceeded

ſucceeded Cambyſes, was a Prince of diſtinguiſhed merit. We are told by Herodotus, that virtue was reſpected among the Perſians, and that courage opened to them the road to honours. Many of their ſoldiers ſignalized themſelves in this war by actions of extraordinary valour, and whole corps followed their example; ſo far was the Empire of Cyrus from being fallen into that ſtate of lethargy and corruption in which Alexander afterwards found it, that it was as yet ſcarce infected with any of the vices which Xenophon * lays to the charge of the ſucceſſors of Xerxes.

The firſt ſucceſs of the revolted Grecian Colonies proves nothing againſt the Perſians. The Empire was unprovided in theſe parts, becauſe it feared nothing there, and, properly ſpeaking, ought to have had nothing to fear. But the inſtant that Darius had marched his forces, did not he amply revenge the affront he had received? When even the battle of Marathon ſhould

* See the Cyropadia, laſt Chapter of the laſt Book.

have been deciſive of the ſuperiority of the Grecians, and a mark that the Perſians were then incapable, by themſelves, of vanquiſhing them; did it follow from thence that Xerxes was to be unſucceſsful? He had in his army all the Grecians of Aſia and the Iſles, with the exception only of the Seriphians, Siphnians, and Melians. Several People of Europe had joined him; and although the general aſſembly of Greece had condemned to decimation all thoſe who joined the Barbarians, yet the Theſſalians, the Dolopes, the Perrohebes, the Magnetes, the Achaians, the Locrians, the Thebans, and almoſt all the Communities of Beotia entered into alliances with the Perſian Monarch.

By means of ſacrificing ſome troops to ſucceſs, Xerxes got poſſeſſion of the Straits of Thermopilæ; by following the ſame method, he would have had every where the ſame advantage. The more one examines the forces of the Grecians, the inconveniences to which they were expoſed by the very form of their Government, and the reſources

reſources which they had a right to expect from it, the more one is convinced that all human probability was againſt their eſcaping from the ruin that threatened them. They were ſaved ſolely by the ſuperiority of Themiſtocles to Xerxes, and of Pauſanias to Mardonius. It is only by comparing the conduct of theſe great men, that the unexpected termination of the Perſian war can be ſatisfactorily explained.

Themiſtocles was born with an unbounded paſſion for glory; eager to ſignalize himſelf, he grew reſtleſs and unable to ſleep at the recollection of the honour Miltiades had gained at Marathon. He united in himſelf every quality which conſtitutes a great man; and no one, we may ſay with Tucidides, has a juſter claim to the admiration of poſterity. A kind of inſtinct, that never deceived him, prompted him to adapt the moſt ſalutary meaſure: his courage was never ſhaken, becauſe his prudence, which foreſaw and provided for every difficulty, rendered him ſuperior to all events.

While the Grecians gave a looſe to their joy for the defeat of Darius, Themiſtocles regarded the victory of Marathon as the preſage of an approaching ſtorm. A Democratical State, always occupied with the preſent, ſeldom attends to futurity. Themiſtocles took eſpecial care not to interrupt the tranſports of his Fellow-citizens, by menacing them with the vengeance of the Perſians; for in their preſent paroxiſm of triumph and exultation, they would have looked on his pretenſions to foreſight either as criminal or ridiculous: but he took advantage of the aſcendant he had over the people, and of their pride ſo recently inflamed by proſperity, to exaſperate them againſt Ægina, at that time the moſt powerful Maritime State in Greece, He inſenſibly incited them to declare war againſt that Republick, and obliged them, on that account, to form a Marine, capable not only of defending his own country, but of affording ſecurity to all Greece.

Suppoſing

Suppoſing the Court of Perſia abſolutely reſolved on avenging its diſgrace at Marathon, Greece had no way to avoid deſtruction, but from the aſſiſtance of a powerful fleet; and to be convinced of this truth, it is ſufficient to recollect the ſituation of that Country, every Province of which is waſhed by the ſea. If Greece had been incapable of protecting her coaſts, Xerxes would have been at liberty to have made his deſcents on every ſide of it: the Grecians would never have known where to aſſemble, nor whither to lead their forces, and it would be natural to expect that every Community, which was threatened by an invaſion, would have kept at home for the defence of its own territories. Thus every State unconnected with, and unſupported by its neighbours, would have fully perceived its own weakneſs, and, not daring to hope for aſſiſtance, have ſunk under the impreſſion of fear, inſtead of being inſpirited with that glorious emulation which operated prodigies, when ſupported by the ſight and the united efforts of a numerous

merous army. In this caſe Xerxes would have met with no oppoſition: this was what Themiſtocles foreſaw and remedied.

A mind leſs provident and leſs capacious would have been ſatisfied with taking care of the defence of Athens, and wholly occupied with her fortifications, her arſenals, and her magazines of proviſions. Themiſtocles did nothing of this; he conſidered Greece as the bulwark of the Athenians; he knew that their City muſt owe its very exiſtence to the whole's being defended; and he enabled the Grecians to act with efficacy, while he appeared to ſacrifice his country to their intereſts.

I do not know whether poſterity have paid a ſufficient attention to that magnanimity which inſpired the Athenians with the reſolution of yielding their City a prey to the fury of the Barbarians, and of tranſporting their wives, their children, and their old men to Salamis and Træſene, while they remained themſelves without a country, and took refuge in a fleet, which they had conſtructed

ſtructed with the wooden materials of their houſes. This reſolution, of which few perſons were capable of penetrating the wiſdom, appeared to the reſt a humiliating flight, or the terrible image of an inevitable deſtruction. To become competent judges of the obſtacles which Themiſtocles muſt have had to encounter, before he could perſuade his Fellow-citizens to abandon their houſes, their temples, and the tombs of their anceſtors, it would be neceſſary for us to tranſport ourſelves back to thoſe remote times, and to be fully acquainted with the almoſt unconquerable prejudices which prevailed in them. Greece would have had nothing to hope for, if this General had not united in himſelf every talent of every kind. It was neceſſary for him, at the very moment he was occupied by the moſt elevated ideas and the moſt difficult combinations of Policy, to have recourſe to the dexterity of inſinuation and intrigue, in order to prevail on the multitude, who were incapable of comprehending his deſigns. As he found it impoſſible

poſſible to communicate to them any part of his ſublime conceptions, he was compelled to ſubjugate them by authority, to intereſt their Religion in his cauſe, to give voice to their Gods, and to fill all Greece with oracles favourable to his deſigns.

After having forced the Straits of Thermopilæ, the Perſians diffuſed themſelves over Greece: Peloponneſus alone was ſhut to them; and Xerxes was on the point of endeavouring to open an entrance to it through the Iſthmus of Corinth. There the Grecians had aſſembled all their forces, and there, rendered formidable by deſpair, they would doubtleſs have made a ſtand becoming their reputation as Soldiers; but what would have been the conſequences even of a victory, if the enemy's fleet, by making powerful diverſions along the Coaſts of the Peloponneſus, had encouraged thoſe Nations to appear in arms, who held private intelligence with the Court of Perſia? * Corinth, I am

* Theſe, Herodotus tells us, were the Dorians, Etolians, Dryopians, and Lemnians.

free

free to confeſs, would not have ſunk under the efforts of Xerxes; and yet, crouded as it was with defenders, and blocked up by land and ſea by a powerful army, it muſt ſoon have experienced all the horrors of famine.

To oppoſe the Perſians, Greece had only a little fleet of three hundred and eighty veſſels, commanded, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, by an Admiral incapable of performing the duties of his rank. Whether it was that Euribiades, alarmed at the weakneſs of his forces, and only attentive to the dictates of his fear, always believed himſelf too near the enemy, or that he fooliſhly ſuppoſed, that, in order to inſure the ſafety of the Peloponneſus, it was enough to cruize on its coaſts; certain it is, that he intended to have abandoned the Straits of Salamis. Themiſtocles oppoſed him with firmneſs, endeavouring to convince him, that it was only in that arm of the ſea that the feeble armament of the Grecians might bid defiance to the ſuperior ſtrength of Xerxes; clearly demonſtrating, that his advantageous

vantageous ſituation gave him an opportunity of diſturbing the operations of the Enemy, without the leaſt hazard to himſelf. Theſe remonſtrances proving ineffectual, Themiſtocles, as is generally known, had no other method of preventing the cowardly and ſenſeleſs deſign of Euribiades, than by aſſuming the character of a Traitor to his Country. He diſpatched a meſſenger to inform Xerxes, that the Grecians were on the point of retreating, and that he muſt haſten to attack them, if he was deſirous of preventing their departure from that ſide of the Peloponneſus. Xerxes fell into the ſnare, and Euribiades was compelled to fight. While the Grecians, who, from the narrowneſs of the Strait, could not be ſurrounded by the enemy, were at liberty to bring all their fleet into action, the Barbarians, wanting room to draw out their immenſe numbers, could only avail themſelves of a ſmall proportion of them. The defeat of the firſt line ſoon ſpread diſorder amongſt the reſt of the fleet, which

was

was ſpeedily put to flight, and diſperſed by the Grecians.

What gave a deciſive turn to the fortune of the day, was the daſtardy of Xerxes. It is true, the loſs which he had juſt ſuſtained was conſiderable; but if he had collected the ſcattered remains of his fleet, would they not ſtill have been ſufficiently conſiderable to have aſſured him the empire of the ſea? Why then did this wretched Prince believe himſelf loſt? His land army had received no check, and almoſt all Greece was ſubmiſſive to him. If he had not been the moſt timorous, and the moſt ignorant of men, would he have fallen a ſecond time into the ſnare Themiſtocles laid for him? A moment's reflection would have told him, that the Grecians would never act ſo impolitically, as to break down the bridge he had thrown over the Boſphorus, and detain a powerful enemy in the heart of their country, after having driven him to the neceſſity of either conquering or dying. Whatever forces a Prince like Xerxes may have, it is a fixed fate, that he will always be vanquiſhed

quiſhed by a Themiſtocles. The moſt powerful armament is in his hand, what the club of Hercules could be in that of an infant, unable to wield it. Xerxes betook himſelf to flight, and though he left Mardonius in Greece at the head of three hundred thouſand men, excluſive of the Allied Forces, he had leſs hopes of ſubduing it by their efforts, than of calling off their attention from his retreat, and preventing the Grecians from carrying their arms into Aſia.

The Army of Mardonius, ſtill ſo capable of alarming the Grecians, if they had not juſt eſcaped from a much greater danger, only awakened their contempt after the flight of Xerxes. They were no longer doubtful of victory, and their intimidated foes began, on the contrary, to deſpair of ſucceſs; but this confidence of the one, and this deſpondency of the other, were alike unwarranted by the actual ſtate of their forces. Greece had need of all her prudence to prevent her from hazarding any thing, and expoſing herſelf to a check which, by rendering imperceptibly

perceptibly to the Perſians the courage they had loſt, might have informed them of a ſuperiority, which Mardonius appeared to be totally unacquainted with. The ſafety of the Grecians ſtill depended on their military ſkill, and in this reſpect Pauſanias, who commanded their army, had greatly the advantage of his enemy.

I know that this Captain, dazzled afterwards by the preſents and the promiſes of Xerxes, not only betrayed the intereſts of his country, but even aſpired to become the Tyrant of it: I will alſo add, that, terrified at the difficulties of his undertaking, and finding no reſources in himſelf, he repented of his enterpriſe from the moment he engaged in it, without having courage either to purſue or renounce it. From hence aroſe that weakneſs, that irreſolution, that cowardice, that compleat the diſgraceful character of a Traitor. He endeavoured to ſtrengthen himſelf by gaining accomplices; and, as if he had only wiſhed to diſengage himſelf from the painful pre-eminence of

a chief

a chief actor in the buſineſs, he caſt his eyes on the faithful Themiſtocles; without conſidering that, if that great man had been baſe enough to enter into his views, he would have reaped all the advantages of the treaſon.

Such was Pauſanias as a Stateſman: but it is not unuſual to find men, who, great or little as they are beheld in different lights, merit at once contempt and admiration. If nature had refuſed him the talents neceſſary for Government, ſhe had been prodigal of thoſe which conſtitute a great Commander. Whilſt Mardonius was uncertain how to act, negociating when he ſhould have fought, and totally ignorant of the art of employing his forces to advantage, Pauſanias was active, vigilant, intrepid at the head of his army; he penetrates the deſigns of his enemy, ſurrounds him with ambuſhes, preſſes him on all ſides, and reduces him at laſt to the neceſſity of engaging the Grecians at Platæa, a confined ſpot of ground, where numbers were of little advantage. Out of that mighty army, forty thouſand only eſcaped

caped under the conduct of Artabazus; the reſt were left upon the field of battle.

Upon the very day that Pauſanias was victorious at Platææ, Leotychides, King of Sparta, and Xantippus, an Athenian General, gained a compleat advantage over the Perſians at Mycale. The Spartan Chief, unacquainted with what had paſſed in Greece, propagated artfully a report along the coaſt of Aſia, that Mardonius had been defeated; and that, as the Grecians were preparing to free their country from Barbarian bondage, they expected the Colonies would ſecond ſo generous an attempt. Diodorus remarks, that it was neither the valour of the Greeks, nor their ſkill in war, which gained them the victory at Mycale: the event was doubtful, till the Samnians and the Mileſians decided it, by going over to the Grecians. The Perſians were alarmed at this defection, which was immediately followed by that of the other Aſiatic colonies, who joined their European countrymen, to defeat their common enemy.

Xerxes, who had proceeded no farther than Sardis, no ſooner heard that his army was entirely routed, than alarmed for his own ſafety, he retired to Ecbatana; communicating the contagion of his fear to all his ſubjects. After having a long time aſpired to univerſal Monarchy, this weak Prince now almoſt deſpaired of retaining poſſeſſion of his hereditary dominions. In proportion to the immenſity of the preparations they had made for the reduction of Greece, the Perſians felt the impotence of their arms after this defeat. Salamis, Platææ, and Mycalé, recalled the remembrance of former diſgraces in the Æthiopian, Ammonian, and Scythian expeditions. Thoſe ſentiments of grandeur and courage, which Cyrus bequeathed as an inheritance to his ſucceſſors, were totally effaced, and Xerxes had nothing to leave to poſterity but an example of the moſt abject cowardice.

There never happened in any Nation, but particularly in a Confederate Republick, an event of equal importance with this I am now

now relating, without occaſioning ſome revolution in its Political ſyſtem. The more the Greeks were ſenſible of the advantages of concord during the war with Xerxes, the more cloſely ſhould they have drawn the bonds of alliance and amity after his overthrow. But unhappily, ſucceſs gave birth to new paſſions in the breaſts of the Spartans and Athenians; and new intereſts aroſe among the other States of Greece, till by degrees the hatred of the two rival Republicks grew more inveterate; their diſſenſions laid the foundation of their ruin; and in ſome meaſure revenged the aſhes of the Perſian Empire.

END *of the* FIRST BOOK.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREEKS.

BOOK II.

THE Grecians, wholly confined within the circle of their domeſtic affairs, before the Perſian war, had ſcarce any connection with their Colonies, or any alarms from ſtrangers. Their repoſe had hitherto been interrupted only by diſputes between two neighbouring Cities, and conſequently having no occaſion to employ any but land forces, they paid little attention to the ſhipping or to the ſailors, whom they only made uſe of in commercial matters. But ſcarce had they eſcaped the danger which threatened them from the Court of Perſia, ere they began to be apprehenſive that ſhe would revenge her defeats; they, therefore, regarded as the moſt intereſting objects, the uniting themſelves with

with their Colonies in the Iſles of Aſia Minor, the protecting them, and, in one word, the making them a barrier to cover themſelves from the dreaded invaſion. From this moment, the marine forces, whoſe importance was already known from the battle of Salamis, became neceſſarily of infinitely more conſideration than a land army: for they not only formed a formidable bulwark againſt the Barbarians, and were adapted to diffuſe the reputation of Greece to diſtant ſhores, but ſerved as a line eminently neceſſary to connect them with their Colonies, and aſſemble, as it were, into one body, a numerous People ſeparated by the ſea.

It is undoubtedly obvious to every rational mind, how much this new manner of thinking ſtruck at the fundamental conſtitution of the Grecians; ſince Sparta ſaw herſelf degraded from her priſtine rank, for the ſingle reaſon of having no ſhipping, no ſailors, no neceſſary funds for the eſtabliſhment of a marine; while Athens, aſſiſted by her numerous fleets, attracted univerſal attention, and already ſeemed to have uſurped

the pre-eminence of which her rival was in poſſeſſion.

Lacedæmon might have avoided the fall with which ſhe was threatened, if ſhe had ſuffered herſelf to be conducted by her true intereſts; but the pride of the Athenians had inflamed her with indignation, and ſhe conſulted but her paſſions. The Spartans had already given demonſtrations of their jealouſy of the dawning glory of Athens, by their attempt to reinſtate Hippias in the tyranny, after the expulſion of Piſiſtrates. From this early proof of their envy, it is eaſy to conjecture, that they could not eaſily pardon her the victory of Salamis, which robbed them of the honour of being the deliverers of Greece. They beheld, therefore, with a ſecret joy, the ruin of that Commonwealth; and when her Citizens brought back their wives and children from Salamis and Træzene, they were deſirous of preventing them from rebuilding their walls. The Lacedæmonians, ſays Diodorus, aſſerted that it was for the intereſt of Greece that Athens ſhould remain unfortified. If Xerxes, con-

tinued

tinued they, ſhould make war on us a ſecond time, the Athenians will be again obliged to abandon their City, while the Perſians, grown wiſe by experience, will not fail to ſeize it, and convert it into an impregnable fortreſs, which it will be impoſſible ever to drive them from, and from which they will keep all Greece in perpetual awe. Thus Athens, as a reward for the generoſity with which ſhe had devoted herſelf for the preſervation of Greece, would have remained an open and defenceleſs place of no conſideration, if Themiſtocles, as is univerſally known, had not, by deceiving the Lacedæmonians, ſucceeded in reſtoring the grandeur of his country.

Far from ſhewing a reſtleſs jealouſy, Sparta ſhould have endeavoured, by inſpiring a general conſtancy, to ſtrengthen the foundation of an union, from which ſhe drew the principal advantage. The firſt Attention of a Power which held the firſt rank in a Confederacy like that of the Grecians, ſhould have been either to inſpire others with its ſentiments, or to adopt theirs,

theirs, that thus it might continue to appear at the head of affairs. It was neceſſary that the Lacedæmonians, attentive to every motion of the Grecians, ſhould have eagerly embraced the party to which their new intereſts ſeemed to incline them. In effect, if they had been the firſt to ſeek an alliance with the Colonies, which, for the moſt part, were powerful by ſea, they might ſtill have over-awed Athens; and that haughty Republick would have been content with the ſecond rank amongſt the States of Greece. But profiting of that inactivity or rather torpor with which hiſtory juſtly reproaches her rival, ſhe made a tender of her friendſhip and protection to the Grecians eſtabliſhed in the Iſles and along the Coaſts of Aſia Minor, and by their aſſiſtance, became enabled to divide the Sovereignty of Greece, that is to ſay, to command by ſea, as the Spartans commanded by land.

While every thing favoured the ambition of the Athenians, Lacedæmon, by a freſh act of imprudence, was precipitating her own

own deſtruction, She had cauſed Pauſanias to be raiſed to the command of the army deſtined to carry the war into Aſia; and this General, who was already corrupted by the Lieutenants of Xerxes, behaved with as much ſeverity to the Grecians, as tenderneſs to their enemies, and thus excited againſt himſelf a general Inſurrection. The Spartans believed it then neceſſary to increaſe the weight of the yoke, in proportion to the ſtruggles that were made to ſhake it off, and therefore rejected the complaints that were laid before them. This conduct was compared to that of Athens, where Ariſtides and Cimon were in poſſeſſion of the chief authority, and whoſe Government was become reſpectable by their juſtice and their generoſity. All the Grecians, the inhabitants of the Peloponneſus alone excepted, implored the protection of the Athenians, and to deliver themſelves from the tyranny of Pauſanias, offered never to march to war but under their banners.

I have only ſpoken yet of the abaſement of Sparta: but it muſt be obvious to every reader

reader that this abaſement, by ſtriking at the General Government of Greece, announced its total diſſolution. A Revolution, as ſudden as this I have juſt mentioned, is always attended with the greateſt confuſion. Laws, manners, cuſtoms, intereſts, every thing is in contradiction with each other: and Greece, in this chaos, muſt have received ſhocks proportionably more violent, as her Cities were more independent. Even allowing that Athens had been fitter than her Rival to be at the head of a Confederacy, would not the Grecians and their Colonies have ſtill committed an enormous fault, in lifting her by their friendſhip from the ſubaltern rank where ſhe was properly ſtationed? It was impoſſible that Lacedæmon, always attached to her ancient principles, and increaſed in reputation, ſhould accuſtom herſelf to appear no longer at the head of Greece: ſhe was much too haughty to conſent to ſuch a degradation. And was it not natural that Athens, elated with ſucceſs, preyed on by ambition, and prompt to every undertaking, who loved

loved dangerous projects, who abandoned what ſhe had, to graſp at what ſhe had not, and whoſe allies had enabled her to give laws to Greece; was it not natural, I ſay, that ſhe ſhould defend her Infant Empire, and take every precaution to eſtabliſh it? From the moment that war ſhould be kindled between theſe two powerful Republicks, Greece would have found herſelf once more expoſed to all the calamities which had formerly afflicted her: and was it not to be dreaded, that the victorious ſhould prove an oppreſſor, ſince he had been armed by ambition? On the other hand, there was no more ſafety for the Colonies; for the diviſions of their mother country expoſed them to all kind of arbitrary impoſitions from the Perſians.* Whatever was the diverſity of intereſts which divided Athens and Sparta, the ancient ſpirit of their Government had yet ſo much power on them, as to produce

* The Athenians had made a treaty with the King of Perſia, in which this Prince conſented that the Grecian Cities of Aſia Minor ſhould continue to be governed by their own laws. After Sparta entered into a war with Athens, ſhe invited the Perſians into an alliance, and reſigned the Colonies to their diſcretion.

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on both ſides a thouſand efforts to avoid a rupture, which the circumſtances of the times, darkened with conſtantly renewing ſuſpicions, rendered inevitable. Aſhamed openly to confeſs the want of that boaſted unanimity ſo long held up as an example to their Cities, they confined their meaſures to the ſecret interruption of each other's tranquillity. Theſe two Republicks had accuſtomed themſelves to be called the feet, arms, and eyes of Greece, which expreſſions ſo thoroughly impoſed on the minds of the Grecians, that they concluded, ſhould any diſaſter befal either, Greece would have remained lame, blind, and without arms.

Lacedæmon acted prudently in not following the firſt emotions of her jealouſy: ſhe was too weak to ſubdue an enemy who would have been ſupported by the reſt of Greece, and who was yet governed by thoſe extraordinary men who had planned the Perſian war, and whoſe ſucceſs had increaſed the publick confidence and courage. Her former influence was only to be regained by the very meaſures which had originally

originally created it; that is to ſay, by perſevering in their ancient moderation: Athens, debauched by proſperity, would have ſoon yielded her a favourable opportunity of conqueſt.

In effect, the real ſource of grandeur in a wiſe Government is, to preſerve a conſtant unanimity amongſt the Citizens, to inſpire them with reverence to the laws; to inſtruct each individual to ſeek his private intereſt in that of the Publick, and to excite talents by rewards and emulation, whilſt it finds in itſelf that firmneſs and equanimity ſo neceſſary to enjoy the favours of fortune, or to tame her in reſiſting her firſt caprices. The Government of Athens was far from being formed after that model. If the tyranny of Piſiſtrates, and the terror of the Perſian arms, had given the Athenians a few virtues, proſperity was to reſtore them to their vices. An abſolute Democracy is the worſt of all inſtitutions, and this was the eſtabliſhed Government of Athens. What advantage could that Republick draw from her Magiſtrates,

giſtrates, who had no regular juriſprudence to direct them, while the people, ſo eaſy to be either deceived or corrupted, had the power of reviſing every decree, and frequently gave contradictory deciſions? Solon could never, conſiſtently with reaſon, flatter himſelf with ruling the conduct of his countrymen by determinate maxims; although he had created a Senate,* whoſe buſineſs it was to prepare ſuch matters as were to be laid before the Aſſembly of the People. He had deſtroyed his own purpoſe, by permitting every Citizen of the

* Solon divided Athens into four tribes; each of whom choſe a hundred Citizens, who compoſed the Council. The number of inhabitants being greatly increaſed, Cliſthenes divided them into ten tribes; each of which ſelected fifty, who formed the Senate. Theſe Senators had by turn the precedency in the Senate for thirty-five or thirty-ſix days. They drew lots for their rank; thoſe tribes, who had the four higheſt numbers, governed affairs during thirty-ſix days, the other only thirty-five. This term was called the *Prytanie*, the preſiding Senators, the *Prytanes*, and the Senate itſelf, the *Prytanæum*. The publick Aſſembly of the People was held in a place called *Pnyce*, or at the Theatre of Bacchus. The ordinary days of meeting were the 11, 20, 30, and 33d of every Prytanie. As there could be no fixed days for extraordinary meetings, the People were then convened by the General or Magiſtrates. Some days before, bills were poſted, to inform them of the ſubject of deliberation. The Aſſemblies were opened by the Praëdres, who declared the queſtion in debate, and the ſentiments of the Senate.

age of fifty, to harangue them.* Eloquence will ever form a party ſuperior to that of Magiſtracy; and by a tranſition, familiar to his art, the Orator could divert the imaginations of his audience to diſtant objects, and dictate decrees to which the Senate was obliged to ſubmit. The Areopagus, reinſtated by Solon, exerciſed then in vain the uſeleſs privilege of Cenſor. How was it poſſible to regulate the manners of a People accuſtomed, through a defect in the Legiſlature, to indulge a ſpirit of licentiouſneſs, which had at laſt formed the principal part of their character, and rendered them incapable of controul? From hence it came, that the Athenians were at times poſſeſſed of all the virtues, at other times of all the vices; and even in ſo emi-

* This law diſpleaſed much the young men of Athens, who, full of pride at their coming out of the Schools of the Sophiſts, did not doubt but the Republick would have been much better governed, if they had been permitted to aſcend the Roſtrum, and to place themſelves at the head of affairs. This law was not regularly obſerved afterwards; for it is aſſured by hiſtorians, that Demoſthenes was only thirty, when he pronounced his firſt Philippic. This Orator was perhaps an exception to the rule, becauſe of his great talents; I am rather inclined to believe that it was an abuſe, a natural conſequence of the diſcredit in which the ancient laws had fallen.

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nent a degree, as neceſſarily to exclude their oppoſites. Thus we ſee this nation, ſometimes taxed with the moſt atrocious inſtances of iniquity, at other times as juſt as Ariſtides. Elevated to the ſublime views of Themiſtocles, ſhe falls a dupe to the intrigues of Pericles, who leads her to the brink of her ruin. She is brave with Cimon, timorous with Nicias, inſolent and haughty with Cleon, raſh with Alcibiades.

The ſame factious ſpirit, which had heretofore interrupted the tranquillity of Athens, was neceſſarily to produce the ſame diviſions. The Law of Ariſtides, by which every Citizen was permitted to aſpire to the Magiſtracies, inſpired the Plebeians with an immoderate degree of pride, which continually excited them to ſhake off the yoke of the Nobles, who, on their ſide, being accuſtomed to rule ſince the baniſhment of Piſiſtrates, regarded the long enjoyment of their authority as a title lawful and inconteſtible.

If the hope of ſeeing ſoon the vices of the Athenians reaſſuming their former Em-

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pire, ought to have tempered the jealouſy of Lacedæmon; the diſorders which threatened her rival, ought to have been a very powerful motive to determine her to a ſpeedy rupture. It was the intereſt of the Athenians to prepare in haſte for war, not to have at once two ſuch formidable enemies to encounter, as the Spartans and the depravity of their manners. Beſides this obſervation, which the pride of Athens did not permit her to make, ſhe might have perceived that ſhe could not preſerve her newly acquired greatneſs, without increaſing it; nor ſolidly eſtabliſh her pre-eminence over Greece, but as much as the Spartans ſhould be humbled enough to renounce their claim, and loſe the remembrance of their paſt glory.

In ſo critical a conjuncture, if the Athenians remained inactive, it was not for want of a man capable of leading them: never a Stateſman knew better than Themiſtocles how to unravel the moſt imperceptible differences of a Political intereſt, nor more excelled in a wonderful facility of diſcerning

the conſequences of events. Had he even wanted ſkill and penetration, his inveterate hatred to the Lacedæmonians would have ſupplied that deficiency. But there appeared already a beginning of corruption in Athens. Ignorant of the real cauſe of her proſperity, this Republick diſdained counſels, expected to be flattered; and the ſoul of Themiſtocles was too elevated to condeſcend to be the Courtier of a capricious multitude. A contraſt was immediately drawn between the rigid reſerve of his behaviour, and the pleaſing popular manner of Cimon; the profuſions of the latter, made the œconomy of the former paſs for ſordid avarice. In one word, the Athenians abandoned Themiſtocles, whoſe only merit was that of having ſaved the Republick, to attach themſelves to Cimon, who revenged her, by carrying her arms into Perſia. In order to juſtify to themſelves this ingratitude, they liſtened to the malicious ſuggeſtions of his enemies, they feigned to fear him, and he was exiled.

Cimon had all the virtues of a good Citizen, and the talents the moſt rare and the moſt

moſt neceſſary to make a good General. Active, vigilant, indefatigable, he had the ſingular advantage of obtaining two victories on the ſame day, one by ſea, the other by land. But whatever Plutarch may ſay of him, he wanted many requiſite qualifications to place him on a level with Themiſtocles in Political knowledge. If he acted right in determining the Republick to relieve the Grecian colonies from the garriſons which the Barbarians kept in their Cities, he was certainly wrong afterwards, when he ſuffered himſelf to be carried away with the general prejudice, which cauſed the Perſians to be looked upon as the greateſt enemies of his country; perhaps alſo that, without reflecting on the conſequences of this conduct, he was obſtinate in carrying war into Aſia, becauſe it procured to Athens a conſiderable booty, and to his armies a glory eaſily acquired.

Yet, ſuppoſing that there was no imprudence in irritating to the laſt degree ſuch Power as Perſia, which was weak, only

through the ſtupidity of her Monarch, whoſe fear checked the exertion of her natural forces; it was at leaſt a ſtep of the higheſt inutility, and which could produce no advantage; for, of what avail was it to purſue through Aſia the enemies of Greece, whilſt he neglected watching a private adverſary, ready at each inſtant to enter the gates of Athens? Of what importance were victories, which could increaſe her power neither by ſea nor land, and which, in affording too much ſecurity to her new allies, did conſequently render an alliance with her leſs neceſſary?

One cannot help blaming the Adminiſtration of Cimon; for if he thought that the hatred of Athens and Sparta was irreconcileable, and that all efforts to prevent an open rupture would be ineffectual, why did he not take advantage of the ſeveral favourable circumſtances that offered themſelves to humble the Lacedæmonians? On the contrary, inſtead of inflaming the minds of the Grecians againſt Lacedæmon, and preparing

paring them for the burſting of the impending ſtorm, he did not even, when he aſſumed the direction of affairs, keep up the ſentiments of indignation which they had conceived againſt that Republick and Pauſanias. Laconia experienced an earthquake, in which more than twenty thouſand perſons periſhed; Cimon made no uſe of that accident. The Helotes, ſupported by the Meſſenians, had revolted, and Cimon was ſilent, whilſt the Orator Ephilates was of opinion, that Lacedæmon ſhould be ſuffered to periſh. A more ſteady and ſkilful Politician would have even pointed out the neceſſity of encouraging and aſſiſting theſe rebellious ſlaves; nor would he have wanted ſpecious arguments to ſet this rebellion in the faireſt point of view, by repreſenting the Spartans as the moſt cruel tyrants, who trampled on the laws of humanity, * and in whoſe extir-

* The Helotes were a People of Peloponneſus, whom the Lacedæmonians had vanquiſhed, and made their ſlaves. In all writers, details are to be found of the cruelties exerciſed on this unfortunate race. Their maſters looked on them as their moſt inveterate enemies; and, when they multiplied too faſt, a certain number was

pation all mankind ought to aſſociate. But Cimon, far from diſcerning the intereſts of his country, declared himſelf openly the protector of the Lacedæmonians, whoſe virtues, he ſaid, he admired and reſpected. He prevailed with the Athenians to ſupport them, and to pardon them the injuſtice with which their zeal had been repaid, in ſuſpecting them of clandeſtinely abetting the inſurrection.

If, on the other hand, this General thought it practicable to reſtore the ancient amity of the two Republicks, and to extinguiſh their ancient animoſities, by giving up to one the ſupreme command on land, and pre-

exterminated. Plutarch obſerves, that it was but a long time after Licurgus, that the Spartans began to treat their ſlaves with that exceſs of inhumanity. I ſhall relate here an inſtance: it is the horrid amuſement of the *Cryptia* or *Ambuſcade*, which was not only permitted, but even authoritatively impoſed on the youth of Sparta. Parties of the hardieſt young Spartans, armed with daggers concealed under their clothes, were diſpatched to traverſe the fields, evidently to mark out ſuch of the Helotes, as appeared to poſſeſs moſt ſtrength and courage, and the moſt manly appearance in face and geſture. Having made their obſervations, they concealed themſelves in the moſt unfrequented places, till night gave them an opportunity to perpetrate the premeditated maſſacre. Then ſallying forth from their lurking places, they ſtabbed with their daggers the devoted unſuſpecting wretches.

ſerving for the other the empire of the ſea; why did he not act conformably to this plan? but he never thought on it. He proceeded as if the intereſts of his country had not changed; and this is what will ever make him be regarded as a man, who ſuffered himſelf to be hurried away by the courſe of affairs, who made war like a great Commander, but like a ſhallow Politician.

The credit of Cimon fell ſo much the more eaſily, that he was frequently abſent on publick buſineſs, and that, when preſent, he ſometimes took the liberty of telling the People diſagreeable truths, and even oppoſed openly their deſigns. Secretly attached to the Nobility, whoſe pretenſions he favoured, he endeavoured to replace in their hands the principal authority, and neglected nothing that could contribute to ſupport the dignity of the Magiſtrates.

Pericles, perhaps a greater enemy to Democracy than Cimon, flattered the multitude, and rendered ſuſpected a man, to whoſe fall he was to be indebted for his elevation.

elevation. Capable of affecting the ſentiments the moſt ſtrange to his heart, of comprehending at the ſame time a multiplicity of objects, and combining them with the moſt accurate preciſion, his exquiſite perſpicuity conſtantly furniſhed him with the means the moſt ſure for the attainment of his ends. A great Captain, a great Stateſman, and a ſtill greater Orator, Athens had never yet had a Citizen, who re-united in himſelf ſo many talents; but all theſe accompliſhments, employed to ſerve his ambition, proved fatal to his country.

Pericles had obſerved that his predeceſſors in power, by a mixture of diſintereſtedneſs and cupidity, of conſtancy and weakneſs, had always, themſelves, been the cauſe of their own ruin. Inſtead of following their example, of being partially virtuous or vicious, ſometimes only occupied with the publick good, at other times with private intereſt, now irritating the multitude, then ſervilely courting their approbation, he made it an invariable maxim to ſacrifice every thing to his

his own ambition. In order to render the prodigalities of Cimon leſs conſpicuous to the eyes of the People, expence was neceſſary: but as his fortune was not above mediocrity, he imagined to be prodigal of the riches of the State. He cauſed retributions to be diſtributed among the Populace, to enable them to be preſent at the Publick Aſſemblies, as well as theatrical repreſentations. Now the multitude, ſeized with the rage of judging, quitted the publick place, but to run to the theatre. Eager to take cognizance of the deciſions given in the different Tribunals, and to know the various cauſes in which individuals were concerned, they left to Pericles an authority without bounds in the adminiſtration of publick affairs.

This Leader of the People was too ſkilful to rely on the ſtability of their affections, if he did not continually labour to fix them upon an immoveable baſis. He became the very ſoul of the Republick; he held the Great in ſubjection, through the abaſe-

abaſement wherein he had thrown the Areopagus and all the Magiſtracies, ſo that no queſtion was decided, but conformably to his own will. Yet, however perſuaſive his eloquence, a reverſe of fortune might have contradicted the Orator, given a convulſive movement to the Athenians, and in awaking them from their intoxication, overturned their idol. Pericles ſaw the danger, and the great art of this ſkilful Politician, ſhewed itſelf, in never embarking the Republick in any enterpriſe, without an apparent certainty of ſucceſs. On this principle, it became impoſſible for him to repair the fault which I have reproached Cimon with. Far from meditating any attack on Lacedæmon, he ſaw, with a kind of ſorrow, the jealouſy of this Republick againſt the Athenians increaſing every day. He felt beforehand, that, if the Lacedæmonians, ſupported by all the forces of the Peloponneſus, ſhould come to an open rupture, the quality of Chief of Athens would become too heavy a burden, and that he might ſink under

under the embarraſſment naturally attending a war, carried on againſt a People hitherto deemed invincible.

Pericles, in this dilemma, found no other reſources left, than to introduce corruption among the Lacedæmonians. He maintained penſionaries, * who, by extolling the moderation of their anceſtors, the laws of Lycurgus, the love of their country, and declaiming againſt the calamities and the dangers of warfare, ſucceeded at laſt in preſerving tranquillity and peace. But this very peace, in itſelf, became a new inconvenience. On one ſide, the war with the Perſians began to be out of faſhion, and it was a pity; for it afforded eaſy victories and a conſiderable booty, which advantages, at once gratified the double propenſity of the Athenians for glory and magnificence. On the other ſide, it was dangerous to leave the Republick in too great inactivity.

* Pericles diſtributed every year ten talents among the principal Lacedæmonians. *See Plutarch.* — A Talent weighed ſixty pounds Troy weight, about ninety Marks French money, or 2062 l. ſterling.

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To applaud or criticiſe ſome theatrical performance, a picture, a ſtatue, or an edifice, were not ſufficient employments to occupy their minds.* The Athenians liked to hear of enemies, armies, campaigns, victories; otherwiſe their natural reſtleſſneſs, excited by factious cabals which warmly renewed, rendered them exceſſively difficult to be governed.

Happily for Pericles, the Allies of Athens were far from being as ſatisfied with his Adminiſtration as the Athenians. They had no objection to the luxury or pleaſures in which the Republick was immerſed, but they did not like to pay the expences of her feaſts

* Pericles, by a judicious diſtribution of proper rewards, excited a noble ſpirit of emulation among the Profeſſors of the fine Arts; and adorned Athens with the maſter-pieces of the moſt ſkilful Artiſts. It muſt be acknowledged, to the honour of Pericles, that whatever works of Greece, either in architecture, ſculpture, or painting, have commanded the admiration of after ages, were the fruit of his Government, and of the attention beſtowed by him upon the moſt elegant ſubjects. For the greater part of theſe maſter-pieces, we are chiefly indebted to Phidias, the celebrated ſtatuary; of whom the famous ſtatue of Pallas, ſo highly valued by the beſt judges, was the capital work. In a word, Pericles repleniſhed the City of Athens with ornaments that attracted the admiration of ſtrangers, and inſpired them with a high idea of the Athenian genius and power.

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and entertainments: they took it very ill that Pericles ſhould levy on them above ſix hundred talents, to procure his Citizens frivolous amuſements; when Cimon was ſatisfied with ſixty * to carry on a war againſt the Barbarians. Pericles exhauſted all the arts he was capable of, to reduce to deſpair people, who could not revolt againſt Athens without running to an inevitable ruin. Beſides their being entirely unconnected, ſo as not to be able to act in concert, the Colonies never had the leaſt ambition; and content with having recovered their liberty, they had obtained of Cimon an exemption from farther aſſiſtance, than furniſhing money and ſhips to ſupport the war commenced on their account. Accuſtomed,

* After the defeat of the Perſians by Themiſtocles, the Athenians carried war into Aſia, to deliver the Grecian Colonies from the yoke of Xerxes. Theſe People, accuſtomed to peace, bore arms with reluctancy, and the Athenians exempted them from it, on condition that they ſhould pay ſixty talents for the expences of their armies. Pauſanias, L. 8, C. 52, upbraids bitterly Ariſtides for it, accuſing him of having opened the gates to cupidity, and of having accuſtomed the Grecians to make a trafic of their alliance and forces. We have ſaid already, that the talent amounted to the ſum of 2062 l. ſterling.

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by this indulgence, to enjoy the ſweetneſs of a tranquil life, they became abſolutely ignorant of military exerciſes, and, according to the judicious obſervation of Thucidides, finding themſelves exhauſted by the charges to which they had ſubmitted, they were unable to avoid the yoke of Athens, if it had been her pleaſure to treat them as ſubjects rather than Allies. By repreſenting the murmurs of theſe wretched People as an inſufferable offence, tending to deſtroy all kind of ſubordination, Pericles eaſily rendered them odious to the Athenians, whom he perſuaded to engage in a war which was to ſtrengthen his credit, becauſe it could procure them an uninterrupted ſeries of ſucceſſes. Theſe, fond of gaining battles and taking cities, no matter at what price, were too ignorant of their real intereſts to perceive, that the advantages they obtained over their allies, announced an approaching fall; and that by their revolt Athens was reduced to the ſame point of weakneſs, in

which

which ſhe had ſeen herſelf before the Perſian war.

But if the Empire of Athens was declining towards its ruin, that of Pericles ſeemed, on the contrary, to be eſtabliſhed on the firmeſt baſis: the time arrived when he was obliged, according to cuſtom, to give an account of his Adminiſtration. This was an operation rather delicate to perform; not that he had enriched himſelf at the expence of the State, but either from his own negligence, or the diſhoneſty of the ſubaltern officers whom he had employed in the management of publick money, there were conſiderable ſums which remained unaccounted for. Beſides, it was grievous to ſhew the Athenians the exhauſted ſtate of their finances; this would have prodigiouſly decried the prodigality of expence in feaſts, ſports, and theatrical repreſentations; it would have been a tacit confeſſion, that the final tendency of theſe amuſements was the ruin of the Republick and her Allies. The well-

well-known witty reply * of Alcibiades, in this extremity, ſerved for counſel to Pericles. Inſtead of thinking how to give a plauſible account of his diſburſements, his ſole ſtudy was how he ſhould avoid giving any at all. To accompliſh this purpoſe, it was neceſſary to transfer the attention of the Athenians from domeſtick concerns to ſome foreign object of importance. But none of the Allies dared to ſtir: intimidated by the ſeverity of Athens, they confined their reſentment within their own breaſts, waiting for a favourable opportunity to give it vent. Pericles ceaſed then to tranſmit money to Lacedæmon; and his Laconian Penſionaries, who might have revenged his negligence, in expatiating with ſtill more eloquence on the bleſſings of peace, very injudiciouſly remained in a profound ſilence. From that moment this Republick, whoſe hatred, em-

* Alcibiades wiſhing to ſpeak with Pericles, knocked at his door, and requeſting an audience, was anſwered, he could not be interrupted, being very buſy in conſidering how to prepare his accounts for the inſpection of the Athenians. Would it not be more judicious, ſaid Alcibiades withdrawing, for him to conſider how to prevent their inſpecting them at all?

[*Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades.*]

bittered

bittered by the complaints of the enemies of Athens, had no longer any impediment to the indulgence of her natural inclination, paſſed a decree, by which ſhe declared, that ſhe took under her protection Corinth, Potidæa, Ægina, and Megæra.

Pericles, to whom every thing ſucceeded according to his wiſhes, took advantage of this decree, to irritate the pride of the Athenians: *This is not the time*, ſaid he, *to ſhew a baſe complaiſance to the will of the Lacedæmonians. If they did not enjoin us to abandon Potidæa, to free Ægina, and to revoke our decree againſt Megæra, we might, without injuring our reputation, conſult our moderation and juſtice: but ſince Lacedæmon preſumes to command, it is the part of Athens to reſiſt. If you yield to the threats of the Spartans, they will believe that you have been determined by fear; and will make ſuch freſh demands, as to force you to refuſe them, or otherwiſe to ſubmit to their yoke. You may this day remove the impending danger, in giving an example of ſpirit and firmneſs, which will awe your Allies into duty, and*

ſhew, once for all, to Lacedæmon what ſhe is to expect from her overbearing haughtineſs; to-morrow, perhaps, it may be a day too late.

The affairs of Athens, although much reduced, were not yet in a ſituation ſo deſperate as to render it impoſſible for Pericles to determine his countrymen, and to form a plan of war, by which they might not only aggrandize their power, but give it a ſolid foundation on the ruins of the Lacedæmonians. This General had all the talents neceſſary to inſure the ſucceſs of ſuch an enterprize: but ever attentive to the ſelfiſh advantage of governing alone, or rather of domineering over his country, he was afraid that a too enlarged and a too extenſive plan of operation, ſhould terminate in the contraction of his private views. If, in effect, the Athenians ſhould turn the whole weight of their arms againſt Sparta, with the reſolution of exterminating her inhabitants; the war became very difficult, and Pericles, obliged to continue it, could not renounce his enterprize without forfeiting his honour,

and

and expoſing himſelf to loſe his authority. On the contrary, if he propoſed to the Athenians only a vague and indeterminate plan for a defenſive war, confining his military exploits to the pillage of Laconia, he was left at liberty to regulate his conduct by circumſtances, to retreat or advance; changing his deſigns with the turn of events, and conſtantly taking the reſolution the moſt fit to promote his private advantage.

While the Athenians commenced hoſtilities under ſo falſe a point of view, the Lacedæmonians, on their ſide, could not give a better account of their enterprize. They ſeemed to imitate the example of their enemies, in giving their whole attention to the circumſtance which ſerved as a pretence for a rupture; and looking upon it as the only cauſe, and the ultimate end of the war, they did not even ſuſpect themſelves to be actuated by motives of ambition; ſo much were their thoughts conſtantly remote from the object which they ought to have had in view.

Since jealouſy of the Athenian glory, and conſequently the deſire of recovering their ancient ſuperiority in Greece, were the reaſons that determined the Lacedæmonians to take up arms, it ought to have been their plan to reduce the Athenians to the ſituation wherein they were before their elevation, or rather below it. The moſt ſure means to effect this, was to reſtore to liberty all their tributaries, to debauch their Allies, by availing themſelves of their diſcontent, and, in one word, to act in ſuch a manner as to inſpire the reſt of Greece with an unbounded confidence.

Sparta acted on principles diametrically oppoſite. She ſolicited the friendſhip of Perſia, and gave up to that Court all the Aſiatic Colonies. It was but with an extreme reluctancy, that ſhe granted her protection to thoſe Cities, who waited for her aſſiſtance to ſhake off the Athenian yoke; and inſtead of treating as enemies, ſuch only of the Allies of her rival, as remained faithful to their firſt engagement, ſhe equally extended her ſeverity to all.

Had

Had the Athenians well underſtood which was their ſituation, they would have been ſatisfied with a marine ſufficient to intimidate their Allies, and ſecurce the publick revenues. Far from exhauſting their wealth in the uſeleſs augmentation of their naval armaments, they would have applied with diligence to increaſe the number of their land forces: they had not the leaſt advantage in defeating the fleet of the Peloponneſus, becauſe it could only be prejudicial to the Allies of Lacedæmon, whereas this Republick ought to have been the direct center of all their blows.

We read in hiſtory of few wars conducted with leſs intelligence than that of Peloponneſus: the two rival Powers are continually loſing ſight the one of the other, and every one of their reciprocal enterprizes, ſeems to be a diverſion from the main object. While Archidamus attacks the Platæans and falls on Arcanania; the Athenians make an irruption into Calcidæ and Beotia. If any of the Allies raiſes the ſtandard of rebellion, all the attention of both parties is immediately turned on that

ſide. Sometimes the theatre of war is in the Iſle of Leſbos, on the territory of Megara, or Corcyra, ſometimes it is tranſferred into Ætolia, Beotia, or Thrace.

Thus, by beginning ſo many different enterprizes, the two Republicks reduce themſelves to the impoſſibility of undertaking any thing deciſive. Fortunate and unſucceſsful by turns, their loſſes and advantages were equally balanced; ſo that Athens and Lacedæmon, fruitleſsly exhauſting and enfeebling each other, were leſs in a ſtate of impoſing laws, and ſtill more far from obtaining the point which ſhould have been the principal object of their ambition.

The war had now laſted ten years; each Republick had received more injury from their errors, than from the arms of their enemies, when, ſtill more inveterate in their reſentment, and almoſt exhauſted, they, through neceſſity, ſigned a truce for themſelves, but through animoſity continued the war by their Allies.

Although neither Cimon nor Pericles had governed the Athenians according to maxims

conducive to the glory of their country; yet the firſt had not degraded the Republick, becauſe his views were always of ſome utility; the other had preſerved her reputation, becauſe his enterprizes, however detrimental to the Publick, had conſtantly been attended with ſucceſs, and ſpread a glow which eaſily dazzled thoſe who are guided only by appearances. But after the death of Pericles, who had always baniſhed merit from high places, and employed only ſuch perſons in the Adminiſtration, as were incapable of exciting his jealouſy; it was quite natural that Athens ſhould fall a prey to a ſwarm of little ambitious men, who, without talents, without knowledge, without integrity of heart or elevation of ſentiment, believed a blind ſervility to the will of the multitude the only requiſite qualification in the Leader of a Republick.

The Athenians, who looked upon Oſtraciſm * as the ſureſt means of preſerving the

* After the Athenians had baniſhed the Sons of Piſiſtrates, they eſtabliſhed in their Republick the Oſtraciſm, already practiſed in ſeveral States of Greece. It conſiſted in a decree of exile for ten years, which, however, was inattended with diſgrace, as

liberty

liberty which they had recovered by the exile of Piſiſtrates, would have been ſooner diſgraced by the Government of obſcure and contemptible men, if ſeveral of their inſtitutions, as well calculated to inſpire the love of glory as that for the country, had not excited talents, and drawn, in ſpite of themſelves, from retirement, men of ſuperior merit, whom the fear of baniſhment from an ungrateful Republick had removed from publick ſervice.* As long as Politi-

ſuch Citizens were alone its objects, whoſe eminent merit and ſervices rendered them too formidable in a Republican Government. The People aſſembled on theſe occaſions to paſs ſentence, and each Citizen wrote upon a ſhell the name of him he believed the moſt capable of attempting on publick liberty; and if the ſuffrages amounted to ſix thouſand, he was baniſhed. The *Petaliſm* (baniſhment for five years) a ſimilar cuſtom in Syracuſes, rendered virtuous men exceſſively timid. Thoſe, ſays Diodorus, whoſe purity of manners and the greatneſs of their knowledge recommended as proper to reſide at the helm, flew from a dangerous elevation to the ſecurity of private life, and men of the moſt deſpicable character ſeized on the reins of Government, which threw Siracuſes into the utmoſt confuſion. Ariſtotle ſays, that Oſtraciſm was the guard of liberty, but wiſhes it might owe its preſervation to ſome other method.

* We read in Plutarch, that the Father of Themiſtocles, obſerving with concern that he aſpired to the higheſt employments of the State, in order to moderate this propenſity, led him to the ſea ſhore; and pointing to the diſabled galleys of the Republick, which were ſuffered to rot in the docks, compared them to Stateſmen grown old in the ſervice of their country, who are always neglected, when no longer of uſe.

cal

cal knowledge was neceſſary to obtain ſome conſideration at Athens, men of ability ſeemed to forget the dangers of the Oſtraciſm; but under the Regency of Pericles, the Republick having acquired a particular fondneſs for Philoſophy and the Fine Arts, ſo as to grant an equal eſteem and conſideration to their poſſeſſors, as to Magiſtrates and Generals; ſenſible men, who ſaw now opened to their view a path to glory, attended with leſs danger, entered it with pleaſure, and Sciences and Arts began to deprive Politicks of ſeveral excellent geniuſes.

Whatever may be the cauſe, it is certain, that at the death of Pericles, merit was ſo ſcarce at Athens, that Cleon, that man whom all the hiſtorians have mentioned with ſo much contempt, aſſumed a predominant influence over his competitors. His ſucceſs gave aſſurance to all intriguing men. In order to elevate themſelves, or ruin a rival, they employed knavery, calumny, and all that low and odious train of artifices, which almoſt always terminate

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in the deſtruction of thoſe who are mean enough to have recourſe to their aſſiſtance. The people, diſtracted by faction and cabal, at laſt ſhook off that indolence which gave them up to the firſt Citizen who had gained their confidence. They diſtruſted every one, were upon their guard, wiſhed to be free, and from this moment experienced thoſe tumultuous agitations which hurried them to their ruin.

Cleon had the principal influence in the affairs of the Republick, and he was upon the point of compleating her deſtruction, when the moſt conſiderable Citizens, of whom, to gain the favour of the Multitude, he was the declared enemy, raiſed him up a competitor; but had nothing better to oppoſe than Nicias, who, through an exceſſive timidity, was afraid of the People when aſſembled. One may eaſily imagine, from this circumſtance, how ill calculated he was for the part allotted him to act. He had virtues, generoſity, eloquence; but by an unaccountable puſillanimous diffidence in his own abilities, he did not dare

to

to be publickly virtuous. Cleon, with his noiſy inſolence, ſilenced the modeſt virtues of Nicias. The People excuſed the rapaciouſneſs of the one; they could not diſcern the diſintereſtedneſs of the other. A brave but an irreſolute General, every enterprize appeared impracticable to Nicias; and when at laſt he began to act, the moment of action was no more. He doubted, deliberated, and ſcarce had he made an effort to decide, when a more advantageous idea ſtarted up, which his imagination purſued, and quickly abandoned for a new chimera. Cleon, on the contrary, doubted nothing, whether an enterprize was raſh or prudent, a meaſure rational or abſurd, was juſt the ſame to him. In fine, the Athenians, perplexed and divided between the timid virtues and talents of Nicias, and the undaunted folly and impudence of Cleon, either wanted courage to take a reſolution, or made choice of the worſt, if, at laſt, they were determined to act.

Alcibiades now began to appear at the head of affairs. He was not ambitious, but

but full of vanity; he wiſhed to be conſpicuous, and to be the principal object of diſcourſe and admiration in Athens. His valour, his eloquence, all in him was embelliſhed with peculiar graces. Addicted to the voluptuouſneſs of love, and the exceſſes of the table; proud of his accompliſhments, and of a certain elegance in manners, which almoſt always denounces the depravity of them, he ſeemed to apply to publick affairs only as a refreſhment from pleaſure. He had the genius of a great man; but his ſoul, whoſe relaxed ſprings were become incapable of a conſtant application, could riſe to the great but by ſtarts. I can ſcarce believe, that a character ſo flexible, ſo pliant, and ſo verſatile as that of Alcibiades, who could be at Sparta, as hardy, laborious, and ſevere in his morals as a Spartan; in Ionia, as refined in his pleaſures, and as delicate as an Ionian; who could give examples of ruſticity in Thrace, and in Aſia be envied by the Satrapes for his luxurious elegance, was well fitted to be a great man. Although he frequented the School of Socrates, he did

not

not think that there was in this world any other good and evil, but what perſonally intereſted him. *Courage, my dear friend,* ſaid to him one day Timon the Miſanthrope, in ſhaking him by the hand, *I am obliged to thee for acquiring ſo much reputation: be the man of the day; thou wilt revenge me of the madneſs of our Athenians.* Every thing is loſt, when a man of this character is intruſted with the ſupreme command. The graces put vices in eſteem; the degeneracy of manners draws after it a ſtagnation of legiſlative authority: agreeable talents alone are honoured and encouraged, and the Government, deſtitute of principles, is conducted only by caprice.

Under ſuch Commanders the forces of Athens were languid, and this Republick appeared as overwhelmed by the war againſt the Lacedæmonians, when ſeized all of a ſudden by a kind of phrenzy, ſhe made an effort to ſhake off the torpor which afflicted her, raiſed a formidable army, and undertook the conqueſt of Sicily. That Iſle had long been the flattering object of the ambition

bition of Athens. Pericles had formerly need of all his credit to prevent that undertaking from taking place. The complaints of the Leontines and Ægeſtians awaked the former ideas of the Athenians. They enjoyed by anticipation the reduction of Sicily; they conſidered it as a military ſtaple or arſenal, from whence they might extend their Empire over Italy, and even Africa. Their plan, as Thucidides tells us in a ſpeech of Alcibiades, was to fall upon the Peloponneſus with the additional forces of theſe ſubdued Provinces. But how could the Athenians be ignorant, that diſtant poſſeſſions are of no advantage, and that the expence incurred for their preſervation, is ever greater than their produce? Could they be ſo blind as not to ſee, that there was no proportion between their own ſtrength, and that of the Provinces they were willing to conquer? In ſuppoſing even that the terror of their arms had precipitated the Sicilians to the yoke, this power could never have been of a long duration: the conquered muſt have ſoon perceived the weakneſs of their conquerors,

querors, and confidence ſucceeding to diſmay, muſt ſoon have incited them to rebellion. Another circumſtance, which it is aſtoniſhing the Athenians did not attend to, is, that their expedition would certainly irritate the Lacedæmonians, who, being upon the watch, would not have failed to ſeize this opportunity, as the diverſion the moſt advantageous they could deviſe to diſtreſs their natural enemy. It was evident that, by dividing her forces, Athens expoſed herſelf to the hazard of being repulſed, both in Sicily and Peloponneſus. In a word, ſince that Republick could collect a ſufficient ſtrength to beſiege a City ſo conſiderable as Syracuſe, was it not more rational to undertake the ſiege of Sparta, and then threaten the foreign Provinces with the re-united forces of Greece, rather than to make the ruin of the Grecians the conſequence of foreign triumphs.

In proportion to the abſurdity of the enterprize, the meaſures purſued to accompliſh it were extravagant. Before the departure of their fleet, the Athenians paſſed a decree

decree, by which it was ordered to their Commanders, that when they ſhould have deſtroyed Syracuſe and Selinuntum, the inhabitants of theſe two Cities ſhould be ſold, and a tribute exacted from the other Cities of Sicily. This was, certainly, to invite the Syracuſans and Selinuntines to defend their liberties to the laſt extremity; and by reducing them to deſpair, force them to the neceſſity of being invincible, if there was any means left to do it. It was to alienate the hearts of the reſt of the Sicilians, and to deprive one's ſelf of their aſſiſtance againſt Selinuntum and Syracuſe, by convincing them that their own intereſt, and that of thoſe two Cities, ought to be inſeparable.

Since the Athenians had no more at their head a Themiſtocles, who could, by his wiſdom and talents, repair the folly of an enterprize commenced under ſuch evil auſpices, this war left ſome feeble hope of ſucceſs, but as much as it ſhould be carried on by Alcibiades, whoſe courage and genius were calculated to give birth to a ſingularity of events, to thoſe unexpected turns of fortune

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that ſometimes confound reaſon, and change the nature of things. But ſcarce was that General landed on the coaſt of Sicily, when his enemies conſpired his ruin; and by ſecuring the Prieſts and Religion in their intereſts, contrived to have him recalled, to anſwer ſome criminal accuſation before the People.* Nicias, who had conſidered this war as the effect of a kind of delirium in his Fellow-citizens, ſhared the command with Lamachus, an enterpriſing ſoldier who believed that courage and perſeverance were ſure to produce ſucceſs, and that the moſt favourable ſituation for acting was always that wherein he found himſelf. He was ſlain, and after his death, Nicias was frightened to ſee himſelf alone at the head of the army.

* To this Alcibiades apparently conſented, and went on board the galley; but on arriving at Thurium he diſappeared. Arriving afterwards at Argos, he applied to the Spartans for permiſſion to live in their City, and under their protection, making them in return an offer of his beſt ſervices. The Spartans, overjoyed to have in their power ſo able a General of their enemy, received him with the higheſt marks of eſteem. By means of accommodating himſelf to the way of life of every country, in which he had occaſion to live, he imitated with the greateſt eaſe the Spartan temperance and auſterity, and by that means quickly gained their ſincere affection. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades.*

While he oppoſed the ardent impetuoſity of his colleague, he was obliged to have an opinion; but his incertitude returned the moment he commanded alone. He ſent to Athens for re-enforcement, and new Adjutants; and in expectation of their arrival, remained inactive, meditating an honourable retreat. Demoſthenes and Eurymedon were appointed to help Nicias; and theſe Generals, whoſe diſſimilarity of character rendered it impoſſible for them to think or act in conjunction, had alone been capable of overturning the moſt practicable and beſt-concerted operations. The Athenians were defeated; Nicias taken and put to death by the enemy; not a ſingle ſhip returned, and very few of the men eſcaped either ſlaughter or captivity; all was diſmay and confuſion in Athens.

After ſuch immenſe loſſes, the reader will eaſily comprehend the impoſſibility the Athenians were in of ever recovering their former ſplendour. Their finances were totally exhauſted; without veſſels, without

 ſailors,

ſailors, they could ſcarce procure themſelves the neceſſaries of life by ſea; and Attica remained uncultivated, ſince the Lacedæmonians, by the advice of Alcibiades, who had taken refuge amongſt them, had fortified Decalia,* from whence they ravaged the country with impunity. Unable to keep their Allies in awe, the Athenians experienced every day the defection of ſome of them. Lacedæmon, on the contrary, found herſelf more and more ſtrengthened by the alliance ſhe contracted with the Cities whom they had diſguſted by their haughtineſs; and to fill up the meaſure of the misfortunes which attended them, revenge induced the Syracuſans to furniſh a numerous fleet, which gave the Spartans the empire of the ſea; while the Ambaſſadors of Tiſſaphernes, a Perſian Governor of the maritime Provinces in Aſia, offered them to furniſh the expences

* An important poſt, within eighteen miles of Athens, whence they commanded the whole country, and prevented the Athenians from working their ſilver mines, or deriving any advantage from their land. All proviſions, therefore, before arriving at the City, were brought a great way about, and became ſo dear, that many of their ſlaves deſerted to the enemy, for want of food.

of their warlike preparations, if they would proceed with diligence to the total extirpation of the Athenian power.

The fate of this People was decided, if the Spartans had attacked the Pyrœeum. The confuſion that reigned in their Government, ſays Thucidides, would have been augmented. The Athenians would have ſunk under their irreſolution, and their dominion would infallibly have been circumſcribed within the limits of their walls. But, continues the ſame hiſtorian, this is not the firſt time that the natural ſlowneſs of the Lacedæmonians has made them loſe their advantages. In reality, no circumſtance could appear deciſive to a People, who never had any fixed object in view during the courſe of the war, and Lacedæmon found herſelf, in ſome manner, embarraſſed by the accumulation of her forces.

This ſuperiority, however, ſoon vaniſhed away: the Syracuſans were obliged to recall their troops to defend themſelves againſt the Carthaginians; and Alcibiades, who found himſelf

himſelf treated with contempt ſince the diſgrace of his country, and who feared of being cruſhed by its impending ruin, enlightened Tiſſaphernes* on the true intereſts of Perſia. He made him ſenſible, that far from putting an end to the war that deſolated Greece, and lending aſſiſtance to the Spartans againſt the Athenians, he ought to keep up their mutual animoſities, aſſiſt them againſt each other, that they might exhauſt their reſources in their mutual deſtruction, and be at laſt obliged to ſeek for the protection of the Perſian Monarch, who, by that means, would become the mediator, or rather the abſolute arbitrator of Greece.

* Alcibiades, after having been a long while plotting miſchief againſt his countrymen, in revenge of their unjuſt treatment of him, and by it acquired an exhorbitant power at Sparta, at laſt drew upon himſelf the jealouſy of King Agis, and the principal Spartans, who deviſed a plan for the deſtruction of ſo active an adverſary. But being informed of his danger, he fled to Sardis, and put himſelf under the protection of Tiſſaphernes. His engaging manners, and the charms of his converſation, ſoon procured him the friendſhip of that Satrap; who, though of a haughty diſpoſition, freely communicated his ſecrets to Alcibiades. But of what value are wit, bravery, and the fineſt exterior accompliſhments, when they cover a bad heart? Alcibiades ſhewed himſelf there the ſame as at Sparta; a man of no principle, and void of all affection for his country.

The return of Alcibiades to Athens* at this critical juncture, revived in ſome manner its courage. This General obtained over the Lacedæmonians a victory of ſufficient moment to induce them to ſue for peace. Both Republicks had experienced all the calamities of war, and had exhauſted all their reſources, without the leaſt advantage iſſuing from it. This ought to have cured Athens of her ambition, and Sparta of her jealouſy. It was, nevertheleſs, impoſſible to make them agree on ſome eſſential article of the treaty; and Athens had ſoon occaſion to repent having rejected the advantageous conditions offered by her rival. Alcibiades, it is true, was victorious in the field: but his enterprizes being planned only to give a luſtre to the General who conducted them, were uſeleſs to the good of his country. Be-

* Alcibiades, knowing that the Athenians were repenting of their harſh uſage of him, had it privately hinted to them, that he was deſirous to return to Athens, and would procure the friendſhip and aſſiſtance of Tiſſaphernes, provided they would aboliſh the popular form of Government, and reſtore Ariſtocracy. This met with great oppoſition at firſt; but as there appeared no other means of ſaving the Republick, neceſſity forced the People to conſent, and Alcibiades returned.

ſides,

ſides, his inconſiderate conduct furniſhing every day his enemies with new means of ruining him, he was baniſhed a ſecond time, preciſely at the moment when Perſia, * renouncing the Politics adopted by Tiſſaphernes, had declared openly in favour of the Peloponneſians.

The war being conducted by corrupt Commanders, who betrayed the intereſts of their country, or by men of no capacity who did not know them, ſeemed likely to terminate in the total ruin of Greece, when Lyſander appeared at the head of the Lacedæmonians. The face of affairs ſoon wore a different aſpect, under an ambitious Chief, whoſe genius, diſengaged from the maxims of his time, was made to open itſelf an untried road to glory, and to trace a plan of action,

* Cyrus, diſtinguiſhed in hiſtory by the name of Cyrus the Younger, had been appointed Governor of Aſia Minor by his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon. The ambition of this Prince was boundleſs; and deſirous to execute a long meditated ſcheme of uſurping the Throne, he contracted a ſtrict league of amity with the Greeks, particularly thoſe of Peloponneſus. His deſign was to gain them to his intereſt; judging, with reaſon, that his ſcheme could never ſucceed, unleſs he united a body of Greeks with his Provincial Forces. With this view he ſupplied Lacedæmon with a conſiderable armament.

whoſe

whoſe importance was far from being felt by his Republick.

Although diveſted of the pre-eminence they ſo long enjoyed, embittered by a long and tedious war, and warmly ſolicited by both Greeks and Barbarians to ruin Athens, the Lacedæmonians ſtill remained attached to their ancient principles of moderation; and nothing proves better the wiſdom of the inſtitutions of Lycurgus.* As if they had flattered themſelves, that by humbling the pride of their rival, they could induce her to return voluntarily into the ſubaltern rank which ſhe ought to occupy, they never thought of her total deſtruction. But Lyſander made them ſenſible, that after ſo long and obſtinate a war, there remained but one party which ſeemed prudent and ſecure, which was to take violent meaſures, and to

* If I am not miſtaken, this obſervation is a ſufficient reply to the reproaches thrown out againſt Lycurgus, both by Polybius and Ariſtotle. The latter accuſes that Legiſlator of fruſtrating his own intentions, by making moderation the baſis of a military Republick. The other blames him for ſuffering the Spartans to aſpire to the Empire of Greece. Surely theſe writers did not conſider that almoſt ſix hundred years had elapſed between Lycurgus and Lyſander.

follow

follow them to the laſt extremity; that a peace, whatever were its terms, would be but a tranſitory truce, if they left the Athenians the leaſt hope of reinſtating themſelves; and that Sparta ought to profit of her preſent ſuperiority to terminate a quarrel, which might otherwiſe break out when circumſtances ſhould be leſs favourable. Since that time, this General looked upon every ſucceſs as a ſtep which led him to the deſtruction of his enemies. If he defeats the remains of their maritime forces, it is with a view of blocking them up by ſea, while Agis and Pauſanias ſhould beſiege them by land.

The fatal moment ſoon arrived. Athens, reduced to the laſt extremity, begged for peace, conſented to demoliſh the fortifications and the walls of the Pyræeum. She freed the Cities which paid her tributes, recalled her exiled Citizens, delivered up all her gallies except twelve, and engaged never to enter into any war but under the orders of Lacedæmon. In fine, Lyſander filled up the meaſure of humiliation which he intended

tended to lay on the Athenians, by changing their Government: he aboliſhed Democracy, and veſted all the authority in thirty Citizens.

Nothing prevented the re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient ſyſtem of Policy in Greece; and it is probable, that Lacedæmon would have been ſatisfied with regaining the ſupremacy ſhe had formerly enjoyed, if ſhe had been permitted to follow her natural inclinations. But in the very moment of her triumph, while proſperity rendered her leſs attentive to herſelf, ſhe was deceived by the General to whom ſhe was indebted for her fortune, and who was baſe enough to ſacrifice his country to ſelfiſh gratifications.

Never did a Spartan poſſeſs leſs of the manners of Sparta than Lyſander. Oaths, treaties, love of the country, honour, perfidy, were with him but mere words. He knew no difference between virtue and vices, but as much as they were more or leſs inſtrumental to the purpoſes of his ambition. The quality of Citizen appeared to him mean, and he aſpired to that of King. Not with

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the idea of a tyrant, who wiſhes to over-turn the Government of his country, but as a ſkilful Politician, and under the ſpecious pretence of reforming its abuſes. His plan, ſay the hiſtorians, were to decry the hereditary right to the Throne as a barbarous cuſtom, that frequently entruſted the reins of Government to the hands of an infant, or ſometimes of a man ſcarce capable of being a Citizen; while the happineſs of a nation ſeem to require that Royalty ſhould be the recompence of merit. But in order to prepare the minds for ſo important a revolution, it was neceſſary to undermine the general conſtitution of the State; to ſlacken the authority of the Laws, flatter paſſions, and above all, to inſpire the Spartans with a taſte for novelties. It was not yet enough for this refined Politician to have ſucceeded in introducing the uſe of gold and ſilver *

* Lyſander, in the zenith of his glory, reſolved at laſt to return to Sparta, there to enjoy the fruit of his ſucceſs; and ſent before him the money he had amaſſed, which is ſaid to have amounted to 1500 talents. On this occaſion it was debated at Sparta, whether it was not an infringement of the Laws to admit this ſilver into the City. The wiſer blamed Lyſander for introducing among them

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into his country, under the pretence of ſupporting its power by new enterprizes; but in reality with the view of corrupting the morals of his Fellow-citizens, and aſſociating them with more facility to his deſigns: he was willing to ſee all Greece concurring to his elevation; and this he eaſily effected by the abolition of popular Government in all her Cities, and eſtabliſhing in its ſtead Regents, who were as many men ſold to his will, becauſe they had no ſupport but his protection.

The death of Lyſander ſaved the Spartans from the blow with which they were threatened; but it left them poſſeſſed of a kind of authority which it was almoſt im-

that pernicious metal, which had always proved the bane of mankind. On their remonſtrances, the ſilver was ordered by the Ephori to be carried out of the City, but the friends of Lyſander oppoſed this ſentence, and propoſed that it ſhould be depoſited in the publick treaſury, ſolely for the ſervice of the State. Plutarch ridicules this experiment. It was not, ſays he, gold and ſilver of which Lycurgus was apprehenſive, but avarice, the conſequence of gold and ſilver. The event ſhewed that the prohibition of uſing them commonly, had the effect of making them more paſſionately deſired; and the Spartans, ſenſible of their value, ſoon employed the moſt tyrannical means to extort them from thoſe under their ſubjection.

poſſible

poſſible for them to maintain. Very far, in reality, from having prepared their elevation with that ſkill, which an inveſtigation of the Policy of Philip, will, in the next book, enable me to explain, he omitted inſtructing them to conceal their ambition, to inſpire their neighbours with confidence, and to intereſt them in their proſperity; miſguided by Lyſander, they had, on the contrary, behaved with as much haughtineſs and ſeverity as the Athenians, and all Greece breathed vengeance. The ſole friends of Lacedæmon were the tyrants eſtabliſhed by Lyſander, and whoſe ruin was prepared by the death of their protector.

Whatever praiſes I have hitherto beſtowed upon the Government of Lycurgus, it was not calculated to preſerve in his Republick the ſort of Empire which ſhe owed to the Policy of Lyſander. The great Legiſlator had prepared her to domineer by that aſcendancy which a ſuperiority of merit and virtue never fails to create. The other had only procured a domination which it was neceſſary to defend and ſupport by

force.

force. As nothing could be more contrary to the ſpirit of the laws of Lycurgus than thoſe ambitious purſuits in which the Spartans were now abſorbed, this ambition which was abſolutely heterogeneous to their character, ought neceſſarily to confound their deſigns, as ſoon as they became conquerors. *In all our actions*, ſays one of the moſt celebrated Politicians, *let us imitate nature: as ſhe never produces large branches upon ſmall ſtems, let no little Republick attempt to ſubdue States more powerful than her own. If, by a ſingular favour of fortune, ſuch enterprizes were crowned with ſucceſs, ſhe would ſoon experience the ſame fate as a tree whoſe branches ſhould be larger than the trunk, which the firſt blaſt of wind would rent to pieces: this is*, continues he, *what happened to Lacedæmon which had conquered all the Cities of Greece; no ſooner did Thebes revolt, than her example was followed by the other Cities, and the withered trunk remained without branches.*

It is true that ſince Lyſander had introduced in his country the ſpoils of the vanquiſhed, and levied regular tributes upon its

Allies,

Allies, the poverty of Sparta ceaſed to be an obſtacle to her aggrandizement, and that ſhe could carry war into diſtant countries, and form conſiderable enterprizes. But did Lyſander, in giving treaſures to the Lacedæmonians, inſtruct them how to make a proper uſe of them, how to render them uſeful to the Republick, before they could baniſh from it the morals and the laws eſtabliſhed by Lycurgus, and before it was poſſible that corruption, which is their natural concomitant, ſhould become a new cauſe of its deſtruction?

It is very important here to obſerve, that it was not with their own ſtrength, but with the forces furniſhed to them by the Perſians, that the Spartans ſubdued the Republick of Athens. Nor were they indebted for that aſſiſtance to Artaxerxes Mnemon, the reigning Monarch, but to Cyrus his brother, whoſe views they had favoured, and who, after having revolted, in order to ſeat himſelf upon the Throne, had been vanquiſhed, and loſt his life in his defeat.

Deprived

Deprived of the protection of a Prince to whom ſhe owed her grandeur, Sparta had rendered herſelf exceſſively odious to the Court of Perſia, and at the ſame time all Greece irritated, as I have ſaid before, at her ill treatments, was contriving how to ſhake off her yoke. Hiſtory offers few inſtances of a more deplorable ſituation: I do not blame therefore the Spartans for having ſunk under the weight of calamity; but for having done nothing of what it was in their power to do to prevent it. They ought to have made of Greece a bulwark againſt the Barbarians, that is to ſay, to have treated her with humanity; to have reſtored to her Cities their Laws and Government; in a word, to have confined themſelves within the bounds of the Empire they had formerly poſſeſſed. If theſe ſacrifices appeared too hard to their vanity, they ſhould have courted the friendſhip of Artaxerxes, diſavowed their approbation of Cyrus and his Grecian followers, and above all gained to their intereſt the Satrapes of Aſia Minor.

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The Republick of Sparta, on the contrary, treated the Grecians with greater ſeverity than ever; and when the Perſian Monarch ſeemed contented with extending his vengeance to the Grecian Colonies of Aſia Minor, ſhe piqued herſelf on a fooliſh generoſity, and reſolved to reſtore them their liberty.

Ageſilaus no ſooner began to render himſelf formidable in Aſia, than Artaxerxes fitted out a conſiderable fleet, to the command of which he appointed Conon, an Athenian, who had taken refuge in his Court. He, at the ſame time, diſpatched Timocrates, the Rodian, into Greece; and this emiſſary, charged with diſtributing large ſums of money, ſoon prevailed on the principal inhabitants of Thebes, Corinth, Argos, &c. to form a league, which became ſufficiently powerful to intimidate the Spartans, and force them to recal Ageſilaus. From this inſtant the Empire of Lacedæmon ſhook to the very center, and ſoon after the Thebans compleated the ruin of that Republick.

Since the time the Spartans became maſters in Cadmæa, and placed a garriſon there,

the ſupreme authority in Thebes had been veſted in the hands of a few of the Nobility. Hiſtorians tell us to what exceſs theſe tyrants abuſed their power, and with what courage and addreſs Pelopidas exterminated them, and regained the Citadel of Cadmæa, before it was in the power of the Lacedæmonians to aſſiſt it. This act of hoſtility was the origin of a ſhort war, in which the Thebans gained ſeveral advantages. The manner in which Ageſilaus conducted himſelf in this war, would lead one to conjecture that his ſucceſs in Aſia was leſs to be attributed to his capacity, than to the aſcendant of the Grecians over the Perſians, if one could not accuſe his great age of having extinguiſhed in him that ardour, that activity, and that foreſight of which Xenophon has left us ſo beautiful a panegyric. However it be, in this caſe, he undertook nothing great, nothing deciſive, and he is, with juſt reaſon, cenſured for having made incurſions upon the Theban territory, which were, it ſeems, very proper to

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try the courage of the inhabitants, and teach them the art of war.

Polybius expreſſes a juſt contempt for the Government of Thebes; and it was, in reality, to the ſole talents and perſonal qualities of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, that this Republick, decried through all Greece for the ſtupidity of her Citizens, and her alliance with Xerxes, owed the eminence and glory ſhe afterwards acquired.

It was natural that theſe two great men ſhould be rivals: but their virtues equal to their talents, gave them but one and the ſame intereſt, which was the publick good. Born in the boſom of opulence, Pelopidas deſpiſed riches. Epaminondas feared that fortune ſhould interrupt his Philoſophic poverty. The firſt was impetuous and enterprizing in war, maſter of every branch of military knowledge, he, however, eſteemed leſs his reputation than the intereſts of his country: a rare example! He was happy to find that his antagoniſt was more uſeful to the Thebans than himſelf. Epaminondas, on the other ſide, ſeemed to be ignorant of the ſupe-

riority of his talents. He had paſſed, almoſt againſt his own will, from the School of Philoſophy to the Government of the State; in a word, to the penetration, courage, and prudence of Themiſtocles, he joined the virtues of Socrates.

Pelopidas gained a victory at Tegyra, which was, ſays Plutarch, a ſpecimen of that of Leuctra, which afterwards ſhewed the weakneſs of the Lacedæmonians, and put an end to their Empire. In that action Epaminondas diſplayed all the reſources of his genius; or, in other words, that combination of talents which conſtitutes the character of an accompliſhed General. But it was with the depth of the moſt profound Politician, that he preſerved to his country her newly acquired ſuperiority. With the view of compleating the diſgrace of the Lacedæmonians, he placed at their gates two irreconcileable enemies; he re-eſtabliſhed in her ancient rights Meſſena,* and built Me-

* Near three centuries were elapſed ſince the City of Meſſena was deſtroyed by the Lacedæmonians, who reduced one part of

galapolis.

galapolis.* His conduct was as humane and as juſt as that of the Athenians, and the Spartans had been cruel and tyrannical. Inſtead of deſtroying the conquered Cities, ſelling the inhabitants, or changing their Laws, he treated them as Allies. Orchomenæa, Phocidæa, Locrida, and Ætolia, experienced this favour.

As all the Provinces of Greece bordered upon the ſea, and formed but one People with the neighbouring Iſles and the Colonies eſtabliſhed on the coaſts of Aſia Minor; Epaminondas judged, that as long as a Republick, ſatisfied with having the ſuperiority either by land or ſea, ſhould not reunite the two Empires, ſhe would only enjoy a precarious degree of power. He determined in conſequence the Thebans to eſtabliſh a formidable marine. He repreſented them, that if they were content with occupying the place of Lacedæmon, they

the Natives to a ſtate of ſlavery, and baniſhed the other from Peloponneſus, under pain of death ſhould they return.

* Megalapolis was a ſtrong and powerful City, inhabited by a Colony of Arcadian Emigrants, till then diſperſed in ſmall hamlets; and who, by this re-union, were incapacitated to keep Lacedæmon in awe, and to revenge the injuries their anceſtors had received from that Republick.

would ſoon find another Athens, which, proud of her maritime ſtrength, would perhaps ruin them, or at leaſt make them pay dear for their defeat. In fine, all the views, all the enterprizes of Epaminondas conſtituted the parts of a whole, and flowing from the ſame ſource, tended to the ſame end.

The Lacedæmonians, defeated at Mantinæa remained deſtitute of reſources, and loſt even the hopes of ever recovering the blow. This battle put the finiſhing hand to the power of the victorious Thebans; but Epaminondas was ſlain, and at that inſtant, ſays Xenophon, his army believed itſelf vanquiſhed: the infantry became motionleſs, the cavalry already in purſuit of a flying enemy, ſtopped, and did not dare to follow their advantage. Thebes remained with a reputation which ſhe was incapable of preſerving. As to her power, it fell with the great man who had formed it, who ſupported it, but did not live long enough to eſtabliſh it on a ſolid foundation.

Although the Thebans, ſtupidly attached to their cuſtoms, had never been able or

willing

willing to comprehend the importance of the reforms propoſed to them by Epaminondas, they had nevertheleſs ſo little diſcernment as to attribute their late victories to their own good conduct, and to believe it an eaſy matter to preſerve their Empire. This pride accelerated their ruin, by impelling them to form enterprizes above their ſtrength. *Athens is humbled*, ſaid Jaſon, the Tyrant of Pheres, to the Theſſalians, *the grandeur of Sparta is no more; the Thebans are riſing, and I foreſee their decline; conſider then in your turn how to poſſeſs yourſelves of the credit which they are going to loſe.* Nothing can prove better how inferior the conquerors of Sparta were to their fortune, than a circumſtance related by Xenophon. The very day before the battle of Leuctra, ſays this judicious hiſtorian, Epaminondas feared leſt Cities of Beotia, who were ripe for revolt, ſhould attack Thebes, which was not in a ſtate of defence, at the moment ſhe was attaining the Empire of Greece.

END *of the* SECOND BOOK.

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
GREEKS.

BOOK III.

SO long as Athens had Allies, who, by the tributes they paid, contributed to the expence of their military expeditions, and indulged their propenſity to indolence, luxury, and pleaſures, ſhe did not perceive the dangerous conſequences of that corruption introduced by Pericles, in giving to the Citizens ſalaries, to enable them to frequent the ſpectacles and attend to publick judgements. But when her Empire was circumſcribed within the narrow bounds of Attica, it was a neceſſity that all the revenues of the State ſhould be expended in thoſe retributions,

butions, or that thoſe among the People, who had no other fortune, ſhould renounce them to re-aſſume their ancient manners; and according to the inſtitutions of Solon, ſeek in a painful labour the means of ſubſiſtence.

Was it poſſible to expect ſuch an effort of ſelf-denial from a People, whoſe taſte for ſports and ſhews had riſen into an immoderate paſſion, and who, dejected by the laſt reverſe of their armies, had not only loſt all hope of recovering the ſhock, but even of the love of glory and of their country? The wealthy and the Magiſtrates dreaded, on their part, that if they ſhould try to awake the People from their intoxication, and perſuade them to relieve the Republick from a burden under which ſhe was ready to ſink, they might be tempted to require the abolition of debts, and an equal diviſion of lands. Sacrificing then publick good to private avarice, they made every effort to confirm and perpetuate this abuſe. Under theſe circumſtances, Eubulus got a decree paſſed, by which the funds ſet apart for the exigencies of war, were appropriated to the ſupport of

publick

publick ſpectacles, prohibiting, at the ſame time, under pain of death, every perſon from propoſing any other application of them, or even the revocation of the promulged decree.

From this period, Athens accuſtomed herſelf to the ſtate of humiliation which ſhe was reduced to. Military talents, as well as civil virtues, were no longer in eſtimation; the Poets and Comedians became the idols of the People, and the intereſt of the Commonwealth was abſolutely neglected. *Your Panathæa and your Bacchanalian revels*, ſaid Demoſthenes to his Fellow-citizens, *are ſtill celebrated with magnificence: on the appointed day yu have foreſeen every thing; no difficulty but yu have ſurmounted it. Is a new theatrical repreſentation to be exhibited? The diſtribution of the parts is an affair which you diſcuſs with the mſt ſerious attention. No one of you is ignoran of the names of thoſe Citizens ſelected by each ribe to attend the rehearſals of its muſical or athletc entertainments. But if the State is in dange, if neceſſity prompts you to oppoſe an enemy, who openly threatens your liberty, then you ceaſe*

to

to be attentive; the debates fatigue you, you ſome-ſee nothing; and if at laſt you paſs a decree, it is only executed in part, and that too late.

While the poverty of the State produced ſuch ſhameful depravation in the manners of the Athenians, and confirmed their diſgrace, the riches introduced by Lyſander into Sparta, prepared a revolution no leſs deplorable in the Laws of Lycurgus. It was decreed, ſays Plutarch, that theſe riches ſhould be appropriated ſolely to the exigencies of the Republick; and that a Citizen, convicted of having in his poſſeſſion any piece of gold or ſilver, ſhould be puniſhed with death. But, adds the wiſe hiſtorian, how could it be expected that private people would deſpiſe what the publick admired? What uſe was it, that the Law ſhould watch at the doors of their houſes, in order to prevent the admiſſion of gold, while ſhe opened their hearts to avarice? Gold and ſilver ſoon found their way from the publick treaſury into private habitations. The Citizens were already corrupted, although ancient auſterity ſeemed outwardly

outwardly to ſubſiſt. They amaſſed, without daring to enjoy, waiting to ſhew their wealth, until the number of the guilty could be ſufficient to brave and ſubvert the Law.

Luxury, which made its firſt appearance but in trembling, ſoon ſucceeded in impreſſing reſpect. We would have, however, but a very imperfect idea of the kind of diſorders which theſe beginnings of corruption introduced in Sparta, were we to compare them with thoſe that the ſame cauſe has produced in other States. The ruſticity of the Lacedæmonians could, only by ſlow and difficult gradations, be faſhioned into that elegant refinement of pleaſure, which ſoftens the heart, and debaſes the mind. Riches, beſides, ſubverted only a few of the Laws of Lycurgus; ſeveral preſerved their whole influence; ſo that Sparta, however tainted with corruption, preſented yet to the Greeks a ſpectacle worthy of admiration, if their attention had been leſs fixed on the virtues ſhe abandoned, than on thoſe ſhe yet retained.

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The Law which the Ephorus Epitadeus promulged, by which it was permitted to ſell eſtates, and to diſpoſe of them by will, was the laſt ſtroke given by avarice to the manners of the Lacedæmonians. The door was no ſooner opened to the traffick of inheritances, than the greedineſs of the wealthy invaded all Laconia.* The Citizen, deſpoiled of his patrimony, found himſelf impelled by more preſſing conſiderations than the duties he owed to his country; he courted the favour of the rich, and, from this moment, diſtinctions were no more attached to probity, but only to riches. The vices of

* Ariſtotle, who wrote about ſixty years after the death of Lyſander, in his examen of the Spartan Republick, condemns highly that Law which permitted the alienation of their lands. He affirms, that the ſame quantity of land, which, whilſt equally divided, ſupplied a militia of fifteen hundred horſe and thirty thouſand foot, could not in his time furniſh one thouſand; ſo that the State was utterly ruined for want of men to defend it. In the reign of Agis the Third, about one hundred years after the time of Ariſtotle, the number of the old Spartan families was dwindled to ſeven hundred; out of which about one hundred rich over-grown families had engroſſed the whole land of Sparta, which Lycurgus had formerly divided into thirty-nine thouſand ſhares, and aſſigned for the ſupport of as many families. So true it is, that the landed intereſt diffuſed through a whole People, is not only the real ſtrength, but the ſureſt bulwark of the liberty and independency of a free country.

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the Great became neceſſary to the maintenance of the Multitude; and the hands of the Spartans, which Lycurgus had deſtined to wield the ſword, were vilified by the implements of arts which luxury introduced into Laconia.

Such was the ſituation of thoſe two celebrated Republicks, a ſhort time after the death of Epaminondas; and no one will doubt, but their declenſion was preparing the ruin of all Greece, if one conſiders the changes which the Peloponneſian war introduced in its Politicks, in its intereſts, and in its manners.

Diodorus obſerves, that by the treaty of truce which Athens and Lacedæmon concluded in the tenth year of the war they made againſt each other, they mutually ſacrificed to an ill-judged avidity, the intereſts of their Allies. Not knowing that the beſt way to ſatisfy ambition is to conceal it, they agreed to keep poſſeſſion of the towns they had conquered; and reſerved, by another clauſe, a liberty of changing in concert any articles of this convention, or of making new ones,

ones, as the exigencies of their affairs might require. It wanted no more, adds the ſame hiſtorian, to kindle ſuſpicions among the principal Republicks of Greece. They began to fear a coalition between Sparta and Athens; and that, inſtead of continuing a ruinous war, they ſhould make a partition of the reſt of Greece.

However unreaſonable theſe alarms may appear, Ambaſſadors were immediately diſpatched from all ſides, to form a league againſt the two Nations who were accuſed of aſpiring to tyranny. Argos, Thebes, Corinth, and Elis were the firſt in that negociation. It is true that theſe Cities, accuſtomed to a ſubaltern part, did not know how to aſſume Politicks ſuitable to a Power of the firſt order; and that, for want of a man who could regulate their conduct, they did not ſucceed in their project: but they taught the other Grecian States to ſhake off the yoke of ſubordination; and from that period Sparta and Athens, were but names without any authority. This beginning of anarchy increaſed, in proportion as the ſtrength of

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the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were exhauſted, and leſs in a condition to command reſpect. But as ſoon as the Thebans arrived to the ſupremacy in Greece, there was not a Commonwealth but thought herſelf powerful enough to aſpire to an equal ſhare of glory; and all flattered themſelves with being able to preſerve the Empire by a conduct more wiſe. This is what Demoſthenes reproached the Athenians with, when he complained bitterly, that there was of all ſides States which offered to take Greece under their protection, and who ſought, in reality, only how to oppreſs her. *The Grecians themſelves*, ſaid he, *are actually their greateſt enemies. Argos, Thebes, Corinth, Lacedæmon, Arcadia, Attica, each of theſe Republicks, I except none, has a ſeparate intereſt.*

Nor was this the only diſorder to which Greece was a prey. Thucidides tells us, that in the firſt year of the Peloponneſian war, avarice and the thirſt of power had cauſed a multiplicity of diviſions among the Corcyreans. Under the ſpecious pretence of preſerving the rights of the People, and of employing

ploying in the Adminiſtration of publick affairs none but the moſt honeſt men, the Magiſtrates, whoſe ſole intentions were to promote their own private intereſts, formed parties, which ſoon degenerated into factions impoſſible to be conciliated, and whoſe animoſities, on the contrary, were not little embittered by the machinations of Athens and Lacedæmon. One of theſe Republicks favoured the pretenſions of the People, the other ſupported Ariſtocracy: each party, availing themſelves of the protection they received, made the ſtrongeſt efforts to oppreſs their enemies.

This diſeaſe in the Corcyreans, continues Thucidides, became a kind of epidemical diſorder, which communicated its infection through all Greece with amazing rapidity. The want of confidence that exiſted between the Nobles, the Rich, and the People, ſince they had extirpated Monarchial Government, appeared every where; but with ſo much more liberty now, that the Athenians and Spartans exerciſed, with regard to each City, the ſame Politick which had fomented the diviſions in Corcyra. Every party made

exceſſive demands, and ſupported them with obſtinacy. Tumultuous clamour was the only reply of injuſtice to the arguments of her adverſaries; who, reduced to deſpair, broke in their turn into outrageous tranſports. They came armed into the publick Aſſemblies, and proceeded to the moſt violent extremities; becauſe the domineering faction, not content with ſtrengthening her power, wiſhed alſo to enjoy the pleaſure of revenging the injuries ſhe had received. All of a ſudden vices and virtues exchanged their names: fury was called courage, and knavery prudence; the wiſe man paſſed for a coward, the inſolent for a zealous friend, and Policy became the art of doing, and not repelling evil. No man was permitted to remain neutral, and preſerve his integrity, and the moſt ſacred oaths were ſnares laid to entangle credulity. In a word, according to the ſame hiſtorian, if there was any conſolation to be obtained amidſt ſo many misfortunes, it reſulted from the advantage which men of the dulleſt intellects ſometimes had: diſtruſting their incapacity, they had recourſe to prompt

prompt and violent remedies, while their enemies were the dupes of their own ſubtle intrigues and artifices.

Theſe diſorders, ſays Diodorus, grew to a higher pitch of diſtraction, after the Thebans had fallen from that point of elevation in which Epaminondas had placed them. Every day one or other of the Grecian States baniſhed a part of their Citizens; and theſe proſcribed men, wandering from territory to territory, ſtirred up every where ſome enemies to their country. At the moment they leaſt expected it, they were recalled by a faction that wanted their aſſiſtance to ſeize on the reins of Government; and theſe were ſoon ſnatched from their hands by a new revolution.

Each Republick had then, at the ſame time, ſeveral different intereſts to attend to: the one was relative to the general happineſs of the Community, the other to the private advantages of the Citizens at the helm: the oppreſſed had their own, each cabal had her own; and theſe various intereſts, multiplied to infinity, oppoſed, interrupted, and de-

ſtroyed continually each other. One day ſuch a Republick was your Ally, the next ſhe was your moſt inveterate foe: your partizans had been either murdered or baniſhed; and the contrary faction had already eſtabliſhed the Government on diametrically oppoſite principles.

Amidſt ſo many troubles and obſtacles, it was next to an impoſſibility to have any fixed object in view, and to act a long time on the ſame principles. No City, therefore, could acquire over Greece an aſcendant ſufficient to prevail upon the whole to aſſociate under the ſame Government, and to re-unite their divided forces, in order to oppoſe them to a foreign enemy, if any had thought proper to ſubdue them. Fortunately for the Grecians, Perſia had laid aſide all thoughts of extending her empire on that ſide of Europe. The Illyrians and Thracians were ſufficiently employed by their ancient enemies; and in looking at Macedon, it was ſcarce poſſible to imagine that, in ſuch a ſmall country, they could have forged chains ſtrong enough for the captivity of all Greece.

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This little kingdom had not yet enjoyed any conſideration and was at that time in the moſt embarraſſing circumſtances. Amyntas, the father of Philip, had been a weak Prince. Overpowered by the arms of the Illyrians, and upon the point of loſing his Crown, he could deviſe no better method of revenging his defeats, and raiſing up enemies to his Conquerors, than by ceding his kingdom to the Olynthians. After having experienced the moſt cruel reverſe of fortune, he was reinſtated by the Theſſalians, and continued to reign with the timid irreſolution of a man, who has ſeen himſelf on the brink of ruin, and owed his ſafety to foreign aſſiſtance. Amyntas was ſucceeded by Alexander, his only ſon, who made but a momentaneous appearance upon the Throne. His ſubjects refuſed to obey a Prince who did not know how to command. At the ſame time that he experienced the aſcendant of the Illyrians, part of Macedonia revolted againſt him, and his Eſtates were almoſt all invaded by his enemies when he died.

The Prince who ſucceeded him was yet leſs worthy of his rank: Perdicas was deſtitute of every talent neceſſary to obtain reſpect, when even he ſhould have had to command a happy and ſubmiſſive People. Ptolomy, a natural ſon of Amyntas, ſeized on one of the Macedonian Provinces, and rendered himſelf independent. Pauſanias, a Prince of the Royal blood, who had been baniſhed, taking advantage of the publick commotions to return to his country, put himſelf at the head of a conſiderable party of Malecontents, and of that croud of men of obſcure birth and turbulent ſpirits, ſuch as are, almoſt every where, the authors and inſtruments of revolutions. Perdicas loſt his life in a battle againſt the Illyrians; and Macedon, whoſe Sceptre paſſed by that accident into the hands of an infant, was in ſo unhappy a ſituation, as to ſee herſelf obliged to lament the death of Perdicas as a new misfortune.

Pauſanias now openly aſpired to the Throne, and Argeas, another Prince of the blood

blood Royal, actuated by the ſame ambition, collected an army to oppoſe his rival. The ancient enemies of the State, availing themſelves of theſe domeſtick troubles, had already penetrated into the heart of the country, when Philip, who was then an hoſtage at Thebes, made his eſcape, and flew to the relief of the kingdom of his anceſtors. No ſooner, ſay the hiſtorians, did he appear in Macedon, than every part of it felt the effect of his preſence. He was immediately declared Regent of the kingdom during the minority of his Nephew; but the Macedonians, ſoon experiencing how much it was their intereſt to have ſuch a man as Philip at the helm of their Government, decreed him the Crown.

However deplorable was the ſituation of Macedon, her misfortunes were not, like thoſe of Greece, irremediable. When a free People is once corrupted, they grow familiar with their vices; they love them, they cheriſh them; and it is very ſcarce to find that a private Citizen has courage enough to ſtruggle againſt the prejudices, paſſions, and cuſtoms,

toms, which reign imperiouſly in the breaſts of an undocile Multitude; or has credit enough to perſuade his degenerate countrymen to make an effort upon themſelves, in order to recover the point of happineſs from whence they are fallen. But if a Republick is in ſome manner incapable of reformation, what muſt have been the States of Greece, where every City was a diſtinct Republick? Hiſtory ſcarce offers two or three examples of free Nations who have ſuffered that a Legiſlator ſhould deprive them of their errors, and amend the abuſes of their Government. Was it then natural to expect, that a prodigy ſo rare ſhould become common in favour of the Grecians? And if this change was operated in one only or two of their Republicks, did it not become uſeleſs to the general ſafety of the nation? Since the corruption of the other States would have offered to her enemies a thouſand means of accompliſhing her deſtruction.

The hiſtory of Monarchies is, on the contrary, full of thoſe kind of revolutions ſo

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ſcarce in Republicks. As the Citizen there is not his own Legiſlator; as he is obliged to obey and to receive whatever impreſſion his Sovereign is pleaſed to impoſe, a great Prince has it always in his power to form a new People: the ſubject awakes from his lethargy, quits his vices, and without hardly perceiving it, aſſumes a new character, and the portion of virtue which one chuſes to give him.

So far was it that the talents which nature had beſtowed on Philip, had been diminiſhed by a bad education, that, on the contrary, the misfortunes of his family had taught him to adorn them with additional virtues: educated in a Republick, where the People is the ſole Adminiſtrator of his own Laws, he ſaw nothing of that pride, oſtentation, and flattery, which beſet the avenues of a Court, intoxicate Princes with their power, and perſuade them that they are great enough by their birth to need any other kind of grandeur. Accuſtomed to that pliancy, that refined addreſs, by which the Magiſtrate of a Democracy ſubdues the paſſions

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of a Multitude, which is his maſter; he brought with him upon the Throne that moderation, that patience, that reſpect for men, which will ever raiſe a Prince above the Laws, and give him an unbounded authority.

Nothing can be more inſtructive than a ſerious examination of the conduct of Philip. There is no precept of Policy to be recommended to a King, but can be found in the life of the Macedonian Monarch; and whoever acts on the ſame principles, will never fail to have the ſame ſucceſs. It was firſt neceſſary to prepare victory to ſoldiers accuſtomed to fly; and it is by ſhewing them beforehand a confidence of which they were yet undeſerving, that Philip teaches them how to reſpect themſelves. Inſtructed in the art of war by Epaminondas, he tranſported into Macedon the exact diſcipline which the Thebans owed to that great man. Philip himſelf invented the Phalanx, that admirable order of battle, which appeared ſo formidable to Paulus Emilius, at a time, nevertheleſs, when its original force had been much weakened,

weakened,* by the attempts that had been made to improve it. If that Prince mingles in the ranks with the common ſoldiers, and by his example teaches them to dare dangers, he has firſt, as a General, tried their

* The Phalanx was a body of ſixteen thouſand men, formed into a ſquare fifteen deep, when the Romans firſt carried their arms into Macedon. It was invincible, ſays Polybius, as long as it remained united: but it ſeldom happened that a body which occupied the ſpace of twenty ſtadia, or a league, could find a proper field for action. The intervention of a hill, a ditch, a river, or a moraſs, deſtroyed its ordnance, and its enemies could ſo much the more eaſily ruin it, that is to ſay, penetrate into thoſe openings, the unavoidable conſequence of inequality of ground; becauſe the ſoldier could make no evolution, nor fight man to man. Suppoſing it even without any foreign obſtacles, it was very difficult that the Phalanx, from its own movements, ſhould not ſuffer ſome fluctuation in its march: and whether in purſuit of a flying enemy, or purſued itſelf in its flight, it entirely loſt its ſtrength. From theſe remarks of Polybius, we are led to conclude, that the capital defect in the Phalanx was, its being compoſed of too great a number of ſoldiers; and that the ſucceſſors of Philip were injudicious in altering the original inſtitution, from ſix or ſeven thouſand men to more than double that number. The more ſuch a maſs was augmented, the more muſt it be embarraſſed in the choice of ground, and its marches muſt be ſlow, difficult, and dangerous. The reader may ſee in Polybius a parallel between the Macedonian manœuvres, and thoſe of the Romans. He gives the preference to the laſt. It muſt, however, be allowed, that with regard to the particular juncture when Philip inſtituted the Phalanx, it was the happieſt diſpoſition that could have been contrived. The manner in which the Romans ranged their troops, in three lines, and in ſmall diviſions, with intervals between, is only proper for troops well exerciſed, and accuſtomed to brave dangers; and the Macedonians were not ſuch when Philip aſcended the Throne. He was then obliged to form a plan, which by its nature could inſpire them with confidence, and required but very little experience in the management of arms.

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courage; he fears to oppoſe it, and wiſhes to conquer by force thoſe only difficulties which cannot be ſurmounted by prudence. If he employs the force of arms to ſubdue Argeas, a man of reſtleſs ambition, whom it is impoſſible to reduce but by overwhelming him; it is by negociations that he ſeeks to ruin Pauſanias: whilſt by dint of money and promiſes he detaches the Thracians from the party of this rebel, he flatters him, amuſes him with fair hopes, and keeps him inactive, until he finds himſelf in condition to threaten him with all his forces.

Publick tranquillity is no ſooner reſtored, than Philip's whole attention is turned to the improvement of every part of his dominions. He fears to give ſtrength to an abuſe, if he attacks it without being ſure of ruining it; he feigns not to perceive a vice which he cannot reſtrain; and thinks of reeſtabliſhing order, but when he has found the certainty of enforcing it. If he inſtitutes new Laws, he has already prepared the minds of his ſubjects to obey them; in a word, the

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movement which he gives to Macedonia is ſuch, that nothing in it remains either inactive or uſeleſs. Such is the progreſs of a well-calculated ambition, which extends its dominion at home, and makes, as it were, the conqueſt of its own ſubjects, before it meditates in vain that of its neighbours.

Philip had ſcarce accompliſhed the ruin of his greateſt enemies, I mean the indolence of his ſubjects, their timidity and their indifference for the publick good, when he was expoſed to the hazard of ſplitting on a very dangerous rock: this Prince had viſited the different Republicks of Greece; he had ſtudied their genius, their intereſts, their ſtrength, and their reſources; he had been witneſs of the fall of Sparta, and of the declenſion of the Thebans; he knew to what pitch was derived that depravity of manners I have mentioned in the beginning of this book; and perſuaded himſelf that Greece ſeemed voluntarily to meet the yoke, and waited only the ſummons of a maſter. If he entered it by the means of their diviſions, he

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was ſure to find Allies. What hopes muſt Philip conceive from the oppoſite intereſts of ſo many different People? Any other Prince had perhaps yielded to the dictates of his ambition, and would have certainly been diſappointed.

Let me be permitted to obſerve, that hiſtory is filled with numerous examples of States either deſtroyed, or confined within the narrow ſphere of mediocrity, for having too eagerly ſeized the opportunities which fortune offered of aggrandizing themſelves. Philip knew that in order to give utility to ſucceſs, there is a regular gradation to be obſerved; that ſuch a conqueſt, which is difficult and uſeleſs in itſelf, when undertaken the firſt, becomes eaſy, confirms preceding advantages, and ſecures new ones when it is made the ſecond enterprize. Had this Prince made an immediate irruption into Greece, the ancient enemies of Macedonia would not have failed to begin, as immediately, their hoſtilities. The Peonians, Illyrians, and Thracians, would have been ſo many auxiliaries

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to the Grecians; and Philip, obliged to ſuſpend his efforts on one ſide, in order to march to another, would have put himſelf under a neceſſity of dividing his forces. Thus going alternately from the Greeks to the Barbarians without finiſhing any thing, he would have multiplied the obſtacles which oppoſed his own aggrandizement, and reduced himſelf to the neceſſity of employing much time, pain, and treaſure, in ſubduing combined enemies, whom he might with eaſe have ſeparately overcome.

Philip had ſhewn himſelf too ſkilful a Politician againſt Argeas and Pauſanias, not to be cautious of creating new adverſaries before the old were defeated. He turned firſt all his forces againſt the Peonians, and ſubdued them; then the Illyrians and the Thracians had ſucceſſively their turn; he recovered from them all the places they had taken from Macedonia, deſtroyed their principal fortreſſes, and built new ones on the borders of his own territory; nor was it till after he had humbled the Barbarians, ſo as to

prevent

prevent any apprehenſion of danger on their ſide, that he undertook to make himſelf maſter of Greece.

Moſt projects are unſucceſsful, becauſe the execution of them is begun from the very moment they are conceived; nothing in conſequence is prepared. Eager to make in haſte proper diſpoſitions, one ſees the objects but half, confuſedly, or through the falſe medium of a ruling paſſion. Inſtead of taking the lead of events, one is reduced to ſeek how to remedy them; they ſoon command, and from that moment it is fortune, not intelligence, that decides the ſucceſs. It happens more frequently yet, that States have but vague and indeterminate ideas of what can effect their aggrandizement; from which it reſults, that a Power deficient in principle, deſtitute of Allies, and odious to its neighbours, never knows preciſely whom he ſhall have to deal with. Not being able, therefore, to direct its views to a fixed point, nor to prepare beforehand by Politicks the ſucceſs of its arms, it never enjoys the natural

tural advantages of its ſituation, and always finds enemies whoſe forces are entire.

Philip, on the contrary, meditated a long time his enterprize againſt the Grecians, and before he attacked them, he was aſſiduous in fomenting their diviſions. With this view he flattered the pride of one Republick, promiſed his protection to another, and courted the alliance of a third; he refuſed, granted, or withdrew his aſſiſtance, as it was moſt conformable to his intereſt. Under pretence that his finances were exhauſted in the wars which he made againſt the Barbarians, or that he wanted to build palaces, and adorn them with the moſt exquiſite productions of art, he borrowed conſiderable ſums of money, at extraordinary intereſt, of all the Cities of Greece: but the object of his Policy was to have in his hands the fortunes of the moſt powerful Citizens of each Republick, and by that means ſecure them to his own intereſt. His intention was to introduce in Greece a new ſort of commerce, the prelude to a new ſpecies of corruption; which, un-

der the appearance of ſatisfying the demands of his creditors, made him ſo many penſioners. In a word, that he might have nothing to fear from the ſtrength of the Grecians, he multiplied their vices.

Inſtructed by the example of Athens and Sparta, who owed their ruin to their tyrannical ambition, Philip, in beginning the conqueſt of Greece was willing to vanquiſh the Grecians by the Grecians themſelves; and to act only as an inſtrument to their mutual jealouſy. Sometimes he gained the affections of a People by his benefactions; ſuch was the caſe of the Theſſalians, whom he delivered from their Tyrants, and reſtored to their former privilege of aſſiſting in the Council of the Amphictyons. At other times, he ſeemed to execute with regret the very meaſures which he himſelf had inſpired. If he carried his arms into any Province of Greece, he had been invited. Thus he entered Peloponneſus only at the prayer of Meſſena and Megalopolis, who complained of ſome incroachments of the Lacedæmonians. Was he ſenſible of the

importance

importance of getting poſſeſſion of a City? He did not ſeek to irritate the inhabitants; he, on the contrary, offered them his friendſhip, and excited their ambition in order to embroil them with their neighbours. But no ſooner had this unfortunate Republick fallen into the ſnare, than playing off all the ſecret ſprings he had prepared to bring about a rupture for himſelf, or feigning to defend the oppreſſed, he ruined his enemy, without incurring the leaſt ſhadow of ſuſpicion. The Olyntheans were the dupes of this Policy, when, relying on the protection of Macedon, they incurred the diſpleaſure of the Potideans.

No Prince, in order to render his deſigns impenetrable, knew better than Philip the art of varying his conduct, without varying his principles. Negociations, alliances, truce, peace, hoſtilities, retreats, inaction, all was employed by turn: and all tended to the accompliſhment of that end from which he appeared the moſt remote. Skilful in bringing forth glimmering lights, in giving fears,

hopes, and ſuſpicions, in confounding or ſeparating objects; his Enemies were always ambitious, his Allies ungrateful, while he alone reaped the fruits of the wars in which he had engaged only as auxiliary.

What brought Philip the ſooneſt to the Sovereignty of Greece, was the decree of the Thebans, by whom he cauſed himſelf to be charged with revenging the injuries done to the Temple of Delphos, and to the rights of the Amphictyonic Council, by the ſacrilege of the Phoceans. Beſides the glory he acquired in finiſhing a war that had laſted ten years; the right, forfeited by the vanquiſhed, of ſending a deputy to the Council, was perpetually annexed to Macedon; and that Power ſhared likewiſe with the Beotians and Theſſalians the prerogative of preſiding at the Pythian Games, of which the Corinthians were deprived, as a puniſhment for aſſiſting the Phoceans.

However inconſiderable in themſelves theſe advantages might be, they changed in ſome manner their nature in the hands of

Philip.

Philip. The Pythian Games, like the other ſolemnities of Greece, were, it is true, no more than publick revels, ſhows, and feaſts of no utility: but ſince the Greeks were become frivolous enough to make them an object of importance, it was not a matter of indifference to a Prince ſo ſkilful as Philip, to preſide over them, and to have in a manner the ſuperintendency of their pleaſures.

The Council of the Amphictyons had loſt all its authority, ſince the ancient principles of Government had been altered. The People having taken the habit of conſulting only their ambition, and of doing themſelves juſtice for the injuries they had received, no longer carried their complaints to that General Aſſembly; and its decrees were as yet looked upon with a kind of veneration, but as much as in them Religion was intereſted. Notwithſtanding this degradation, Philip acquired no ſmall advantage in being admitted into it. He was no more a ſtranger to Greece; he could, without incurring ſuſpicion, enter more intimately into their affairs, and aſſiſt, in ſome degree, in the

Councils of a People, whom it was his deſign to ſubdue.

This Prince eaſily ſucceeded in gaining a total aſcendancy over a body of men, who, ſince a long time, were already guided by the impreſſions of foreign influence. But in order to render it a more uſeful inſtrument to his ambition, he revived its dignity, and, without ceaſing to direct all its motions, he reſtored the greateſt part of its ancient laws. The Prieſts, the men of probity, and all the perſons of real Religion, devotees to the Temple of Delphos, had already begun to admire and exalt the reſpect and zeal which Philip ſhewed for the Gods; his Penſioners, on their turn, proclaimed and magnified his juſtice and his moderation; and there was no other talk through all Greece but of the return of the golden age. The beſt part of the Citizens, wearied with domeſtick feuds, flattered themſelves with ſeeing very ſoon the return of an uninterrupted tranquillity; whilſt ambitious intriguing men, and the heads of the different factions, congratulating themſelves in ſecret of the immenſe credit

credit acquired by their Protector, foreſaw an approaching revolution, and contributed, by their extravagant praiſes, to the general deluſion. In a word, ſo infatuated were the Grecians in favour of Philip, that even Demoſthenes, his greateſt enemy, ſuddenly altered his language: inſtead of perſevering to impel the Athenians into a war, he ſpoke of peace; and pronounced a diſcourſe to determine them to acknowledge the new dignity of Philip, and to give their approbation to the decree which admitted him as a member of the Amphictyonick Council.

Till then, that Orator alone had unveiled the projects of this ambitious Prince, and made every effort to open the eyes of the Multitude, and rouſe them in their own defence. Had it been in the power of any man to awake the Athenians from their lethargy, to inſpire the Grecians with their priſtine valour, and reſtore them to a community of intereſts, Demoſthenes would have accompliſhed it; he, who, by the fire of his orations, at this day ſtill agitates and inflames

flames the paſſions of his readers! But he ſpoke to the deaf; and thanks to the more eloquent liberality of Philip, when the Orator propoſed and inſiſted with all the powers of his eloquence on the neceſſity of levying an army and equipping gallies, a thouſand voices cried out, *Peace is the greateſt of bleſſings.* Demoſthenes ſpoke to the love of glory, to the love of the country, to the love of independency, when thoſe paſſions exiſted no more. The Macedonian Penſioners, on the contrary, worked upon, and intereſted the indolence, avarice, and luxury of the Athenians; ſo that this Republick, rooted in her inactivity, was incapable of exciting the emulation of Greece by an example of ſpirit or reſolution.

But, when even Philip ſhould have made uſe of leſs art to ſubdue the Greeks, did Demoſthenes know which was their actual ſituation with regard to each other; that is to ſay, to what pitch were arrived their implacable hatred, their jealouſies, their diviſions, the diverſity of their intereſts, which kept them in a continual warfare; when he expected

pected to re-unite them, and to form againſt Macedon a general league, ſuch as had been formerly made againſt Perſia?

Let us refer to what Polybius ſays on the ſubject. *However eſteemable*, ſays the hiſtorian, *the conduct of Demoſthenes may in many inſtances appear, one cannot excuſe him for having laviſhed the infamous appellation of traitors, to the moſt reſpectable Citizens of ſeveral Republicks, becauſe they were attached to the intereſts of Philip. All theſe Magiſtrates, whoſe reputation Demoſthenes has endeavoured to ſully, might eaſily have juſtified a conduct, which either augmented the ſtrength and power of their reſpective Republicks, or prevented their ruin. If the Meſſenians and Arcadians thought that their intereſts were not the ſame as thoſe of Athens; if they preferred imploring the protection of Philip, to ſuffering themſelves to be enſlaved by the Lacedæmonians; if they neglected to guard againſt remote evils to ſeek a remedy againſt an impending misfortune; ought Demoſthenes to brand theſe proceedings as a crime? This Orator was greatly deceived, if he fancied that the intereſts*

reſts of Athens ſhould be conſidered by the reſt of Greece as neceſſarily interwoven with their own.

One may eaſily pardon Demoſthenes for not having perceived at firſt the changes which had happened in the Political ſyſtem of Greece, and for having taken for the mobile of his actions ſuperannuated maxims, whilſt he ſhould have adopted new ones, better calculated for the diſpoſition of the times; an error too common in Stateſmen! But could he not perceive, that the injuries which he beſtowed ſo plentifully on the Magiſtrates of Meſſena, Megalopolis, Argos, Thebes, far from producing the effect he expected, could only create enemies to the Athenians, and partiſans to Philip? After he had tried the weakneſs, irreſolution, and baſeneſs of his Fellow-citizens; after he had known from experience the inutility of the Embaſſies which he wearied Greece with, why did he not change his views? Muſt not the Politician and the Citizen appear deſpicable in our

eyes,

eyes, at the very moment the Orator commands our admiration?

In order to oppoſe the fortune of Philip, Demoſthenes dares to adviſe the Athenians to raiſe two thouſand foot and two hundred horſe, of which a fourth part were to be Citizens; and to put a few light armed gallies in commiſſion. *I do not form*, ſaid he, *larger demands, becauſe our preſent ſituation does not admit of an armament capable of attacking Philip in open campaign.* What then could be his deſign? *We ought*, continues he, *to confine ourſelves to ſimple incurſions.* A ſtrange manner, indeed, of conducting a war under ſuch circumſtances! Was it neceſſary to have ſuch a great depth of knowledge to perceive the folly of a plan, which, inſtead of inſpiring the Athenians with courage, tended only to awake in them a ridiculous inquietude; which, far from impoſing on an enemy of an acknowledged ſuperiority, was proper to irritate him, and, of courſe, haſten the ruin of Athens? Polybius alſo reproaches Demoſthenes with want

of

of foreſight, and too great a readineſs in giving way to the raſhneſs of his temper. *The Athenians*, ſays this hiſtorian, *yielding at laſt to the ſolicitations of their Orator, oppoſed Philip: they were defeated at Cheronæa, and after this battle they would have preſerved neither their houſes, nor their temples, nor even the quality of Citizens, had not the Conqueror conſulted his generoſity.*

I am ſeized with admiration at the rare good ſenſe with which Phocion ſpoke on the ſame occaſion to the ſame Athenians. That man was as great a General, as Demoſthenes was a bad ſoldier: he entered into the ſituation of his Fellow-citizens, and adviſed them to preſerve peace, although the war might place him at the head of the affairs of the Republick. *It is my opinion*, ſaid he to the Athenians, *that you ſhould endeavour to be the ſtrongeſt, or learn how to preſerve the friendſhip of thoſe that are ſo. Do not complain of your Allies, but of yourſelves, of your indolence, which authoriſes all kind of abuſe in your Government; complain of your Commanders,*

Commanders, whoſe rapine and cruelty riſe againſt you thoſe very people who will be involved in your ruin. I will vote for war, ſaid he, in another place, *when you ſhall be capable of waging it; when I ſhall ſee young people well reſolved not to abandon their ſtandard, the rich contributing voluntarily their quota, and Orators forbearing to pillage the Publick.*

Such was the Policy of Phocion. That great man conſidered his Republick as labouring under a diſeaſe impoſſible to be eradicated; and, like a ſkilful phyſician, far from thinking of reſtoring her immediately to a perfect health, he expected, by a wiſe and circumſpect management, to prolong her life. Enfeebled, in effect, by a long ſeries of evils, violent remedies would have neceſſarily haſtened her diſſolution. Phocion would have ſuffered a virtuous People to abandon themſelves to deſpair, becauſe virtuous People have a right to expect every thing from deſpair; but he knew that it is raſhneſs for a corrupted Republick even to dare what is only difficult. He apprehended the ruin of Greece inevitable; and

was

was ſenſible at the ſame time, that reſiſtance would haſten the blow, and that to parry it a while, was all that human prudence could accompliſh.

What I have hitherto ſaid of the ſituation of Greece, and the ſagacious Policy of Philip, may naturally lead the reader to imagine that Demoſthenes, whether he urged the Athenians to undertake enterprizes which could not be attended with ſucceſs, or by his arbitrary behaviour, increaſed the diviſions amongſt the principal Republicks, was himſelf accelerating the declenſion of Greece, and, conſequently, ſerving the ambition of Philip. But we ought to be cautious in drawing a concluſion that does not appear ſufficiently grounded.* This Prince, on the contrary, conſidered Demoſthenes as a dangerous enemy, and left no method untried to win him to his Party, or at leaſt to purchaſe his ſilence.

* There is reaſon to believe that Demoſthenes himſelf expected nothing advantageous from the meaſures he engaged the Athenians to purſue; for in the great number of exordiums he compoſed at leaſure, and which he made uſe of as occaſion required, there are ſcarce two or three that ſeem prepared in caſe of happy events.

Philip,

Philip, undoubtedly, knew all the advantages he reaped from the imprudence of Demoſthenes; but too ſkilful a maſter of intrigue, not to be certain of ſtirring Greece when he pleaſed, and of producing in it diviſions by the means of his Penſioners and Allies; it was of little importance to him, whether the reſiſtance of a few Republicks furniſhed his ambition with a pretext for ſubduing them; he had no need in that caſe of the ſervices of Demoſthenes. But he dreaded that impetuous eloquence which repreſented him as a tyrant, which by recalling without ceaſing to the memory of the Grecians the glorious actions of their anceſtors, and their love of indepedency, forced him to act with extreme caution and circumſpection. The more art Philip employed to render Greece wearied of her liberty, and to inſpire her with ſuch a confidence as might prepare her to obey when ſhe ſhould be vanquiſhed; with the greater vexation muſt he obſerve that the Athenian Orator unveiled the myſtery of all his projects; and in teaching the Greeks to bluſh

before

before hand at a ſervitude which they were unable to avoid, rendered in ſome manner uncertain the fruit of his victories.

Beſides, that Prince had ſeen that in the former diſputes of Greece, Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and ſome other Republicks, had in their turn implored the aſſiſtance of Perſia, and had uſefully employed the forces of that Monarchy to ruin their enemies. The Greeks no longer conſidered this application as odious; and it was quite natural to think that, after having tried without ſucceſs to find reſources in Greece againſt the Macedonians, Demoſthenes might throw himſelf under the protection of the Satrapes of Aſia. Philip had ſo much the more reaſon to fear ſuch a ſtep from the Orator, that there was a prevailing report, that he had entered into a ſtrict engagement with the Court of Perſia, and that he had even received ſubſidies from that quarter.

If that Power had meddled with the affairs of Greece, the projects of Philip would have been entirely defeated. The immenſe wealth of Aſia would ſoon have bribed away his

his partiſans; they would have re-united all the Republicks, in giving their Chiefs but one ſole intereſt, that of amaſſing riches. Thus, inſtead of vanquiſhing the Greeks by themſelves, that is, by dividing them, Philip would have been obliged to attack them re-united, and to compleat his conqueſt by triumphing over the Perſians The event juſtified how well the alarms of Philip were founded. Demoſthenes, in his third Philippic, introduces the propriety of ſending Ambaſſadors to the King of Perſia, to repreſent to him how much it was his intereſt not to ſuffer the aggrandizement of Macedon at the expence of all Greece, and in particular to preſs him to give an immediate aſſiſtance to the Athenians. The Orator, who at firſt had only ſounded the minds of his countrymen, ſoon inſiſted, in another diſcourſe, on the neceſſity of this reſolution, which was at laſt approved by his Republick. The negociation ſucceeded, and Philip, who had undertaken the important ſieges of Perinthia and Byzantium, found his opera-

tions interrupted by the ſuccours ſent to the beſieged by the Perſian Court and the Republick of Athens.

Now it was that this Prince diſplayed all the wiſdom he was capable of. He judged that, by perſevering obſtinately in his enterprize, it would irritate his enemies, ſtrengthen the bands of their connection, and force them to do from paſſion, what their courage and prudence would never prompt them to attempt. To diſpel the gathering ſtorm, he raiſed the ſiege of the two places which he had already cloſely blocked up, and turned his arms againſt the Scythians.

The Athenians, whoſe vanity was equal with their baſeneſs, had not the leaſt doubt but that this new expedition of Philip was the reſult of deſpair. They believed that, humbled by his diſgrace, he was going to conceal his ſhame into Scythia. Then abandoning themſelves to extravagant tranſports of joy, they celebrated the return of liberty, and thought that Greece had nothing more to fear from a Prince employed

in a war that muſt certainly ruin him.* If Philip heſitated to turn his arms againſt the Scythians, and begin an uſeleſs and ſerious war, that would have prevented him from ſeizing the opportunities of falling upon Greece, the Athenians judged that he was irreſolute and timid, and did not fail to attribute his conduct to conſternation. On the other ſide, the abject ſervility of the Court of Perſia perſuaded Ochus that he had triumphed over Philip. The leſs this pretended triumph had coſt the Perſians, the more unneceſſary they thought it to ſhew greater forces to keep Philip in awe. The pride of their Allies, and their own exultation, prevented them from taking any meaſure for future defence; and, as their ſagacious enemy had foreſeen, the bands which united them relaxed.

* The Scythians inhabited the country which is between the Danube and the Tanais. Theſe People, who lived upon milk and the fleſh of their flocks, did not cultivate the ground, and conſequently had no fixed habitations. To make war with them, was therefore a glaring abſurdity. An enemy no ſooner entered their territory, than he was in want of every thing, and periſhed without ſtriking a blow. All thoſe who ever waged war againſt the Scythians, have had the ſame fate.

Mean while Philip, who watched them from the wilds of Scythia, meditated his vengeance: but, in order to make a ſudden diverſion on the minds, and the better to ſeparate Athens from Perſia, he embroiled the Greeks in an affair, in which he ſeemed to make it his duty not to take any part. Availing himſelf of his credit with the Council of Amphictyons, he perſuaded them to declare war to the Locrians of Amphyſſa, who were accuſed of having appropriated to their own uſe certain conſecrated lands belonging to the Temple of Delphos; and to give the command of the army to Cotyppus, a man, who was entirely devoted to the Macedonian intereſt. This General protracted the war; did not permit himſelf to obtain the leaſt ſucceſs, and even ſuffered the Locrians to gain ſufficient advantages to alarm the Grecians, leſt a ſcandal ſhould be thrown on the honour of Apollo, in ſuffering ſuch a violation of his rights to remain unpuniſhed. The ſpirit of enthuſiaſm once kindled by the partiſans of Philip, all Greece agreed that a general

effort

effort was to be made to exterminate that ſacrilegious People: ſimilarity of circumſtances recalled to the memory the Phoceans: Philip had ſubdued them, he alone could reduce the Locrians. Accuſtomed to this manner of reaſoning, his enemies did not dare to oppoſe it, for fear of being accuſed of impiety; and the Amphictyons, not aware of the conſequences of making ſuch a choice, and well pleaſed to ſave their reſpective States the expences of this war, by a ſolemn degree, elected Philip Commander in Chief of the Greeks.

The more this Prince had hitherto avoided to ſhew any oſtentation, the more he now ſought to impoſe on the minds of men by the pompous apparatus of his expedition, when he ſaw himſelf authoriſed by the States of Greece, and, under the ſanction of Religion, at liberty to give full ſcope to his ambition. He had no ſooner defeated the Locrians, than, profiting of the kind of intoxication which always recompanies ſucceſs, and which men never fail to carry be-

yond the bounds of moderation, he made himſelf maſter of Elatea, collected his forces there, and under colour of puniſhing Athens for aſſiſting the rebels, turned the whole weight of his arms againſt that City. The danger which the Athenians ſaw at their gates, effected what the eloquence of Demoſthenes had pleaded for in vain. The Citizen, tearing himſelf from his pleaſures, immediately re-aſſumed his ancient genius. The Republick contracted an alliance with the Thebans, whom Philip had begun to treat with a kind of indignity, after he had firſt rendered them odious to Beotia; and theſe two Nations fought with the moſt heroic valour in defence of their liberty.

The battle of Cheronea decided the fate of Greece. Philip, ever attentive to divide his enemies, and temper, by acts of clemency, that ſeverity which the exigencies of his affairs ſometimes conſtrained him to exerciſe; met the Athenians with benefactions,*

* Philip, tranſported with joy at his victory, erected a Trophy, ſacrificed to the Gods, and gave preſents to his Officers. Ælian relates, that having next day given a great entertainment, the

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ſent back their priſoners without any ranſom, and offered them advantageous terms of accommodation; while he purſued the Thebans with animoſity, and granted them peace, only after he had lodged garriſons in their Citadels. He was now in poſſeſſion of the moſt advantageous poſts in Greece; his troops were accuſtomed to victory, and all trembled at the name of the Conqueror, or praiſed his moderation. But his new Empire was far from having any ſtability: it was more difficult to render the Grecians patient under the yoke, than to have impoſed it upon them. Their paſſions had inſenſibly led them into ſervitude; but the preſence of a Maſter muſt infallibly open their eyes, and a Nation is never more formidable than when ſhe fights for the re-

wine raiſed him to ſuch an extravagant pitch of exultation, that he run to the field of battle, inſulted the dead bodies of his enemies, and fell a dancing, ſinging at the ſame time the beginning of the decree drawn up by Demoſthenes. It is added, that Demades, who was one of his priſoners, reproached him with ungenerous behaviour, by telling him, that *being Agamemnon, he acted the part of Therſites*; and that Philip was ſo far from being offended at his boldneſs, that he ſet him at liberty; and, as a farther proof of his generoſity, ſent away all the other Athenian priſoners without ranſom. *Ælian*, lib. 8.

covery

covery of her liberty, before ſhe is accuſtomed to obey. In ſuch a one as Greece, naturally fickle, reſtleſs, proud, impetuous and warlike, the leaſt event might have occaſioned a revolution, or at leaſt revolts, which would have put Macedon under the neceſſity of continually fighting, without ever enjoying the fruits of her conqueſt.

Philip compleated his work with as much wiſdom as he had begun it. There is not a more ſtriking object exiſting for Political obſervation than the behaviour of this Monarch after the battle of Cheronea. He contains the pride of victory under an appearance of modeſty; he wins, by his mildneſs, the affections of thoſe whom his proſperity ſeemed to alarm. Each City preſerves her Laws and her Government; not the leaſt mark of violence! It is by embroiling the Greeks with the Court of Perſia, that he pretends to deprive them of foreign aſſiſtance againſt Macedon. It is in flattering their pride, in leading them to the conqueſt of Aſia, that he makes himſelf the maſter of all the forces which they might have

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turned againſt him, that he enſlaves them in their own country, and puts it out of their power to revolt.

He had already ſent ſome of his Generals into Aſia, and was preparing to follow them himſelf with a formidable army, when he was aſſaſſinated. This event was no ſooner publiſhed, than the Thracians, Illyrians, Peonians, and Taulentians appeared in arms, and began hoſtilities. The Grecians, on their ſide, fancied themſelves once more reſtored to liberty; and thinking that the young Succeſſor of Philip, too much engroſſed by the Perſian war, would neglect reducing them, they abandoned themſelves to their natural reſtleſſneſs. But nothing reſiſted Alexander: Thracians, Peonians, Illyrians, Taulentians, all at his aſpect returned to their allegiance. This Prince, however, appeared in Greece to give an example of ſeverity, capable of impreſſing awe on the generality. He ordered the walls of Thebes to be demoliſhed, becauſe that City had been the firſt to raiſe the ſtandard of revolt; then availing himſelf

ſelf of the publick conſternation, he received in an Aſſembly of the Grecians at Corinth, the title of Commander in Chief, ſuch as his Father had, and flew to the conqueſt of Perſia.

Since the reign of Xerxes, this Empire had been gradually declining. The Succeſſors of that Prince, diſcouraged by the affront his arms had ſuſtained in Greece, thought no more of extending their territories; and from that period neglected the eſtabliſhments neceſſary to their own preſervation. The ſweets of peace became a voluptuous idleneſs. The weight of their Crown overloaded Monarchs ſinking under the laſſitude of pleaſure. They ſhut themſelves up in their Palaces, and left to rapacious, cruel, ignorant and treacherous Miniſters, the care of reigning in their name.

Artaxerxes, ſirnamed Longimanus, had made it an art of arming the Grecians the one againſt the other; of ballancing their advantages, and cheriſhing their rivalry, in order to keep them employed at home, and,

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by that means, prevent them from carrying war into Aſia. Such timid Policy degraded the Succeſſor of Cyrus below Lacedæmon and Athens, debaſed the minds of the Perſians, and familiarized them with their own baſeneſs.

Xerxes II. and Sodgian made but a ſhort ſtay upon the Throne, which they diſhonoured by their debauchery and cruelty. Theſe two monſters were ſucceeded by Darius Nothus. This was a ſlave decked with the ornaments of Royalty. Intended by nature to obey, every one wiſhed to govern him; and he diſentangled himſelf from the ſhackles of ſome of his Eunuchs, who had made him the inſtrument of their injuſtice, only to ſubmit more ſervilely to the more imperious authority of his Wife.

Under the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, all tranſactions in Perſia were decided by the intrigues of women and favourites. This Prince had none of thoſe qualities which raiſe deteſtation; but the puſillanimity of his character led him to tolerate in his Court, and among his Satrapes, thoſe irregularities,

which

which he ſhould not have dared himſelf to commit. His brother had almoſt ſucceeded in an attempt on the Crown; and, in the courſe of the frequent revolts which broke out towards the cloſe of his reign, ſuch crimes were perpetrated, as equally diſhonour the mind and the heart.

If I forget, ſaid Xerxes the Firſt, *the injuries which my father has received from the Grecians: the conflagration of Sardis, the incurſions which they have made in Aſia, and the battle of Marathon, do not believe they will be affected with my moderation; it will excite their pride. My generoſity will be conſtrued into fear or impotence, and theſe People, whom I ſhall neglect to chaſtiſe, will enter Aſia ſword in hand. It is impoſſible that Grecians and Perſians be ever more united; too much hatred and contempt divides them: either Perſia muſt ſubmit to receive Laws from Greece, or Greece become a Province of Perſia.*

The Succeſſors of Xerxes ſhould have looked upon theſe words as the ſtandard of Perſian Politicks, particularly ſince the battles of Salamin, Platæa, Mycale, and the exploits

ploits of the Athenians under Cimon, had demonſtrated the truth of them in the cleareſt light. Artaxerxes Mnemon ought to have conſidered, that there are natural antipathies which nothing can conquer, and every thing increaſes. Injuries are often obliterated among individuals, becauſe they can give one another marks of a ſincere repentance, and that, in the courſe of a renewed intimacy, they can inſpire one another with new ſentiments of affection; but rival States have not the ſame advantage. Publick alliances, very different from private connections between two Citizens, do not extinguiſh their jealouſies; theſe ſuſpicions maintain a ſecret antipathy, and it is not uncommon to ſee two Nations, united for a long time by a conformity of intereſt, and in whom the habit of hating and offending each other has never been diminiſhed.

It was then the duty of Artaxerxes Mnemon to put an end to the long diſagreements between his predeceſſors and the Grecian Republicks; and if the reader recollects what I

have

have ſaid of the ſituation of Greece after the death of Epaminondas, he will readily judge how eaſy it was to profit of the fortunate circumſtances which afterwards contributed to the ſucceſs of Philip.

It was a contracted habit amongſt the Grecians to have recourſe to the Court of Perſia, either for redreſs or protection. Artaxerxes had enjoyed a great credit in Greece; he had often been the arbitrator of their differences, and had dictated to ſeveral Republicks the conditions on which he wiſhed them to make peace; he was himſelf the guarantee of it, and experienced that, by refuſing his aſſiſtance to all, he rendered them equally incapable of ſupporting a war againſt each other. The greateſt difficulty was then over: the Grecians were prepared to receive the yoke of Perſia; it remained only to impoſe it. Without having need of thoſe wiſe and ſkilful precautions which were neceſſary to a Prince ſo circumſcribed in power as Philip, Artaxerxes would have had the ſame ſucceſs, if, while he ſhould have poured ſome

ſeaſonable

ſeaſonable liberalities into Greece, he had been attentive to maintain a powerful marine. He would have had it in his power to invade Macedon, before Alexander could have ſuppreſſed the revolts in his neighbourhood, or eſtabliſhed himſelf upon the Throne of his anceſtors.

But the underſtanding of Artaxerxes was too contracted to comprehend all theſe advantages, and his ſoul was too mean to profit of the favours offered by fortune, if he abandoned the timid Politicks of his predeceſſors. Deceived by the courage of the ten thouſand Grecians, who followed Cyrus the Younger in his expedition, and whoſe retreat is, undoubtedly, the moſt extraordinary event in ancient hiſtory, he thought, perhaps, that Greece was yet the ſame as in the days of Themiſtocles. He dreaded her efforts; and when he experienced the ſuperiority of the arms of Ageſilaus, thought himſelf exceſſively happy in the removal of ſo formidable an enemy, by bribing ſome of the Grecian States to carry war into Laconia, and make a diverſion in his favour.

The

The Acceſſion of Ochus to the Throne offered an alarming ſpectacle to the eyes of Perſia. This monſter put ſuch of his brothers to death as were leſs unworthy of reigning than himſelf; and afterwards extended his proſcriptions to his whole family. Covered with the blood of his relations and his ſubjects, he abandoned himſelf totally to voluptuouſneſs. There was in all Perſia one only man more wicked than Ochus; the Eunuch Bagoas: one ſhudders at the thought of his inhumanity; yet ſuch an abominable villain was wanted, to revenge worthily the Empire of the evils it had ſuffered. Arſes aſcended, in trembling, the Throne of his Father, and Bagoas deſtroyed him to give the Crown to Darius Codoman.

If a wicked, weak, or luxurious Prince, frequently ſuffices to overturn the beſt eſtabliſhed Monarchy, how was it poſſible that the Empire of Cyrus ſhould reſiſt the united vices of his Succeſſors? The character of Darius is, however, treated by hiſtorians with far more reſpect than his Predeceſſors; he had perſonal courage, was generous and humane;

humane; and though he poſſeſſed an authority without bounds, he conſulted the Laws, and reſpected the manners of his ſubjects. But his mind was unenlightened and irreſolute; he had none of thoſe active qualities, whoſe exertion might have defended his Throne againſt the ſtorm that threatened it. Darius began to reign almoſt at the ſame time that Alexander ſucceeded Philip; and when even he ſhould have been a great man, he ſhould not have had time enough to reform the abuſes, correct the vices of the Government, fix to his vaſt Empire ſprings capable of moving it, and enable it to reſiſt a powerful Enemy. Not being able to become, as it were, the ſoul of Perſia, and to communicate to her that ſpirit which glowed in his own breaſt, he could oppoſe to Alexander ſubjects only, to whom the glory or diſgrace of the State was equally become indifferent; armies without courage or diſcipline, and accuſtomed to fly before the Grecians; Courtiers with debauched hearts, eager to make their profit either of the weak-

neſs of their Prince, or publick misfortunes, in order to gratify their avarice, their ambition, and the mean jealouſy which divided them.

Alexander paſſed in Aſia with thirty thouſand infantry, and five thouſand cavalry. Darius was defeated, Perſia conquered by the arms of Macedon, yet the plan of Philip was not executed. It was, as I have already obſerved it, to divert the attention of the Grecians from the recent loſs of their liberty; to take away from them the forces which might have nouriſhed their confidence; and accuſtom them to obey, in making for himſelf an Empire within which their country would have been incloſed, that this Prince intended carrying war into Aſia. His ſon, on the contrary, ruſhed upon the States of Darius, thinking only how to overturn all that preſented itſelf before him, without eſtabliſhing any thing. An enterprize prudent in the hands of Philip, became raſh in the hands of Alexander. The firſt, in planing this expedition, intended to join to his own

own forces two hundred and thirty thouſand Greeks, which gave almoſt a certainty to the hope he entertained of conquering Darius, and of having ſucceſſes more laſting than thoſe of Ageſilaus; for being the maſter of all the forces of Greece, he had no occaſion to fear being interrupted by any revolt. The Second, begun his conqueſts with a ſmall army, and his imprudence in ſo doing is ſo much the more to be blamed, as he was not ignorant that his power was odious to Greece, and that the Perſians might eaſily find Allies amongſt ſome of the Republicks, and in his abſence make a powerful diverſion.

If Darius had had firmneſs enough not to ſuffer himſelf to be intimidated by the raſh preſumption of Alexander; if he had followed the wiſe advice of Memnon, and imitated the Policy of his predeceſſors in diſtributing ſome money among the Grecians; if he had armed for his defence thoſe troops whom his Enemy had neglected to take with him, is it not probable that Alexander, who had entered Aſia with as little precau-

tion* as Ageſilaus, would have experienced the ſame fate? This laſt was obliged to abandon his conqueſts, and renounce the well-grounded expectation of ruining an Empire which had formerly been the terror of Greece, in order to fly to the aſſiſtance of Sparta; and the other muſt have been forced to haſten to the defence of his own hereditary dominions.

Unſatisfied with the Monarchy of Cyrus, to penetrate into India, to meditate the conqueſt of Africa, that of Spain and Gauls, and after croſſing the Alps, to propoſe returning into Macedonia through conquered Italy, was forming a plan vaſtly remote from the views of Philip, and ſubſtituting to it nothing rational. Wherein does the glory of thoſe conqueſts conſiſt, whoſe ſole object is the depopulation of mankind? What name

* I have taken notice in the preceding book of the imprudence the Lacedæmonians were guilty of in commencing a war with Perſia; whilſt, notwithſtanding their advantages over the Athenians, they had but a very precarious authority over Greece. Had Ageſilaus been as great a Politician as he was a great Captain, he would not have neglected to require that all the Republicks of Greece ſhould contribute to his expedition; he would, in a word, have followed the Politicks of Philip.——*See the Eulogium on Ageſilaus, by Xenophon,—Plutarch,—Diodorus Siculus.*

ought

ought we to give to a Conqueror who continually looks before him, without ever deigning to caſt his eyes behind? Who, marching with the raging impetuoſity of a torrent, flows away, diſappears, and leaves after it nothing but ruin and deſolation! What were the hopes of Alexander? What did he for the advantage of Macedon? Could he be inſenſible that ſuch greatneſs could not be laſting; that conqueſts ſo rapid, ſo extenſive, ſo diſproportionate with the ſtrength of Macedon, could not be preſerved? If he was ignorant of ſuch common maxims, though evident truths; if he could not unravel the ſecret ſprings, and the ultimate end of his Father's Politicks, we muſt admit the intelligence of this Hero to have been confined within extremely narrow bounds; if, on the contrary, nothing of all that eſcaped his penetration, and he could not yet moderate his deſires, we ought to conſider him as a madman, to be hated by poſterity.

Darius having offered Alexander ten thouſand talents, and the half of his Empire,

Parmenion thought it unwiſe to reject theſe offers; *I would accept them*, ſaid he, *if I was Alexander*;—*ſo would I*, replied Alexander, *were I Parmenio*. This reply, not very remarkable for its good ſenſe, has been admired, becauſe it ſhews the whole character of Alexander, and announces clearly that his courage and ambition were equally unbounded. Philip would have thought like Parmenio, and immediately have concluded a peace with Darius. Maſter of one part of Aſia, he would have laboured uſefully to promote the glory and welfare of the Macedonians. He would have imprinted reſpect and fear on the Grecians in ſurrounding them with his power. In a word, he would have founded a great Empire; and in eſtabliſhing a conſtant order among the ſeveral Provinces of his dominions, he would have left his Succeſſors in a condition of preſerving his conqueſts, and even of extending them.

The character of theſe two Princes, conſidered in this point of view, affords an amazing contraſt. In Philip, we ſee a Politician ſuperior

ſuperior to all events, and formed to govern mankind. Fortune can oppoſe no obſtacles which he has not foreſeen, and which, conformably to their different nature, his wiſdom, patience, courage, or activity, will not enable him to ſurmount. We diſcover an immenſe genius, whoſe enterprizes are all connected together, and help one another in their ſucceſſive execution. What he now performs, is a conſequence of what he has done before, and prepares to a future action. In Alexander we ſee an extraordinary warrior, whoſe raſh and impetuous valour cuts every where, (if I am allowed the expreſſion) the Gordian Knot, which his father would have looſed. The exceſs of all his qualifications ſurprizes our reaſon, and makes him appear great, becauſe it renders thoſe who conſider him ſenſible of their inferiority; and inſtead of granting only ſurprize to that rare phenomenon, we give it admiration.

Let us ſuppoſe, for a moment, Philip in Aſia at the head of the forces of Greece. If his prudence ſeems at firſt leſs calculated to intimidate

intimidate Darius than the enthuſiaſm of Alexander, it will nevertheleſs bring him to the ſame end. The audacity of Alexander ſucceeded, becauſe it impreſſed the heart of Darius with fear, a paſſion which contracts the mind, chills the imagination, and renders all the faculties of the ſoul vapid and inſenſible. Darius would have experienced from Philip another kind of conſternation. The King of Macedon would have ſurrounded him with ſnares; he would have availed himſelf of the diviſions that reigned in Aſia, whoſe Provinces, diſunited in Manners, Religion and Laws, had not the leaſt connection with each other; he would have awakened every where the ſpirit of revolt; tempted the ambition of thoſe proud Satrapes who breathed but independency; he would have traded in Cities, and, as it has been ſaid, carrying on war like a Merchant, as well as a General, he would have ruined the Empire of the Perſians; and Darius, without perhaps having been vanquiſhed, had ſeen his power annihilated.

Place

Place Alexander in his Father's ſituation, and Macedon, which had not entirely ſunk under the imbecility of her laſt Kings, will be cruſhed under the courage of Alexander. If any of her neighbours ſeeks to take advantage of her weakneſs, or of the confuſion of her affairs, our Hero will run to vengeance, without having prepared it. It would be uſeleſs to recapitulate here all the critical conjunctures in which Philip was engaged. I confine myſelf to recal the raiſing of the ſiege of Perinthia and Byzantium. Was Alexander capable of ſuch a conduct? *

He abandoned the manners of the Grecians, and adopted thoſe of Perſia. Some writers, to ſave the glory of this Hero, have imagined that this change was the effect of his Politick, in order to conciliate the affections of the Barbarians, and by that means eſtabliſh his new Empire. If this was his

* It muſt be allowed, ſays Mr. Tourell, that at firſt ſight we are inclined to give the preference to Alexander, the ſplendor of whoſe conqueſts outſhines that of Philip's; but on a more narrow inſpection, and on ballancing the obſtacles that lay in the way of the one, againſt the circumſtances that forwarded the ſucceſs of the other, we ſhall be of opinion with Cicero, that the Son was a great Conqueror, but that the Father was a great Man.

real

real motive, does not the fallacy of his judgement deſerve reprehenſion? In order to ingratiate himſelf with his new ſubjects, was it prudent to ſhock the old ones? The Grecians, though leſs numerous, deſerved, without doubt, ſome regard; they were brave, warlike, and jealous of their liberty; the Perſians, accuſtomed to fawn, and ſubmiſſive to the rod of deſpotiſm, were made to be ſlaves. It was, therefore, on the ſide of Greece, rather than on that of Perſia, that the Kingdom of Macedon could be menaced with a revolution. And indeed, at the death of Alexander, the Grecians made an effort to break their chains: but Aſia never thought of it, and a celebrated Politician aſſigns a reaſon for this difference. What advantage, ſays he, could accrue to the Perſians from preferring the family of Darius to that of Alexander? Whoever ſucceeds in dethroning a deſpotick Prince, needs not fear to ſee his prey wreſted from him. Theſe, over whom the vanquiſhed commanded, were men baſe and without virtue, he had poſſeſſed alone all the authority; none then, after his fall,

ſhall

ſhall have credit enough to arm the People, and to lead them on to revenge the death of a Maſter, whoſe fate is indifferent to all.

The change of Manners in Alexander proceeded from mere depravity. When he entered the tent of Darius, which was adorned with the richeſt and the moſt magnificent ornaments, this Prince, whoſe ſoul had yet been opened to the ſole paſſion of conquering, was ſo dazzled with the brilliant appearance of the objects round him, that he could not forbear exclaiming to his attendants, *This is indeed to reign!*—This beginning of corruption expanded with proſperity. Maſter of all, he choſe at laſt to enjoy.

Whatever Plutarch may ſay, let no one think that Alexander ever thought of connecting the various Provinces of his Empire ſo narrowly, as to make of them a ſingle body that was to laſt for ever. The more the qualities that conſtitute a Conqueror were conſpicuous in him, the leſs room was there to diſplay thoſe of a Legiſlator. Far from remedying the evils which the ambition of his Lieutenants ſeemed to forbode,

Alexander

Alexander foreſaw their diviſions with tranſports of joy: he conſidered their future Wars as Funeral Games inſtituted to his memory. He gave himſelf the ſignal, when he deſigned vaguely for his Succeſſor *The moſt Worthy*. It is very probable that this Prince believed it of importance to his fame, that his Succeſſor ſhould be leſs powerful than himſelf, and that ſeveral great Monarchies ſhould be formed from the ruins of his Empire.

END *of the* THIRD BOOK.

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
GREEKS.

BOOK IV.

THE ſervility of the Perſians, and the weakneſs of Greece were exceſſive; yet the power of the Macedonians tended to its ruin. It ſeems to be the fate of Empires ſo vaſt as that of Alexander, to ſink under the weight of their own importance. Sometimes, the ſecurity in which they are with regard to ſtrangers, lulls them away from the attention with which they ſhould watch over themſelves, and relaxes the ſprings of their Government. At other times, the Miniſters cannot help giving way to the luxuries and pleaſures which beſiege them; and the Peo-

ple,

ple, harraſſed by repeated acts of oppreſſion, abandon themſelves to a lethargic ſtupidity. More often yet, the too vaſt extent of a Monarchy conſtitutes its weakneſs. It is almoſt impoſſible that a proper harmony could be maintained between every part. Nothing, in conſequence of the great diſtance, is executed but with great dilatorineſs; and there being no proportion between the abuſes and the remedies which Policy could apply, prudence, ever leſs ingenious than paſſions, cannot reſtrain a torrent of vices, whoſe force, increaſing with an amazing rapidity, threatens at each inſtant ſociety with an immediate diſſolution.

The terror that accompanied the name of Alexander, the admiration which a thouſand heroick qualities had inſpired for his perſon, and the kind of enthuſiaſm that glowed in the heart of his ſoldiers, were the only bands that maintained obedience. The reign of this Prince was too ſhort, and, when he died, his Monarchy too recent, to have eſtabliſhed Laws, or given authority to cuſtoms that ſhould keep their place. His camp had not been

been a ſchool where one could learn to be moderate and juſt. The Lieutenants of a Hero, whoſe maxim it was that courage and force were legitimate titles to reign wherever there exiſted men, ought to have been intoxicated with ambition. Almoſt abſolute in the Provinces truſted to their care, could it be expected that they would acknowledge the authority of a weak Prince,* and of an infant yet in his cradle, between whom was divided the Throne of Alexander?

Had Perdicas, who was appointed to the Regency, poſſeſſed all the qualities and all the talents of Philip, he could not poſſibly have maintained order and ſubordination. Nothing could repair in him the defect of having been the equal of all the Captains who had been truſted with the Government of the Provinces. His dignity, far from keeping them in awe, irritated their pride and pretenſions. It is true that, reſtrained by the

* Aridæus, brother of Alexander; they gave him the name of Philip on his acceſſion to the Throne. He reigned in conjunction with his Nephew Alexander, the Son of Alexander and Roxana.

fear

fear of rendering themſelves odious, none dared to declare openly againſt a lawful authority; but they paid no deference to the Regent's commands. Each of them regulated his Adminiſtration by Laws that correſponded beſt with his own intereſt, levied armies, built fortreſſes, and refuſed to render any account of the tributes and taxes he cauſed to be collected. In a word, the Macedonian Monarchy, though yet apparently united, was in reality divided into ſeparate and independent Kingdoms.

In a ſituation ſo critical, Perdicas could ſtrengthen the Government but by giving remarkable proofs of his attachment to the family of Alexander. He ought to have reſigned, in ſome manner, his authority into the hands of a Council compoſed of all the Great Men of the State, at whoſe head, after the example of Eumenes,* he might have

* The ingenious fiction of Eumenes, impoſed upon the ſuperſtitious minds of Antigonus and Teutamus, Chief Officers of the Ayryraſpides, whoſe envy and emulation diſdained to be directed by him; he pretended that Alexander appeared to him in a viſion, and ſhewed him a magnificent pavillion, richly ornamented with a regal Throne, and promiſed if they would ſit in Council, there he

ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed Alexander to preſide. But whether his vanity did not permit him thus to diſguiſe his ambition, or that his knowledge of the Macedonian Generals convinced him, that, however irreproachable his conduct might be, their artful inſinuations would render it ſuſpected, and afford pretences to juſtify a civil war; he did not heſitate, after his marriage with Cleopatra, the ſiſter of Alexander, to ſhew that he aſpired to the Empire, and was willing to maintain his authority by the force of arms.

Scarce had the Regent made the neceſſary preparations to attack Ptolemy, who had rendered himſelf independent in Egypt, when Antigonus, the moſt politick, and the moſt ambitious of all the Lieutenants of Alexander, repreſented Perdicas as an Uſurper, who wiſhed to diſpoſſeſs the Great of their Governments, place ſome of his creatures in their ſtead, and ſacrifice afterwards to his

himſelf would be always preſent to direct and proſper their conſultations and atchievements. They ordered, in conſequence, a ſplendid tent to be erected, and a Throne within it, called the Throne of Alexander, where the principal men aſſembled to deliberate on affairs of conſequence. *Plutarch's Life of Eumenes.*

ambition the two Kings of Macedon. Such accuſation ſufficed to kindle, through every part of the Empire, a war which every body deſired, and from which the Governors of the Provinces in particular, expected to gain the principal advantage.

Perdicas, whom his ſeverity and pride had rendered odious to his army, fell the victim of an inſurrection by the ſword of conſpirators. The ſoldiers offered the Regency to Ptolemy himſelf, againſt whom they were marching; but this Prince,* for we may henceforth give him that appellation, prudently refuſed a dignity, whoſe prerogatives it was impoſſible for him to maintain, without exciting the jealouſy of the other Governors; and which, in giving him an imaginary, yet conteſted power over the ſucceſſion of Alexander, would probably have expoſed him to loſe his pretenſions to Egypt. The Regency was then entruſted to Aridæus and Pithon, the Chiefs of the conſpiracy that had de-

* The Lieutenants of Provinces, though independent in their Governments, did not take the title of King, till after the extinction of the family of Alexander. Antigonus ſet the example, which was ſoon followed by Ptolemy and the other Generals.

ſtroyed

ſtroyed Perdicas; but theſe two men, finding themſelves unequal to the weight of their dignity, reſigned it to Antipater, Governor of Macedonia; who had paſſed, at the head of an army, from Europe into Aſia, to make a diverſion in favour of Ptolemy, and attack Eumenes and the other Generals who had perſiſted in their duty.

Antipater, not inferior in Politicks to Ptolemy, took care not to ſacrifice the fortune he enjoyed to the intereſt of his new dignity. Whether by his connections with the rebels he was informed of their deſigns, and, in conſequence of theſe informations, judged that the Macedonian Empire could not any longer ſubſiſt; or whether he ſaw ſome danger in renouncing his preſent engagements, to contract new and precarious ones with the friends of Perdicas and of Government, he did not heſitate to bring diſgrace upon Regency, and to precipitate the fall of the State. In the freſh diſtribution he made of the Empire, he ſtripped of their Provinces Eumenes and the other Generals of his party,

and gave them to the moſt dangerous enemies of Government. This regulation muſt excite a bloody war in Aſia between the Lieutenants of Alexander; for the preſent poſſeſſors were by no means diſpoſed to give up their Provinces, upon a ſimple order from the Regent, and thoſe appointed to ſucceed were too elated, not to try every method to enter into poſſeſſion of the dignities they had been honoured with. Whilſt every thing was preparing for a revolution, Antipater repaſſed into Europe with the two Kings under his protection; and confining his cares to the Government of Macedon, ſeemed to forget the conqueſts of the Macedonians.

The Grecians would have acted with prudence if, before they made any attempt for the recovery of their liberty, they had waited till the firſt contentions, which I have been ſpeaking of, and which it was eaſy to foreſee, would break out in Aſia. Phocion neglected nothing to repreſs the ardour of the Athenians, who were impatient to take up arms, as ſoon as they heard of the death of Alexander.

ander. *If Alexander*, ſaid he, *is dead to-day, he will certainly be ſo to-morrow, and after to-morrow.* But Demoſthenes, who had been recalled from exile, proclaimed high the advantages of liberty; he repreſented with his uſual eloquence the ſhame of Greece, and in provoking her to revolt, he increaſed the weight of ſervitude.

The complete victory gained by Leoſthenes, General of the Grecian confederacy, over Antipater, could not be of any utility to their intereſts; and while the Athenians and their Allies abandoned themſelves to tranſports of joy, was not Phocion right in telling them, *I wiſh I had gained that battle, but I would be aſhamed of having adviſed it.* What, in effect, could they expect from their enterprize againſt a Monarchy ſo powerful as the Macedonian, whoſe parts were yet ſo ſtrongly united? Could the Grecians be inſenſible that they ſhould triumph in vain over Antipater, as long as the civil war ſhould not have broken out among the Lieutenants of Alexander? No ſooner was their victory known, than re-enforcements were ſent to

their enemy from every part of the globe. Clitus armed a conſiderable fleet; Leonatus paſſed into Europe with the forces of his Government of Phrygia. Craterus led with him from Cilicia ſix thouſand Macedonians, the better half of whom had accompanied Alexander in all his expeditions; beſides theſe, he had a thouſand warlike Perſians, and fifteen hundred cavalry. This is what Phocion was afraid of, and what prompted him to repreſs the blind and impetuous ardour of his countrymen. Suppoſing that, inſtead of revenging his defeat, impoſing heavier chains, deſtroying the popular Government in Athens, tranſporting part of her Citizens into Thrace, and garriſoning the fort Munychia, Antipater had experienced a ſecond diſgrace of greater conſequence than the firſt; he would ſoon have received new ſuccours, and Greece had been overwhelmed, before the Macedonian forces had been exhauſted, or the ſeeds of their diviſions ripened into action.

But after Perdicas had declared war againſt Ptolemy, the face of affairs was entirely changed, and circumſtances became as favourable

vourable to a revolt in Greece, as before that time they had been averſe to it. So far would Antipater have been from receiving any aſſiſtance from Aſia, that it would have been his intereſt to ſend thither all the forces he could afford, to oppoſe the ambition of Perdicas, and ſupport Antigonus and Ptolemy, whoſe ſafety was of the higheſt importance to all the ambitious men in the Empire. Antipater would have followed with Greece the ſame plan of conduct, as he did with the Ætolians, with whom he was then at war; and whom he brought over to a peace, by offering them the moſt advantageous terms. Perdicas, on the other ſide, and his adherents, would have courted her alliance as they did that of the Ætolians.* In a word, by aſſuming a character of importance amongſt the ſucceſſors of Alexander, the Grecians would

* No ſooner did Antipater march into Aſia, than Perdicas concluded a treaty with the Ætolians, by which they engaged to make a diverſion in his favour. They accordingly entered Theſſaly with an army of ſixteen thouſand men; poſſeſſed themſelves of ſeveral fortreſſes, and oppoſed Polycles, the Lieutenant of Antipater. Being obliged afterwards to recal a conſiderable part of their forces to oppoſe the Arcananians, the troops they left were defeated by Polyphercon, another Lieutenant of Antipater, who ſoon recovered all the Cities which had been taken by the Ætolians.

have

have rendered themſelves reſpectable, and found no other obſtacle to the reſtoration of their liberty, but the inveterate corruption of their manners.

Inſtead of being in a condition to take advantage of the diſſentions that broke out amongſt the Macedonian Chiefs, Greece fell the firſt victim to their arms. No party had occaſion to ſpare her, becauſe the ſtate of weakneſs to which the vengeance of Antipater had reduced her, rendered her deſpicable. That unfortunate Country became the theatre of war. The few Cities which till then had preſerved ſome appearance of liberty, were a prey to a croud of petty Tyrants; who, under covert of the troubles which agitated Macedon, uſurped the ſupreme authority. I ſhall only mention here the Macedonian affairs, ſo far as may be neceſſary to ſhew the real ſituation of Greece.

Antipater lived but a ſhort time after his elevation; and, inſtead of bequeathing to his Son the general Regency of the Empire, and the Government of Macedonia, he appointed to both Polyperchon, his Lieutenant above-

above-mentioned. Caſſander, indignant at the injuſtice of his Father, deſired earneſtly to be revenged, and to ſeize on a Throne which he already regarded as his lawful inheritance. But having as yet filled only ſubaltern poſts in the Government, he wanted money, troops, veſſels, and every thing neceſſary for the execution of his deſign. He communicated it to Seleucus, Governor of Babylon, and to Antigonus, who commanded in Aſia Minor. Theſe two men, whoſe ambitious ſpirit ſought only the means of multiplying the general diſturbances, and rendering the Regency contemptible, flattered the reſentment of Caſſander, gave him an army, and enabled him to form an enterprize againſt Macedon.

Polyperchon, weakly eſtabliſhed in his Government, was obliged to abandon it on the approach of Caſſander. He retreated into Peloponneſus with the troops he had attached to his ſervice, and carried away with him the treaſures amaſſed by the Kings of Macedon. With theſe he attracted under his banners all thoſe Grecians, who, having no other

other profeſſion than warfare, ſold their ſervices to the higheſt bidder, and to whom, as Philip ſaid, war was a time of peace. Then trying to intereſt Greece in his fate, he iſſued a decree, by which he ſubſtituted Popular Government to the Ariſtocracy eſtabliſhed by Antipater, and enjoined every Republick to baniſh their Magiſtrates, and engage, by a ſolemn oath, never to undertake any thing againſt the intereſts of Macedon. But in vain did Polyperchon endeavour to reanimate the languid genius of Greece: cruſhed under the weight of her diſgraces, ſhe was totally incapable of feeling. This decree, by reviving the cuſtoms of proſcription and exile, was productive of new diſorders, and Polyperchon, forced to remain on the defenſive, in order to ſecure the fidelity of ſeveral Cities, reſolved to appoint Lieutenants, who ſoon abuſed their power, and became inſupportable Tyrants.

While the Regent of the Empire was acting in Peloponneſus the part of an Adventurer, whilſt Tyranny multiplied its barbarities in Greece, and Macedon experienced every

every day ſome new revolutions, in which the whole family of Alexander periſhed at laſt in the moſt tragical manner, Antigonus defeated Eumenes, Alcetas and Attalus; leaving behind not the leaſt veſtige of the partiſans of Perdicas and Government. After ſo many ſucceſſes, this Captain ſaw himſelf, in ſome manner, the maſter of Aſia; but the ſole Monarchy of Alexander could ſatisfy his ambition. Caſſander, Ptolemy, Seleucus and Lyſimachus appeared to him ſo many troubleſome rivals, whoſe fortune he could not contemplate without vexation. Whether Macedon offered him a more brilliant career, by the reputation it had acquired under Philip and Alexander, or whether he thought that the poſſeſſion of this Kingdom would give its Kings a right upon the Provinces which had been diſmembered from it, it was with Caſſander that Antigonus determined to commence the war.

With this view he contracted an alliance with Polyperchon, cheriſhed his hopes, and furniſhed him with forces, that he might ſupport

ſupport himſelf againſt his enemies. In order to bring to his party all the Cities of Greece, by a ſpecial decree he reſtored their rights of freedom, and relieved them from the oppreſſion of foreign garriſons. His Son Demetrius, ſirnamed Poliorcetes, went at two different times into Greece to enforce his Father's orders. Indeed, this young Hero diſpoſſeſſed Ptolemy of moſt of the places wherein he kept a garriſon, and drove Caſſander from thoſe he occupied: yet the miſfortunes of the Grecians were not alleviated; the armies which ravaged their country deprived them of that liberty which was granted by uſeleſs decrees; and the only comfort they felt, if it could be called one, was to change their yoke, and to ſee their enemies dealing out deſtruction on each other, and reciprocally puniſhing themſelves for their ambition.

Caſſander, on the point of ſeeing himſelf expelled from Macedon, awaked Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lyſimachus from the kind of apathy in which they ſeemed to be languiſhing, and opened their eyes to the proſpect of the

the impending ſtorm. He remonſtrated, how imprudent it was for them to ſuffer the too great aggrandizement of aneighbour, without oppoſition; he made them ſenſible, that the danger he was threatened with muſt be common to them; that they would be involved in his fall, Antigonus being too ambitious to make Macedon the term of his conqueſts; and that now, if ever, was the time to unite their forces againſt their common oppreſſor. Theſe four Princes formed immediately an offenſive and defenſive league, and marched to the enemy. The famous battle of Ipſus finally determined the long-conteſted ſucceſſion of Alexander. Antigonus defeated, loſt his life in the combat, and his enemies divided his ſpoils. *

Greece would have, from this moment, ſeen herſelf delivered of that croud of Ty-

* After much controverſy, the Empire of Alexander was divided in the following manner: Egypt, Libia, Arabia and Paleſtine, were aſſigned to Ptolemy;—Macedonia and Greece to Caſſander;—Bithynia and Thrace to Lyſimachus;—and the remaining part of Aſia, as far as the River Indus to Seleucus.——This laſt territory, which comprehended all the Provinces of the ancient Perſian Empire, was called the Kingdom of Syria, becauſe the Seleucidæ its Kings, of the race of Seleucus, reſided at Antioch, a City of Syria.

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rants by whom ſhe was oppreſſed, or at leaſt have enjoyed ſome of the advantages which peace could procure, under the protection of the Kings of Macedon, to whoſe lot ſhe had fallen; had not ſhe been deſtined to be the theatre of the uncommon adventures of a Prince, on whom Fortune ſeemed willing to exhauſt all her caprices. Demetrius Poliocertes had ſaved from the wreck of his Father's fortune, only the City of Tyre, the Iſle of Cyprus, and a very ſmall dominion on the coaſts of Aſia. Since Alexander, ambition, hope, and courage, were ſufficient titles to aſpire to the acquiſition of Kingdoms. Demetrius was tempted to reign over Greece, where he had preſerved many friends, who ſupplied him conſtantly with intelligence; but whilſt at the head of an army of adventurers, in all worthy of him, he was buſily employed in making conqueſts, he was deprived of his paternal inheritance. Fortune, however, ſoon indemnified him; for, taking advantage of the contentions which aroſe among the Sons of Caſſander,

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about the right of ſucceſſion, he ſeated himſelf on the Throne of Macedon. But this proſperity was of a ſhort duration: after ſeven years, this young Hero was again deſpoiled of his ſceptre; when his reſtleſs ſpirit ſuggeſted to him to paſs into Aſia, there to conquer new poſſeſſions, leaving to his Son Antigonus Gonatas, forces ſufficient to maintain his power in Greece. It was this Prince, according to the report of hiſtorians, who, acting on the ſame Political principles as Polyperchon, placed Tyrants in moſt of the Cities, or declared himſelf the Protector of all thoſe who had uſurped the Sovereign Authority. By their means, he became powerful enough to recover the Kingdom of Macedon, on the death of Soſthenes, to confirm his Regal Power, and leave this acquiſition an indiſputable right of inheritance to his poſterity.

Whilſt Greece, every day more enſlaved, was agitated by the various revolutions I have juſt now but ſlightly ſketched, the Ætolians, till then undiſtinguiſhed, began to appear

pear upon the ſcene, and be the ſubject of diſcourſe. Of all the Grecians, they had alone preſerved that ſpirit of piracy and robbery, which the others had loſt at their formation into Societies; *The Ætolians*, ſays Polybius, *are rather wild beaſts than men: juſtice, right of nations, treaties, alliances, are with them empty names, the objects of their deriſion. Accuſtomed to live by plunder, they ſpare their Allies, only when they can gratify their avarice and rapacity at the expence of their enemies.* So long as Greece was in a ſtate of keeping them in awe, they confined their depredations to Macedonia, Illyria, on the ſea, or to the Iſlands which had leſs connection with the Continent. But when the Grecians were corrupted, diſunited, and enfeebled by domeſtick wars, every thing aſſumed a different aſpect. The Ætolians, who at firſt put under contribution only ſome particular diſtricts of Peloponneſus, ſoon wrought deſolation through the whole Province; and emboldened afterwards by their ſucceſs, and the alliances they contracted

tracted with one or other of the ſucceſſors of Alexander, they at length extended their incurſions to all Greece.

The devaſtation committed by this ferocious People recalled to remembrance, in ſome Republicks, their ancient aſſociations. Dyma, Trytæa, Patres, and Pharæa, then * the moſt reputed Cities of Achaia, and the moſt expoſed to the inſults of the Ætolians, were the firſt to renew their former alliance, and their treaty gave birth to the ſecond Achaian League. As this confederacy filled afterwards the ſame place that Athens and Sparta held formerly amongſt the Grecians, it becomes intereſting to trace its progreſs.

Achaia, like every other ſtate of Greece, had been originally governed by Kings. Theſe were the deſcendants of Oreſtes, and preſerved the Crown in his family, till the ſons of Ogyges, having incurred the odium of their People, were expelled the kingdom.

* Theſe Cities were twelve in number: viz. Patres, Dyma, Pharæa, Tritæa, Leontium, Ægina, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Ceraunia, Olen, and Elym: this laſt was waſhed away by the ſea a little before the battle of Leuctra.

Thus the Achaians beginning to be free, each of their Cities formed an independent Republick, which had its own Government, its Territories, and its particular Magiſtrates. The diſtinctions which Monarchy had introduced diſappeared, and ſupreme authority was veſted in the People. Democracy, ſo tempeſtuous in the reſt of Greece, cauſed no diſorder in Achaia; becauſe it was tempered by general Laws agreed on by all its Republicks, when they contracted an alliance rendered ſo neceſſary by their weakneſs, and to which they were already prepared; having had till then the ſame weights, the ſame meaſures, the ſame laws, the ſame genius, and the ſame intereſts.

Each of theſe Republicks renounced the privilege of contracting private Alliances with Foreign Powers; agreed that the moſt exact equality ſhould be the baſis of their union, and that the richneſs or ancienty of a City ſhould have no ſuperior prerogative. They created a national Senate, which aſſembled twice in the year at Ægium, at the beginning

beginning of ſpring and autumn; and this was compoſed of an equal number of deputies from each Republick. They were the arbiters of peace and war; had alone the privilege of forming alliances, making treaties, eſtabliſhing Laws conducive to the melioration of their Government; ſending Ambaſſadors, and receiving thoſe of Foreign Powers addreſſed to the Achaians. If, during the receſs of the Senate, ſome important or unexpected affair intervened, the two Prætors had a right to convoke an extraordinary Aſſembly. Theſe Magiſtrates, whoſe authority was annual, commanded the armies, and although they were not permitted to undertake any thing, without the participation of ten Commiſſioners, called *Demiurgi*, who compoſed their Council; yet, when the Senate, wherein they preſided, was not aſſembled, they appeared, in ſome degree, the depoſitaries of the whole publick authority.

It reſulted from theſe Political arrangements, that the inhabitants of each City of Achaia enjoyed liberty without the fear of

loſing it; and that confining their attention to Civil affairs only, they were not agitated by thoſe great national concerns which occaſion violent commotions, are the ſource of party and cabal, and almoſt ever work the deſtruction of a Democracy. The Achaians, peculiarly inclined to moderation, neither thought of acquiring riches, nor of rendering themſelves formidable to their neighbours by their arms. Their Senate, obliged to conform its conduct to the natural genius of the People it governed, was without ambition, and, of courſe, conſtantly prepared to follow the dictates of juſtice. By this invariable attachment to virtue, it commanded reſpect, and not ſeldom merited the honour referred to it, of deciding the diſputes which roſe ſometimes in Peloponneſus and other parts of Greece, nay even amongſt foreign Nations.

The Achaians, indulged by Philip and Alexander in the poſſeſſion of their laws and conſtitution, I might almoſt venture to ſay of their liberty, could not nevertheleſs

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eſcape the misfortunes that Greece experienced from the ſucceſſors of thoſe Princes. The Cities of Achaia felt equally with Macedonia all the viciſſitudes of fate: ſome were alternately forced to admit the garriſons of Polyperchon, others thoſe of Demetrius, Caſſander, or Antigonus Gonatas; the reſt was oppreſſed by tyrants ſpringing from their own boſom, and all connexion ceaſed to exiſt amongſt them.

Such was the ſituation of Achaia, when Dyma and the three other Cities I have before mentioned laid the foundation of a ſecond league, that adopted the manners, rules, and policy of the firſt. Five years after this period, the Ægeans having freed themſelves from the foreign garriſons they were encumbered with, incorporated with this riſing Republick, which grew ſtill more powerful by the junction of the Carynians and Burians, who had deſtroyed their Tyrants. Some Cities of Peloponneſus requeſted as a favour to be admitted members of this confederacy; whilſt others waited till they

could diſcern their true intereſt, or till, by a kind of violence, they ſhould be compelled to adopt a meaſure of whoſe utility they ſoon had occaſion to be ſatisfied.

The Achaians, ſays Polybius, might have made a much more rapid progreſs, whilſt Macedon, diſtracted by domeſtick diſſentions, could give but a ſlight attention to the affairs of Greece, if their Prætors had been men of diſtinguiſhed courage and talents. One might even ſuſpect that the quick ſucceſſion of thoſe Magiſtrates, was for a long time, an obſtacle to the advancement of Achaia, by the inactivity which naturally reſulted from the diverſity of their ſentiments. This at leaſt is certain, that the face of affairs was greatly improved, when the Achaians, inſtead of annually electing two Prætors, choſe only one, to whoſe care they confined the whole Adminiſtration. It was on the fourth year of this reform, that Aratus delivered Sycione his country, from the tyranny of Nicocles, and made it a member of the Achaian League. The ſuperior talents of this

this celebrated man raiſed him to the Prætorſhip, which, in his hands, became a kind of perpetual Magiſtracy, and during which he offered to Greece a ſight altogether extraordinary. Without the leaſt ambition or deſire of making conqueſts, the Achaians declared a kind of ſecret war to all the Tyrants of Peloponneſus; they took ſeveral Cities by ſurprize, and after having reſtored them to freedom, thought themſelves ſufficiently indemnified for the expence and peril of their undertaking, if they united them to a Society, where they enjoyed equal Independency and Prerogatives with the Cities the moſt anciently allied. Many of the Tyrants, conſcious of their own weakneſs, particularly after the death of Demetrius King of Macedon, their Protector, reſigned voluntarily their authority.

This ſudden change in the affairs of Peloponneſus, and the important part which the Achaians began to aſſume, would have led any one to imagine that the ancient hatred of the Grecians for Monarchical Government

vernment was revived, and that, united by the ſame intereſt, they were ſoon to form but one ſingle indiviſible body. But beſides that theſe Cities which had formerly domineered over Greece, were jealous of the rapid progreſs of the Achaians, and in conſequence traverſed ſecretly their deſigns, the League itſelf was not powerful enough, to give confidence and courage to a People tired of ſtruggling againſt Fortune, and ſince a long time familiar with ſubjection. The moderation of the Achaians ought neceſſarily to increaſe the number of their Allies; but this ſame moderation was at the ſame time a potent obſtacle to their aggrandizement; becauſe it inſpired them with the love of peace, and that the particular attention they had to preſerve that bleſſing, made them neglect the cultivation of thoſe active virtues, which alone could have rendered them, as it were, the ſoul of Greece, and enabled them to eſtabliſh in it a Government that could reunite all its forces.

Aratus,

Aratus, who may be regarded as the author of the ſecond aſſociation of the Achaians, did not contribute little in maintaining that moderation which was the diſtinguiſhing mark of their character. He was, ſays Polybius, the man in the world beſt calculated for conducting the affairs of a Republick with propriety. An exquiſite accuracy of judgement always prompted him to take the beſt reſolution in all civil conteſts. Skilful in managing and directing the paſſions of thoſe he had to deal with, he ſpoke with grace, knew how to be ſilent, and poſſeſſed the art of acquiring friends and preſerving their attachment. He was not ignorant of the manner of forming and animating a party, could lay ſnares for an enemy, and ſurprize him unaware; and nothing could equal his activity and courage in the conduct and execution of theſe ſorts of projects. Aratus, however, ſo ſuperior by all theſe talents, was below mediocrity as a General; confuſed when it was neceſſary to act with open force, a ſudden timidity ſuſpended all the faculties of his ſoul; and

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though he filled Peloponneſus with the trophies of his victories, yet few Commanders have been more deficient in military talents.

Polybius ſhould have added, that Aratus rendered himſelf juſtice on that point; that he was ſenſible of his embarraſſment at the head of an army, and avowed it himſelf, as hiſtory aſſures it: It was conſequently natural, that in the proſecution of his own tranquillity, all the views of this Magiſtrate ſhould have been turned towards the eſtaliſhment of peace; and that, in order to give it permanence, he ſhould have cheriſhed in the Achaians that principle of fear to which the League owed its origin; and repreſſed with care thoſe movements of ambition which might have been the conſequence of ſucceſs. Beſides, this profound Politician undoubtedly knew that the Achaian Cities, from the very nature of their confederacy, were not capable of purſuing with perſeverance any enterprize that required time to accompliſh it. He ought then to have regarded as impracticable the project of reſtoring liberty to all the Grecians, and

re-uniting

re-uniting them under one and the ſame Government.

To prevent the evils the Achaians were expoſed to from their own weakneſs, whilſt they had at their gates ſuch formidable enemies as the Kings of Macedon, who waited only for a favourable opportunity to ſubdue them, Aratus ſkilfully availed himſelf of the rivalry that ſubſiſted amongſt the ſucceſſors of Alexander. The ambition of theſe Princes was not ſatisfied with the diviſion of territory ſettled after the battle of Ipſus. Full of jealouſies, fears, and ſuſpicions, their ſole endeavour was to weaken each other. The Courts of Syria and Egypt were principally attentive to the progreſs of the Kings of Macedon; who, regarding themſelves as lawful heirs of Alexander, thought they had an inconteſtible right to the Provinces diſmembered from his Empire; and flattered themſelves with reducing them eaſily under their dominion, as ſoon as they could collect together the forces of conquered

quered Greece, and reſume the project formed againſt Aſia by Philip, and executed by Alexander.

Theſe Aſiatic Powers ſaw then with ſatisfaction that, far from ſubmitting to the Macedonian yoke, Peloponneſus had entered into a confederacy favourable to its liberty, and which would ſerve them as a rampart. It was their duty to protect the Achaian aſſociation. Aratus was ſenſible of it; and by the alliances which he contracted with the Kings of Egypt and Syria, he kept Antigonus Gonatas, and his ſon Demetrius in awe, and ſucceeded even to impreſs them with reſpect.

But however prudent this policy was, much more was ſtill wanting to remove the fears one could entertain for the fate of Achaia. It might happen that her Protectors ſhould diſagree, or that, involved in civil diſcord, they ſhould be too much employed at home to think of their Allies. Beſides that, a King of Macedon might ſeduce

duce them from an attention to their real intereſts, corrupt their Miniſters, or conſtruct a navy ſufficiently formidable to render uſeleſs the ſuccours deſtined for Peloponneſus, whilſt his land army ſhould accompliſh the conqueſt. Hazard might alſo give to the Macedonians a Prince active, warlike, enterprizing, whilſt Egypt and Aſia ſhould be ruled by indolent and fearful Monarchs.

Theſe were very near the dangers which prudence permitted the Achaians to foreſee: but every thing is danger for a Republick that has not within herſelf ſufficient forces, which may ſerve her as an anchor, where, if I am allowed the expreſſion, the veſſel of the State, properly moored, may ride ſafe amidſt the caprices of Fortune. A thouſand accidents might ruin the Achaians; and it was this they ought the leaſt to have expected, that totally changed their Conſtitution and their Politicks.

After having given, without ſucceſs, the greateſt proofs of courage, at the time that Alexander was engaged in his Perſian expedition,

pedition,* the Spartans were at laſt immerſed in the moſt ſhameful degeneracy. Not the ſmalleſt veſtige of their ancient manners was now to be found, and Agis their King, in attempting to revive the Laws of Lycurgus, rouſed againſt him a Republick grown fond of her vices, and fell a victim to the artifice and violence which corruption oppoſed to him.

The tragical end of this Prince, ſo calculated to cool the ardour for reformation, ſeemed to have put the laſt hand to the baſeneſs of the Lacedæmonians; yet Cleomenes was not diſcouraged; and though, in reality, his views tended to the ſame end, the path he purſued was too different to have reaſon to fear the ſame fate. What Agis had attempted as a Philoſopher, was followed by Cleomenes through ambition. The one, charmed with the beauty of the Laws of Lycurgus, wiſhed

* The Spartans refuſed to join with Alexander in the Perſian war, and formed an alliance againſt Macedon. Their army conſiſted of 20,000 foot and 2000 horſe. Antipater oppoſed them with a ſuperior force; an engagement enſued, and the Allies of Sparta deſerted. Part of the Lacedæmonians were cut to pieces, the reſt ſaved themſelves by a ſhameful flight.

to

to re-eſtabliſh with them temperance, frugality, the love of Juſtice, and reſpect for Religion. The other was very far from paying the ſame reſpect to thoſe virtues independently conſidered. If he was deſirous of baniſhing the vices of his country, it was becauſe they had enervated the Spartans, and that, by this reaſon, their Republick was no more in the hands of a Prince than a vile inſtrument, abſolutely unfit to be employed in doing great things. Born with an extenſive genius, his courage and ambition were ſuperior to every obſtacle. He began his reform by ridding himſelf of the Ephori, and baniſhing thoſe of his fellow-citizens, who, by their wealth, were the moſt intereſted to controvert his deſigns. He made afterwards a new diviſion of the lands, aboliſhed all the debts; and profiting of all the credit which ſuch revolution reflected on its author, to center all the authority in his own perſon; wicked, diſſembling and faithleſs Tyrant, he reſtored ſome wiſe Laws.

The

The ability of this Prince, ſeconded by the enthuſiaſm of the Lacedæmonians, empowered him to make a conſiderable enterprize. The firſt object of his attention was to regain to his country the ſuperiority it had loſt; he, in conſequence, turned all his forces againſt the Achaians, who were in poſſeſſion of all the Empire of Peloponneſus. Aratus felt immediately that the Powers in alliance with him, were not equally intereſted in ſupporting the confederacy againſt Sparta, as againſt Macedon. It was certainly a matter of the greateſt indifference to the Kings of Syria and Egypt, whether each City of the Peloponneſus had by turn the pre-eminence over the others, provided the Macedonians ſhould remain in their former ſituation. Perhaps alſo it was the intereſt of thoſe Princes to favour a Republick, which, after having been re-inſtated in her ancient Laws, and having recovered her reputation, became much more fit than the Achaian League to defend the independency of the Grecians, and keep them re-united againſt Macedon.

Beſides,

Beſides, when Aratus ſhould have had every reaſon to depend on the protection of his Allies, what an expence of time muſt have been loſt in ſending Ambaſſadors and negociating; whilſt Cleomenes, active, diligent, indefatigable, was puſhing on the war with vigour, without loſing a ſingle inſtant. Suppoſing even that the Courts of Syria and Alexandria had ſent in haſte ſuccours to the Achaians; it ſeems to me that Aratus would have committed an imprudence, if he had invited their troops into Peloponneſus: certain it is, that Macedon could not have ſeen this enterprize without inquietude; the preſence of her enemies in the heart of Greece, muſt have forced her to take up arms; for inactivity, in ſuch a circumſtance, had rendered her deſpicable; and they would have dared every thing, had they found her without defence. In that caſe, Policy left her no other reſource than to embrace the part of the Spartans. The war between Lacedæmon and the Achaians, from that period, would have been perſonal

between the ſucceſſors of Alexander; and Greece again expoſed to the ſame devaſtation and the ſame diſaſters from which ſhe was ſcarcely freed: the Auxiliaries once become principals in the war, whatever Power had been ſucceſsful, would have abuſed its advantages in oppreſſing the Spartans, the Achaians, and the whole Peloponneſus.

Aratus, in my opinion, cannot be too much commended, for having had recourſe to the protection of Macedon at this unfortunate juncture.* Plutarch, indeed, thinks differently. *Aratus*, ſays he, *ought to have ceded every thing to Cleomenes, rather than have filled Peloponneſus a ſecond time with Macedonian ſoldiers---who was this Prince?* purſues he, *a*

* Though Plutarch undoubtedly is one of the beſt hiſtorians of antiquity, and in many parts of his works inimitable; the learned reproach him with ſometimes failing in recollection: nor can it be denied that he will relate the ſame fact in two different manners. Thoſe who are converſant in political affairs, if I am not miſtaken, will allow that he was not a very refined Politician. He gives a proof of this in his reflections on the conduct of Aratus, and theſe I have undertaken to confute. I might often enough have taken that liberty. I am glad to inform the reader of it, as it might happen that entertaining a falſe idea of the characters of ſome of the great men of Greece, from the obſervations of that hiſtorian, they ſhould be apt to accuſe me of miſrepreſentation.

deſcendant

deſcendant of Hercules; he was born at Lacedæmon, and it would have been more glorious for the Peloponneſians to have obeyed the laſt of the Spartans, than a King of Macedon.

But did not Plutarch perſuade himſelf too eaſily of the practibility of prevailing on the Achaians to acknowledge the power of Cleomenes? we muſt depend on what Polybius relates, a writer almoſt contemporary, and the moſt wiſe, ſagacious, and penetrating hiſtorian of antiquity. From him we learn that this Prince, odious to all Greece, was with reaſon conſidered as the Tyrant of his Country. In vain did his partiſans, whom he had delivered from miſery, pretend to exculpate him, by quoting the example of Lycurgus, who was obliged to have recourſe to ſome degree of violence, before he could eſtabliſh a thorough reformation in the Legiſlation and manners of Sparta. In Lycurgus, we ſee the father of his Country; becauſe, in his arduous enterprize, he had totally forgotten himſelf to be ſolely occupied with

the publick good, and the care of rendering his fellow-citizens virtuous. In Cleomenes we ſee a Tyrant; becauſe his endeavours were not to eradicate, but only to change the vices of the Spartans, and that he ſacrificed the moſt valuable conſiderations to ambition and private intereſt.

Had this Prince even reſembled the portrait drawn by Plutarch, had he been magnanimous, eager in purſuit of glory, generous, abhorring injuſtice, and cheriſhing his ſubjects as his children, it was ſtill impoſſible for the hiſtorian to point out a method ſufficiently powerful to determine the Cities in the Achaian confederacy to ſubmit themſelves to Cleomenes. I know not whether there was a time when virtue had ſuch an empire over the minds of men; but under the Prætorſhip of Aratus, that happy time was already regarded as a fable amongſt the the Grecians. Could Plutarch, ſo celebrated for his knowledge of the human heart, be ignorant that a People will never voluntarily renounce their independency, and that,

rather

rather than obey an uſurping and arbitrary invader, they will raiſe a Tyrant of their own choice? Such is the courſe of the paſſions of men. Beſides, the Achaian league was compoſed of Cities that would have preferred to be buried under their ruins, to the grief of renouncing their inveterate hatred to the Spartans. Polybius poſitively aſſures us, that if Aratus had not ſolicited the protection of Macedon, the Meſſenians and Megalopolitans were determined to do it for themſelves, and to part from the Confederacy.

Had not Aratus been more ſkilful in the art of governing than the hiſtorian who condemns him, the Cities of the Achaian aſſociation would have immediately been in arms againſt each other. By making fruitleſs efforts to conciliate the minds, and preſerve peace, he would have kindled a civil war in Peloponneſus. Would the Kings of Macedon, even unſolicited by any of the Cities, have remained unconcerned ſpectators of theſe quarrels? It would be ridiculous to think it: they would not have failed to take advantage of a circumſtance ſo favourable to

their ambition, and to ſubdue at length Peloponneſus, when exhauſted by domeſtick feuds; under the ſpecious pretence of re-eſtabliſhing order and publick tranquillity.

What principally ſeems to have miſled Plutarch's judgment in this affair is, that Antigonus,* ſirnamed Doſon, after having entirely defeated Cleomenes at Seleſia,† and ruined the Lacedæmonians, kept Peloponneſus in a kind of ſubjection, by placing garriſons at Corinth and Orchomenœa. This, no doubt, endangered the liberty of the Achaians; but is that a ſufficient motive for our condemnation of Aratus? So unfortunate is the ſituation of Stateſmen, that their Political conduct is frequently arraigned, though they have ſometimes no

* This Prince, on whom moſt hiſtorians beſtow the title of King, governed Macedon, only with the quality of Regent, during the minority of Philip, the Son of Demetrius.

† Cleomenes, deſtitute of reſources in Laconia, was obliged to ſeek for an aſylum in Egypt, where he periſhed miſerably. After his flight, the exiles returned to Sparta, and they created new Ephori. A man, whoſe name was Lycurgus, not one of the Heraclidæ, bought the Crown at the price of a talent to each of thoſe Magiſtrates. This Republick, ſays Polybius, oppreſſed with calamities, torn by inteſtine diſorders, troubled by frequent diviſions of land, and the baniſhment of its Citizens, at length yielded to the Tyranny of Nabis.

choice

choice to make but between two deſperate plans. Aratus prevented the ruin of his country, and he is cenſured; becauſe, in eſcaping deſtruction, the Achaians found themſelves under a neceſſity of having ſome regard for the Court of Macedon.

The treaty ratified between this able Politician and Antigonus Doſon, will be regarded as the moſt deſirable event for the Grecians as well as the Macedonians, if we reflect on the change which ſoon happened in their Political intereſt. From the time of Hannibal's penetrating into Italy, to proſecute a war which was to decide the fate of Rome and Carthage, the private hatred of Achaia and Macedonia, their rivalſhip, their deſire of ſupporting or ſubduing each other ought to have ſubſided. The common enemy, who was forming againſt both in the Conqueror, and whoſe aggrandizement prepared to both the ſame danger which the conqueſts of Cyrus had formerly threatened Greece with, rendered neceſſarily their intereſts common, and reciprocal apprehenſions ought to have been productive of reciprocal

ciprocal concord. Agelaus, of Naupactum, was ſenſible of it, when, ſeeing the Grecians occupied, through mere curioſity, and as unintereſted ſpectators, in the different events of the ſecond Punic war, he could not help telling them: *How earneſtly is it to be wiſhed that the Gods would begin to inſpire us now with ſentiments of harmony and unanimity; that, by re-uniting our forces, our country and liberty might be ſecure from the inſults of the Barbarians! It does not require a great Political ſagacity to foreſee that the Conqueror, whoſoever he may be, whether Roman or Carthaginian, will not confine his Empire to Italy and Sicily: his ambition would be contracted within too narrow a circle; he will bring his arms into Greece; and if the cloud which threatens from the Weſt ſhould burſt over our heads, we cannot be any more the maſters of making war, or treating of peace as we pleaſe; we ſhall be condemned to obey.*

To juſtify the well-grounded alarms of Agelaus, it would ſuffice to ſhew here which was the genius of the Romans; to ſeek into the cauſes of the grandeur of that ambitious People; who raiſed from the moſt abject

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to the moſt elevated ſtate of human glory, and, who, ſtimulated from the nature and principles of their Government to extend their Empire, could not ceaſe to conquer, whilſt the earth afforded Nations to ſubdue, or till they themſelves became vanquiſhed by their own proſperity. In effect, the grand aim of the Romans ſeemed to be univerſal Monarchy; all their inſtitutions tended to make of them a Nation of warriors, abhorrent of repoſe; becauſe war, far from exhauſting them, multiplied their forces and their wealth. From their very beginning they had contracted an habitude of intermeddling with affairs which, to all appearances, ſeemed to be abſolutely indifferent to them; it was impoſſible to be their neighbour, without ſooner or later becoming their enemy: and it was eaſy to ſee, by the manner in which they had accompliſhed the reduction of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, what they were to do for their aggrandizement, and that they would fall upon Greece and Macedon after the conqueſt of Africa.

Neither

Neither Greece nor Macedon, ſaid Agelaus, *can ever ſeparately reſiſt the arms of the Victor. We have occaſion for your aſſiſtance againſt the Barbarians,* added he, addreſſing himſelf to Philip, *the Gods have given you the power of protecting our liberty; do not reject their favour: but in defending us, remember you are labouring for yourſelf; your kingdom will find, in its turn, in our friendſhip all the reſources neceſſary to its grandeur. Good faith, therefore, ought to be your only policy; for, if the Grecians do ſuſpect that you prevent ſtrangers from invading their country, only to reſerve an opportunity of conquering it afterwards for yourſelf, I dare to announce it to you, from that moment all is over: the bands of amity once broken, our diſtracted Cities will not heſitate to contract alliances with the Barbarians: they ſhall ceaſe to be free! But the pleaſure of being revenged of you, will alleviate their diſtreſs, if, by it, they may compleat your ruin.*

It was the duty of Philip, in ſo critical a conjuncture, to imitate Themiſtocles; for though he had neither a Xerxes, nor a Mardonius,

donius, nor Aſiatick ſoldiers to oppoſe, yet he might have commanded an army capable of aſtoniſhing the Roman Legions, had he perſevered in thoſe maxims of prudence and moderation inculcated by Antigonus Doſon; maxims that rendered the beginning of his reign illuſtrious.

Nature, ſay the hiſtorians, had re-united in Philip all the virtues that do honour to a Throne. His underſtanding was lively, comprehenſive, and penetrating. His heroick valour was ſo much the more calculated to win him every heart, that he was at the ſame time poſſeſſed of that enchanting art of pleaſing, which, in a Prince, is nothing elſe but affability joined to talents. Fond of glory to enthuſiaſm, he thought impoſſible it could be united with injuſtice. The conſtant moderation of his conduct prevented every ſuſpicion that might have kept the Grecians on their guard. So many virtues diſappeared in one day; and the Phenomenon, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, is ſo much the more aſtoniſhing, that this Prince, who was a long time ſurrounded by thoſe

thoſe deſpicable mortals, who can riſe to fortune but by lowering their maſter to their own level, had preſerved a firmneſs of character hitherto proof of all ſeduction.

Demetrius of Phares* excited the ambition of Philip, by repreſenting the conqueſt of Italy as an eaſy enterprize after the battle of Canæ. The Romans, according to him, could never recover the blow their arms had ſuſtained; and it was impoſſible for the General of a Republick ſo ill governed as that of Carthage, to reap any great advantage of his victories. Philip, wholly ingroſſed by this idea, neglected his conqueſts in Ætolia. Inſtead of laying waſte that country, as he had it in his power, and deſtroying the principal Cities of a Nation odious to all the Grecians, with which it was impoſſible to treat with ſafety, and which alone was capable of interrupting the good intelligence that ſubſiſted between Peloponneſus and Macedon, this Monarch haſtened

* Demetrius, of Phares, was a very bold and enterprizing, but raſh man, who, on being baniſhed from his own territories by the Romans, had choſen the Court of Ptolemy for an aſylum.

to

to profer terms of accommodation, and peace was concluded; that he might be at liberty to fix all his attention on the affairs of Italy.

If Philip had no further views on Greece, his connection with Hannibal was perfectly conſonant with the rules of wiſdom; for it was his intereſt that this General ſhould ſubvert the Roman Empire; or at leaſt ſo humble it, as to force it to entertain no other thoughts but of its own preſervation. It was Policy to favour the Carthaginians; becauſe they were leſs dangerous and leſs enterprizing enemies than the Romans; beſides, it was eaſy to judge, that, being indebted for their preſent fortune to the ſole genius of Hannibal, the form of their Government, their Police, and their manners, would render their power uſeleſs, when lodged in any other hands.

If conſiderations like theſe determined Philip to court the friendſhip of Hannibal, they ought likewiſe to have prevented his being intimidated by the menaces of the Romans, when they heard of his treaty. Their

reſentment

reſentment ſhould have pointed out more forcibly how much it was his intereſt to ruin them, to ſecond the deſigns of Hannibal, and to ſupply him with thoſe ſuccours, which the diſunion in their councils prevented the Carthaginians to furniſh. Philip flattered himſelf of an eaſy eſtabliſhment in Italy; and the Roman fleets, by inſulting the coaſts of his kingdom, inſtantly convinced him of his error. Fear then ſucceeds to aſſurance; he repents the engagements he has taken with Hannibal, and renounces them, without ſubſtituting any thing reaſonable; but even takes falſe meaſures. If he perceives that he muſt prepare for war, and put himſelf in a ſtate of defence againſt the Romans, he forgets the wiſe counſels of Agelaus, and fancies the reduction of Greece the only method of augmenting his ſtrength; and by ſowing new diſſentions in her Cities, or inflaming the former ones, he prepares a pretence for enſlaving the whole.

Are the Meſſenians perplexed with domeſtick contentions: *Have not you Laws,* would

would he ſay to the Nobles, *to reſtrain the inſolence of the multitude? Are you without arms*, ſays he to the people, *that you do not yourſelves juſtice on your tyrants?* At length univerſal complaints broke forth againſt the perfidy of Macedon. Her Allies became her enemies. The Achaians took up arms; and, led to the field by ſo great a General as Philopœmen, who was ſtiled the laſt of the Grecians, they defended their liberties with more courage and obſtinacy than Greece ever dared to expect. Philip, finding inſurmountable impediments to his projects, is at laſt reduced to abandon his views on Italy which eſcaped alſo from the hands of the Carthaginians, and to direct his whole attention to the affairs of Greece. He foreſees himſelf inevitably expoſed to the attacks of two formidable adverſaries; misfortune embitters his ſoul; he liſtens only to the ſuggeſtions of rage, and becomes at laſt the moſt inſupportable of Tyrants.

The Romans ſtill preſerved that auſterity of manners, which has rendered them afterwards

terwards ſo illuſtrious, when the Ætolians, miſguided by their averſion to Philip, to Achaia and Athens, invited their Republick to revenge the oppreſſions they ſuffered from Macedon. Rome, enriched with the ſpoils of Carthage, could now ſupport the wars the moſt diſtant and the moſt expenſive. Poverty and the Laws were reſpected by her Citizens; a perfect union ſubſiſted amongſt their different ranks; the dangers they had eſcaped by the defeat of Hannibal, had given a new force to the ſprings of Government; the Romans, in fine, were more than ever perſuaded that there was nothing impoſſible to their patience, their love of glory, and the courage of their Legions. Whoever has the ſlighteſt knowledge of the ſecond Punic war, muſt be ſenſible of the vaſt diſproportion there was between the forces of the Roman Republick, ſeconded by ſome of the Grecian States, and thoſe which Philip had to oppoſe them. That Prince was vanquiſhed, and obliged to ſubſcribe to the humiliating terms of a peace, that deprived

him

him of the places he occupied in Greece, and left him deſtitute of ſhips, after war had exhauſted his finances.

From this period, the Romans exerted on the Republicks of Greece all the arts of that ſagacious and refined Policy, which had already deceived and ſubdued ſo many Nations. Under the ſpecious pretext of reſtoring each City to its liberty, of re-inſtating them in their ancient Laws and Government, they, in reality, deſtroyed the poſſibility of their ever re-uniting under the ſame intereſt. The Roman Republick began to domineer over the Grecians, by means of the Grecians themſelves; ſhe waited till they were conquered by their own vices, before ſhe oppreſſed them by her arms. She had zealous partizans in every State, whom gold had ſeduced, and who were attached to her intereſt. Hiſtory has tranſmitted to us the names of theſe infamous men, who, ſometimes delators of their Fellow-citizens at Rome, ſometimes the authors of tyranny in their own country, pretended that there

was in Greece no other Laws, Manners, and Cuſtoms, than the will of the Romans. In every diſſention that aroſe, Rome never failed to offer her mediation; ſhe always recommended peace, becauſe ſhe reſerved to herſelf the ſole privilege of making war; gave counſels; ventured ſometimes orders; but conſtantly concealed her Ambition under the ſpecious appearance of publick good.

The Ætolians, who had flattered themſelves with the proſpect of great advantages, in favouring the Roman arms againſt Philip, obtained for recompence of their ſervices an expreſs prohibition of no longer diſturbing the tranquillity of Greece by their depredations; and ſaw themſelves reduced to the neceſſity of either periſhing with miſery, or repairing, by an honeſt induſtry, the evils which they pretended to receive from Peace. This Tyranny appeared to them inſupportable: but the yoke being too heavy to be ſhaken off without the aſſiſtance of ſome Foreign Power, they diſpatched emiſſaries to the Court of Syria, to engage Antiochus to take

take up arms againſt the Roman Republick. The loſs of Aſia Minor was the conſequence of this Prince's defeat; and the Grecians, deſtitute of reſources, found themſelves ſurrounded on all ſides by the Roman Power.

The firſt uſe the Conquerors made of their victory, was to ruin the Ætolians. The Roman Republick, however, granted them Peace, on condition that they ſhould always be ready to march when ordered, but never aſſiſt her enemies, or thoſe of her Allies; that the Ætolian league ſhould pay to the Romans two hundred talents, and engage to pay three hundred more within ſix years; that forty of their principal Citizens ſhould be ſent to Rome, and the ſelection of her Magiſtrates reſtrained to the circle of theſe hoſtages. Thoſe Cities in the Confederacy that had diſapproved the alliance with Antiochus, were declared free: in fine, the Romans gave to the Arcananians, as a reward of their fidelity, the City and territories of the Æniades. Incapacitated to offend any more their neighbours, ſays Polybius, the

Ætolians turned their fury againſt each other, and carried their domeſtick contentions to the higheſt degree of violence; revenging, in this manner, upon themſelves, the inhumanity they had ſhewn to the reſt of Greece, and making their country the ſcene of the moſt horrible injuſtice, confuſion, ſlaughter, and aſſaſſination.

Greece felt grievouſly the defeat of Perſeus; as immediately after the vanquiſhers rendered their yoke more heavy, and rivetted ſtill cloſer the fetters of ſlavery. It became cuſtomary with the Roman Senate to cite before it ſuch Cities as were at variance with each other; they were favoured with counſels, which it was a crime not to follow. In the midſt of this univerſal ſubjection, the Republick of Achaia alone picqued herſelf on ſome veſtiges of liberty and independency; ſhe ſtill regulated civil concerns, and even formed alliances without conſulting the Roman Senate. *If what the Romans require of us*, ſaid the Achaians with Philopœmen, *is conformable to the Laws, to juſtice, and to the faith of the treaties which ſubſiſt between us, let us*

us not beſitate to pay them a proper deference. But if their pretenſions are contrary to our Liberty and to our Cuſtoms, let us explain the reaſons why we cannot ſubmit to their will. Should remonſtrances, ſupplications, right and reaſon, all prove inefficacious, let us invoke the Gods to witneſs their injuſtice; but yet let us obey, and yield to violence.

This compound of ſubmiſſion and firmneſs, of timidity and courage, raiſed ſuſpicions againſt the Achaians; and by cheriſhing their love for a liberty that exiſted no more, without affording them the means of recovering it, accelerated their ruin. It was by removing the ſlighteſt appearance of danger, that the Romans guarded themſelves againſt the caprices of fortune. They apprehended leſt the loftineſs of the Achaians, if not timely ſuppreſſed, ſhould become contagious in Greece; and revive the remembrance of its ancient freedom. Beſides, Rome was arrived at too high a degree of elevation, not to miſapprehend remonſtrances for rebellion; to complain was a failure to reſpect; all what Achaia had of honeſt People, and of

Citizens

Citizens, diſtinguiſhed by their too great attachment to their native country, were obliged to abandon it.

This example of ſeverity, calculated to root out all kind of oppoſition, or at leaſt ſuppreſs its murmurs, inflamed the minds of the Peloponneſians. They complained, they murmured without reſtraint; and as if they had been willing to familiarize themſelves with the idea of revolt, by ſpeaking of the Romans in terms of contempt, they attributed publickly the greatneſs of Rome to an inexplicable caprice of fate. This opinion, however irrational, made a very conſiderable progreſs, and its effect was ſoon perceived in the diſputes which aroſe afterwards between Achaia and Sparta.

The Roman Republick appointed Commiſſioners to examine into the cauſe of this diſagreement; their inſtructions were, to weaken the Achaians, and to detach from their alliance as many Cities as poſſible, but particularly Sparta, Argos, Corinth, Orchomenæa and Heraclea. The pride of the Achaians went ſo far, as to treat the Roman Deputies

ties with ſome degree of contempt. But this crafty Republick, whoſe refined Policy knew ſo well the art of precipitating ruin on a Nation wiſe enough to avoid it: and feigned to lend an helpful hand to that which blindly ruſhed into its own deſtruction, overlooked for the moment the injury done to its Miniſters. The Senate ſent other Commiſſioners, whom they ordered to behave with the utmoſt mildneſs, and, by gentle perſuaſions, invite the Achaians to recall their troops, and forbear the hoſtilities already commenced in the territories of Sparta.

By this exceſs of moderation, Rome ſought only to throw all the blame of a rupture upon the Achaians, and, by that, to juſtify the extreme ſeverity ſhe meditated. The more mildneſs ſhe affected, the more the Achaians ſhewed inſolence. Dicus and Critolaus were then the Chiefs of the League; and Polybius repreſents them to us as two worthleſs men, whoſe Empire was abſolute over all thoſe Citizens, who were either diſhonoured by the depravity of their morals, or reduced by their ill conduct to ſuch a penury,

penury, as to have nothing to loſe in caſe of a revolution. Theſe two Demagogues perſuaded the Achaians, that this affected gentleneſs of the Romans was the effect of fear; that, occupied with a third war againſt a Nation ſo powerful as the Carthaginians, they had firſt endeavoured to impoſe on Greece by a pompous embaſſy: but that, this method not proving ſucceſsful, they had appointed a ſecond commiſſion, whoſe conduct evinced clearly, that they did not dare to provoke new enemies, and even repented of having weakened by their tyranny the Empire which they had uſurped over Greece. *Since Rome trembles*, ſaid theſe men, *this is the moment of reſiſtance: we muſt either renounce for ever our liberty, or avail ourſelves of this opportunity to confirm and ſtrengthen it.* Theſe ſentiments glided into every heart, and the ſecond Deputies were equally unſucceſsful with the firſt.

Metellus, who commanded in Macedon, did every thing in his power to diſſipate the miſt that blinded the Achaians, and bring them

them back to their duty; but all his efforts proving fruitleſs, he ordered his Legions to march. The Achaians, on their ſide, had prepared for war: the two armies came to an engagement in Locrida, in which the Romans were conquerors. But notwithſtanding the great check their antagoniſts received on that day, they did not yet deſpair of their ſafety. Critolaus was ſlain; Dicus, his colleague, aſſumed the command of the army, collected its vanquiſhed remains, and having armed even the ſlaves, thought himſelf in a ſtate of trying new hazards, and courting Fortune once more in the field.

Metellus, who continued his march towards Corinth, did not ceaſe to offer the Achaians freſh terms of peace, when the command of the Roman army devolved on Mummius. That Conſul, as renowned in Greece for the ruſticity of his manners, and his ignorance in the polite Arts* that captivated

* This illuſtrious Roman gave upon this occaſion a ſtriking proof of his diſintereſtedneſs, integrity, and great knowledge in the art of war; but at the ſame time ſhewed himſelf very deficient in point of taſte for the fine Arts; for we are told by Velleius Paterculus,

her,

her, as for his ferocious treatment of her inhabitants, obtained a compleat victory. The conſternation of the Achaians after the battle, was equal to the raſh confidence with which they had undertaken the war, and preſented themſelves to the combat.

It was natural to think, that thoſe who had eſcaped the Roman ſword, ſhould ſeek refuge in Corinth, and, by defending themſelves vigorouſly in a place of ſuch ſtrength, regarded as the key of Peloponneſus, ſhould try at length to obtain an honourable capitulation. The Achaian ſoldiery thought otherwiſe: they feared the proximity of their Victor, and fled in confuſion towards the interior parts of Peloponneſus; whilſt ſeveral of the Corinthians, ſeized with the ſame terror as the army, abandoned their own City. Mummius delivered it up to pillage; the Citizens who had remained in it were put to the ſword; women, girls, infants, all

that, to make thoſe employed to tranſport the Corinthian ſtatues and pictures to Rome more than ordinarily careful about ſo precious a truſt, he threatened, that if any of them were ſpoiled or miſſing, he would oblige the bearers to furniſh others at their own expence.

were

were ſold for ſlaves. The magnificent City of Corinth was reduced to aſhes, and the liberty of Greece buried under its ruins. The walls and fortifications of all the Cities engaged in the revolt were demoliſhed. The Popular Government was every where aboliſhed; and Greece, governed by a Prætor, became a Province of the Roman Empire, bearing the name of Province of Achaia.

Such was the fate of, perhaps, the moſt illuſtrious Nation of antiquity, whoſe reputation excited the jealouſy of the Romans themſelves. No ſociety ever preſented to reaſon a ſpectacle more noble and more ſublime than the Republick of Lacedæmon. For the ſpace of near ſix hundred years, the Laws of Lycurgus were obſerved with the moſt religious fidelity. What race of men, ſo attached to all kinds of virtues as the Spartans, ever exhibited to the world ſuch a ſucceſſion of glorious examples of moderation, patience, courage, temperance, equity, and the moſt exceſſive love of their country? In reading the hiſtory of that People, our ſoul

is

is elevated, and ſeems to expand beyond the narrow limits in which the degeneracy of the preſent age reſtrains our feeble virtues.

Whatever may be the ſentiment of one of the moſt judicious writers of antiquity, who ſeeks to diminiſh the glory of the Grecians, by ſaying that their hiſtory * receives its principal luſtre from the genius and art of the eminent men who have written it; can any one conſider the whole body of the Nation, without avowing that ſometimes it ſoars above the height allowed to the generality of mankind? The battles of Marathon, Thermopilæ, Salamin, Platæa, Mycale, the retreat of the ten thouſand, and ſo many other heroic actions performed within Greece itſelf, during the courſe of their inteſtine wars, are they not ſuperior to all the eulogiums of hiſtorians?

But one thing for which it deſerves our particular regard is, for having produced the

* Athenienſium res geſtæ, ſicuti ego exiſtimo, ſatis amplæ magnificæque fuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen quam famâ feruntur. Sed quia provenere ibi ſcriptorum magna ingenia, per terrarum orbem facta pro maximis celebrantur, ita eorum qui ea fecere virtus tanta habetur, quantum verbis eam potuere extollere præclara ingenia. *Sal. in conj. Cal.*

greateſt

greateſt men it is in the power of hiſtory ever to record; I do not except the Republick of Rome, whoſe Government, however, was ſo well calculated to elevate the minds, to excite talents, and expoſe them in their moſt brilliant point of view. Whom has Rome to compare with a Lycurgus, a Themiſtocles, an Epaminondas, &c.? One may ſay, that the grandeur of the Romans was the work of the whole Republick: no Citizen riſes ſuperior to the age he lives in, or to the wiſdom of Government, to ſtrike out new lights, and form it upon a new model. Each Roman is wiſe or great by the wiſdom and greatneſs of the Republick; he follows the beaten path, and the greateſt man amongſt them only advances a few paces beyond his compatriots. But in Greece, on the contrary, I often perceive ſome of thoſe vaſt, powerful, and creative geniuſes who reſiſt the torrent of cuſtom, provide for all the exigencies of the State, open to themſelves an unbeaten road to fame, and reading into futurity, take the lead of events.

Had

Had extraordinary talents and merit been leſs diffuſed among the Grecians, the part they acted might have been more conſiderable. Had one of the Republicks of Greece poſſeſſed alone the diſpoſitions that render a People lofty, courageous, powerful, ambitious, and fit to rule over their neighbours; Greece, being governed as Rome did govern Italy, would have had it in her power to form and execute as extenſive a plan of conqueſts as the Miſtreſs of the Univerſe. Several of her Cities, on the contrary, had inſtitutions wiſe enough to feel within themſelves that force and vigour which are the neceſſary concomitants of the deſire of domineering: jealous of each other, they employed all their attention to their domeſtick conteſts; they exhauſted and ruined at laſt one another; becauſe they had very near the ſame reſources, ſoldiers equally brave, and equally experienced Generals. The Romans conquered the world: but would they ever have emerged from their primitive obſcurity, if, at their beginning, they

they had met with ſuch opponents as Sparta or Athens?

In paſſing under the Roman Dominion, Greece ſtill preſerved a very honourable aſcendency over her conquerors. Her knowledge of the Arts, and her taſte for polite Literature, amply revenged the defeat of her arms, and in their turn ſubdued the pride of the Romans. The Victors became the diſciples of the vanquiſhed, and learned a language which Homer, Pindar, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demoſthenes, Plato and Euripides had embelliſhed with all the graces of their ſuperior wit. Orators, who had already attracted the attention of Rome by their eloquence, now ſought to obtain from Greece that refined and delicate taſte which ought to guide genius, thoſe ſecrets of the art, which give it a new ſtrength, and there went to form themſelves to the enchanting talent of embelliſhing every thing. In the Schools of Philoſophy, where the moſt diſtinguiſhed Citizens of Rome diveſted themſelves of their prejudices, they learned

learned to honour the Grecians; they brought back in their own country gratitude and admiration; and their Republick, by their advice, lightened the weight of bondage, feared to abuſe the rights of victory, and, by benefactions, diſtinguiſhed Greece from her other conquered Provinces. What a glory for Sciences, to have preſerved the country which cultivated them from misfortunes, which neither Legiſlators, Magiſtrates, or Generals, had been able to avert. They are fully revenged from the inſolent ſcorn of ignorance, and ſure to be ever reſpected, when they ſhall meet with as competent and as equitable judges of merit as were the Romans.

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